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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON MIGRATION 
 
ERKAN DUMAN 
Ph.D., Dissertation, July 2018 
Dissertation Supervisor: Prof. Abdurrahman B. Aydemir 
 
Keywords: remittances; child human capital accumulation; adult labor supply; migrant 
networks; location choice 
 
 
This dissertation includes two chapters. In the first chapter, we examine the impacts of 
remittances on various household outcomes including: child school attendance and child 
illiteracy, child labor, adult labor and household well-being. We use IV estimation technique to 
account for the endogeneity of remittances. We find evidence of a significant positive impact 
of remittances on school attendance of 6- to 19-years-old boys and of 6- to 14-years-old girls. 
Receiving remittances leads to a lower school retention for 15- to 19-years-old girls. Girls of 
ages 6-to-14 from recipient households are more likely to be literate. Children aged 15 to 19 in 
recipient households are significantly less likely to supply labor. Adult labor supply results are 
in favor of income effect hypothesis. Lastly, recipient households are shown to be relatively 
better-off with respect to welfare compared to non-recipients. In the second chapter, we 
estimate the determinants of 28-54-years-old male work migrants’ location choices among 67 
provinces of Turkey. The results show that internal migrants respond to differences in migrant 
networks, labor market and population attributes between locations while deciding on the 
migration destination. Distance from the source province is shown to be a significant deterrent 
of immigrant’s location choice. Migrants are drawn to cities in which their former compatriots 
are highly concentrated. Migrants are more likely to move to cities which have relatively better 
economic conditions as captured by lower unemployment rate and to cities with larger 
populations that has larger economic activity.  
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ÖZET 
 
GÖÇ ÜZERİNE MAKALELER 
 
ERKAN DUMAN 
Doktora Tezi, Temmuz 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman B. Aydemir 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: uluslararası para transferleri; çocuk beşeri sermaye birikimi; yetişkin 
emek arzı; göçmen ağları; yer seçimi 
 
 
Bu tez iki bölüm içermektedir. İlk bölümde, uluslararası para transferlerinin hanehalklarındaki 
çocukların okul devamsızlıkları, okur-yazar olma durumları, ve emek arzları; hanehalklarındaki 
yetişkinlerin emek arzları; hanehalklarının refah düzeyleri üzerine etkisi araştırılmaktadır. Para 
transferlerinin içselliğini hesaba katmak için araç değişken yöntemi kullanılmaktadır. 6-19 yaş 
grubu erkekler ve 6-14 yaş grubu kızların okul devam durumları üzerinde para transferlerinin 
pozitif manidar etkisine delil bulunmuştur. Para transferi almak 15-19 yaş grubu kızların okul 
devam ihtimallerini azaltmaktadır. Para transferi alan hanelerdeki 6-14 yaş grubu kızların, para 
transferi almayan hanelerdeki emsallerine kıyasla okur-yazar olma ihtimalleri daha yüksektir. 
Para transferi alan hanelerdeki 15-19 yaş grubu çocukların emek arz etme ihtimalleri daha 
düşüktür. Yetişkin emek arzı sonuçları gelir etkisi hipotezinin ağır bastığına delalet etmektedir. 
Son olarak, para transferi alan hanelerin almayan hanelere kıyasla refah düzeyi bakımından 
daha iyi durumda olduğu görülmüştür. İkinci bölümde, 28-54 yaş grubu iş amaçlı göç eden 
erkeklerin Türkiye’deki 67 il arasından yer seçimlerinin belirleyicilerini tahmin etmeye 
çalışıyoruz. Sonuçlar göstermektedir ki iç göçmenler yer seçimlerini yaparken illerin göçmen 
ağları, emek piyasaları ve popülasyon özellikleri farklarını göz önünde bulundurmaktadır. 
Kaynak ilden mesafenin iç göçmenlerin yer seçimleri önünde manidar bir engelleyici olduğu 
bulunmuştur. İç göçmenler hemşehrilerinin yoğun yaşadığı illere çekilmektedirler. İç 
göçmenler ekonomik bakımdan daha iyi konumda olan illere ve popülasyonları daha büyük 
olan illere göç etmeyi tercih etmektedirler.    
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1 THE IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES ON CHILD SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND 
ILLITERACY, CHILD LABOR, ADULT LABOR AND HOUSEHOLD 
WELL-BEING: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 With the increase in international migration all over the world, an economic actor paves 
its way to the stage as an important international financial flow to developing countries-namely, 
remittances. The beginning of the 1990s witnessed remittances gaining importance over other 
international financial flows (e.g., foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and official 
development assistance) to developing countries. Since the late 1990s, international migrants’ 
remittances have surpassed official development assistance and portfolio investment, and in the 
beginning of the 2000s, remittances have come very close to the total amount of foreign direct 
investment flows (Yang, 2011). In 2004, the estimated value of workers’ remittances to 
developing countries was $160 billion, with $40 billion going to Latin America (Acosta, 2006). 
In 2009 and 2010, remittances to developing countries were $325 billion and $307 billion in 
nominal terms, respectively (Yang, 2011). The average annual real growth rate of remittances 
in the period 1999-2008; the decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis, is worthwhile 
mentioning: while foreign direct investment and official development assistance had average 
annual real growth rates of 11.0 percent and 5.8 percent respectively in the corresponding 
period, remittances exceeded both with an average annual real growth rate of 12.9 percent 
(Yang, 2011).  
The excessive amounts of remittances sent to developing countries in the preceding 
decades and its continued growth has attracted attention of researchers. Motivations behind the 
decision to remit and development impact of remittances constitute the two broad areas on 
remittances in the literature. Studies focusing on the former one suggest a number of motives 
including altruism, exchange for the services provided to the migrant by recipients, insurance, 
loan repayment, and investment (Brown and Poirine, 1997; Docquier and Rapoport, 2006). Pure 
self-interest in the form of aspiration to receive inheritance can be added to the list as an 
important goal in remitting especially when the remittances are sent to the parents’ of the 
migrant and the inheritance is conditional on the behavior of the children (Lucas and Stark, 
1985).  
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Another set of papers study the uses of remittances and simply ask how remittances 
affect recipient countries or households. Studies trying to find causal linkages between 
remittances and economic performance at the country level are inconclusive. Faini (2007) finds 
a positive relationship between remittances and economic growth; however, others find no or a 
negative relationship (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jajah, 2003; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005).  
Studies using micro level data are partly motivated by the desire to understand 
remittance impacts in greater detail. In studies on household level impacts of remittances, 
choices made by the households with respect to the usage of remittances on consumption and/or 
investment expenditures are frequently observed. There is no widely accepted view on which 
of these two-alternative use of remittances is desirable. Yang (2011) states that it could be 
optimal to use remittances on consumption where households suffer from low income levels; 
whereas, it could be optimal to use remittances on productive investments for households that 
enjoy a sufficient or a higher wealth level and where productive investments would not have 
been achieved due to budget constraints without the extra income derived from remittances. 
Brown and Ahlburg (1999) conclude that increased income derived from remittances is used 
for higher levels of consumption in South Pacific island states. Yang (2008) shows that there is 
no correlation between an increase in remittances due to international migrants’ favorable 
exchange rate shocks and consumption expenditures of migrants’ origin households in 
Philippines. However, the exogenous increase in income leads to increased entry into capital 
intensive enterprises such as transportation and manufacturing by the migrants’ origin 
households in this context. 
 Investing in the human capital of children is stressed in the literature as an important 
aspect of investment decisions of remittance receiving households. A sizeable number of 
studies focuses on the impacts of migration and remittances on educational attainment of 
children. Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances reduce the school dropout hazard 
rates of 6 to 24 years old boys and girls in El Salvador. Acosta (2011), also in the case of El 
Salvador, finds on average null effect of receiving remittances on the likelihood of children 
between ages 10 and 18 attending school. When the differences by demographic groups are 
taken into account, girls between ages 10 and 18 from remittance receiving households are 
around 10% more likely to attend school compared to non-recipient counterparts, yet the null 
impact remains the same for boys between ages 10 and 18. Considering the differences by age 
groups, remittance receiving children between ages 15 and 18 seem to be less likely to attend 
school compared to non-recipient counterparts, whereas the evidence suggests no difference in 
school attendance with respect to remittance-receipt status of the household for children of ages 
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10 to 14. The former and the latter studies use consecutive waves of the nationally 
representative cross-sectional household survey for El Salvador (Encuesta de Hogares de 
Propositos Multiples—EHPM) for years 1997 and 1998, respectively. In addition to the 
differences in estimation samples, above studies also differ in that Cox-Edwards and Ureta 
(2003) do not address endogeneity of remittances. Yang (2008), in the case of Philippines, states 
that positive exchange rate shocks for international migrants lead to enhanced human capital 
accumulation in origin households. His results support the claim that remittances increase child 
school attendance and educational expenditure. He concludes that a positive exchange rate 
shock for international migrants is associated with an increase in school attendance rates of 10 
to 17 years old girls. However, there is no such causal relationship between positive exchange 
rate shocks and school attendance rates of 10 to 17 years old boys. Bansak and Chezum (2009) 
show that, in Nepal, remittances increase school attendance of young children (5 to 10 years 
old males and females) with the effect being larger for males. They also show that receiving 
remittances do not change the likelihood of school attendance of old children (11 to 16 years 
old males and females). Lopez Cordova (2005), in the case of Mexico, provides evidence that 
remittances decrease illiteracy rates of children aged 6-to-14, and increase school attendance 
rates of five years old children. However, the impact on school attendance is insignificant for 
6- to 14-years-old children and becomes negative for children between 15 and 17. Lopez 
Cordova (2005) doesn’t investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the impacts of remittances 
with respect to the gender of the child. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) tried to identify a causal 
linkage between child schooling and having a household member living abroad for the case of 
Mexico. Their results imply that 10- to 15-years-old girls whose mothers have less than 3 years 
of schooling benefit from the migration of a household member with regard to accumulating 
more years of schooling: additional 0.89 and 0.73 years of schooling for 10- to 12 and 13- to 
15-years-old girls, respectively. They also show that migration has a positive impact on the 
accumulated years of schooling for boys aged 10 to 12, but for this sample, the Sargan-Hansen 
test rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are exogenous to the estimation 
equation. Therefore, the results concerning boys aged 10 to 12 should be approached with 
caution.  Boys and girls aged 13 to 15 from migrant households where mothers have schooling 
between 3 and 12 years obtain less schooling compared to their non-migrant counterparts. In 
their study, years of schooling of the mother is used as a proxy for the wealth level of the 
household. Hence, they argue that migration, via relaxing the household budget constraint 
thanks to the remittances received, increase years of schooling attained for girls living in 
households with low income levels. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) investigate the overall 
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impact of migration on school attendance and the number of grade years completed for children 
aged 12 to 18 in rural Mexico. They find evidence of a negative significant effect of migration 
on school attendance and attainment. Their results show that living in a migrant household 
lowers the chances of boys completing junior high school and of boys and girls completing high 
school. Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Salcedo (2012), by exploiting the variation in the remittances—
due to 2008-2009 U.S. recession—that Mexican migrants’ origin households receive, find that 
a negative shock to the remittances is associated with a significant decrease in school attendance 
of 12 to 16 years old children left behind.      
 Outcomes related to child human capital accumulation is not restricted to child 
schooling only. Child labor is an outcome as important as child schooling with respect to child 
human capital investment decisions of households. Labor force participation of a child reduces 
the time available to spend on education. There is a consensus in the literature regarding the 
negative correlation between time spent on schooling and on labor for children. Hanson and 
Woodruff (2003) argues that in poor countries, while deciding on the schooling of the child, the 
main cost for the household is not the tuition, books, or uniforms but the foregone earnings of 
the child. Households which would not rely on their children’s wage labor are those that can 
maintain a satisfactory wealth level. In the light of these explanations, increasing educational 
attainment of children may come through decreasing their participation in labor force and this 
can be achieved by increasing the income level of households. As a priori guess, remittances 
by increasing household budget and relaxing liquidity constraints of households may serve this 
function. There is a large literature on how remittances affect child labor. Yang (2008) makes 
use of an exogenous variation in origin household’s income which results from exchange rate 
shocks to Filipino migrants and concludes that an increase in the size of the exchange rate shock 
is associated with a decline in total hours worked by 10 to 17 years old males, while there is no 
significant association between positive exchange rate shocks and total hours worked by 10 to 
17 years old girls. When the composition of the work done is considered, boys aged 10 to 17 
work fewer hours in unpaid family work, and work more hours in self-employment; however, 
the increase in hours worked in self-employment is not enough to cover the overall decrease in 
total hours worked for boys. An increase in the exchange rate shock is associated with a 
decrease in hours worked in unpaid family work for girls aged 10 to 17 but the impact is only 
marginally significant at 10% level. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), in the case of Mexico, 
investigate the reason of lower levels of school attendance and years of schooling accumulated 
for migrant families’ children and find as an explanation doing housework for girls between 
ages 16 and 18 and migrating themselves for boys at all age cohorts (12 to 15, and 16 to 18 
5 
 
years old). There isn’t a significant effect of having a migrant household member on 12 to 18 
years old boys’ likelihood of working as unpaid family workers or as wage earners. Their study 
reveals that girls between ages 16 and 18 lose on both dimensions—schooling and work 
experience—of human capital accumulation. In other words, 16 to 18 years old girls from 
recipient households have lower rates of school attendance and less work experience compared 
to 16 to 18 years old girls from non-recipient households. Acosta (2011), in El Salvador, finds 
on average that remittances decrease the likelihood of working for wage and increase the 
likelihood of working as non-wage laborer (i.e., doing unpaid family work) for children aged 
between 10 and 18. When the differences in genders are accounted for, girls aged between 10 
and 18 from recipient households seem to have lower chances of working for wage or working 
as non-wage laborer compared to their non-recipient counterparts. Boys aged between 10 and 
18 from migrant households are substituting wage labor with non-wage labor. Alcaraz, Chiquiar 
and Salcedo (2012) find a significant increase in child labor resulting from a decrease in 
remittance receipts for 12 to 16 years old children in Mexican migrants’ origin households. 
 A substantial part of the literature on the economic impacts of remittances is concerned 
with the linkage between remittances and labor force participation decisions of adults in origin 
households. Theoretically, the direction of the impact of remittances on adult labor force 
participation decisions is uncertain. If migrants’ earnings abroad are substantially higher than 
their corresponding domestic labor market earnings potential, then the remittances sent by the 
migrants may positively affect the household income. As any other source of non-labor income, 
remittances will increase the reservation wages of the non-migrants in the household. This 
income effect may direct non-migrants in the household to substitute labor with leisure: increase 
the likelihood of leaving the labor force or give them enough motives to stay out of it at all 
(Killingsworth, 1983). However, if the remittances are channeled to maintain existing 
household enterprises or to set up a new household enterprise, then there may be an increased 
demand for labor in the migrants’ origin households. This increased demand may reveal itself 
in two ways: i) by an increase in the labor supply of non-migrants in the household either by 
new entry to the labor market as non-wage (i.e., self-employed, employer, or unpaid family 
worker) or wage laborer; or by an increase in the working hours of non-migrants who already 
participate in the labor force; and ii) by substitution of non-wage labor for wage labor, or by a 
shift from a category of non-wage work to another category of non-wage work (from unpaid 
family work to self-employment or vice versa). Increased demand for the non-migrants’ labor 
may deduce from the necessity of replacing the absent migrant’s labor and/or income as well 
as from the productive use of remittances through financing household enterprises which 
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creates its own demand for additional manpower (Binzel and Assaad, 2011). Remittances, by 
creating opportunities to enter the labor force may give rise to earning own income, and as a 
result may benefit the non-migrant women in obtaining a higher bargaining power in the 
household. The empowerment of women in the household may have impacts on the child 
schooling and child labor decisions, may change the allocation of resources in favor of children; 
thus, benefit the child human capital accumulation. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the 
impacts of remittances on the labor force participation decisions of adults and especially of 
women. Binzel and Assaad (2011), find a significant increase, resulting from the migration of 
a male household member, in the likelihood of participating in the labor force and in the 
likelihood of working as non-wage laborer (self-employed, employer or unpaid family worker) 
for women aged 25-49 in rural Egypt. In the intensive margin, they could not find a significant 
impact of migration on the working hours of the women left behind. Acosta (2006), in El 
Salvador, finds a significant negative impact of receiving remittances on the labor force 
participation of women in the migrants’ origin households: women from remittance receiving 
households are 60 percentage points less likely to participate in labor market. Lokshin and 
Glinskaya (2009) examines the impact of male migration on prime-age women’s labor force 
participation rates in Nepal and finds that migration of a male household member reduces labor 
force participation rates of women by 5.3 percentage points. Mendola and Carletto (2009) 
accounting for remittances effect, find a significant negative impact of current migration 
experience on the probability of engaging in paid self-employment (of size 54%) and a 
significant positive impact on the probability of engaging in unpaid work (of size 32%) for 
Albanian women. There is no impact of migration experience in the household on Albanian 
men’s labor force participation decisions, though. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) by 
accounting for the endogeneity of remittance income, show that Mexican men reduce work 
hours in formal sector (i.e., wage and salary work with a contract) and in urban self-
employment, and increase work hours in informal sector (i.e., wage and salary work without a 
contract) due to an increase in the amount of remittances received. Thus, they argue that the 
disruptive effect of out-migration of a household member outweighs the income effect of 
remittances on labor supply behavior of males left behind—the forgone income or labor of the 
migrant, besides related migration costs, seems to be compensated by an increase in the labor 
supply of other male members of the household in informal sector. Increase in remittances is 
associated with a decrease both in unpaid family work and in informal work for Mexican 
women, suggesting dominance of income effect over disruptive effect of remittances. 
Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001), in Philippines, find that migration reduces labor market 
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participation of 15- to 64-year-old males and females. Nevertheless, their definition of labor 
market participation includes paid employment and self-employment but excludes unpaid 
family work, plus the endogeneity of migration is not addressed in their analysis. Cox-Edwards 
and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009), in Mexico, find that receiving persistent remittances do not 
affect labor supply behavior of either men or women of ages 12- to 65-year-old. They argue 
that the migrant sends back remittances to recover his pre-migration contribution to the 
household income and the amount of remittances sent is not large enough to alter the prices of 
labor to achieve a significant difference in non-migrants’ labor supply behavior between 
receiving and non-receiving households.          
 While a large fraction of the literature on the impacts of remittances is dedicated to 
human capital accumulation outcomes—child or adult—some focus on the impacts on 
household well-being. Adams (1998), in the case of rural Pakistan, is unable to find any 
significant impact of remittances on non-farm asset accumulations. Lopez Cordova (2005) 
shows that, in Mexico, receiving remittances decreases the chances of households suffering 
from poverty where poverty is defined as the household income being at most two times of the 
official minimum wage. However, remittances do not have a significant impact on extreme 
poverty where extreme poverty cutoff is set at the official minimum wage. Lopez Cordova 
(2005) argues that high costs associated with international migration is the main reason behind 
the finding of a zero impact of remittances on extreme poverty. Households suffering from high 
levels of poverty cannot afford to migrate and send remittances back home. His findings suggest 
that there is a lower boundary of income for a household to benefit from migration and 
remittances. Adams and Page (2003), on the other hand, analyze seventy-four countries and 
show that a 10 percent increase in the amount of remittances received decreases the share of 
people living under 1 dollar per day by 1.9 and 1.6 percentage points in low and middle-income 
countries, respectively.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next subsection provides information 
on migration history of Turkey with a special focus on the important role that remittances play 
on economic development. Section 1.2 presents the identification strategy, the empirical 
approach, and a thorough examination of the issues accompanying estimation of impacts of 
remittances on binary household outcomes. Section 1.3 describes the data and presents 
descriptive statistics before carrying on with the estimation results in Section 1.4. Finally, 
Section 1.5 concludes.   
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1.1.1 Migration and remittance history of Turkey 
 In the beginning of 1960s, Turkey was experiencing an unemployment rate of 10 percent 
and an additional underemployment over 15 percent (Icduygu, 2009). Turkish government 
borrowed heavily from other countries and had difficulties in paying its debts due to the foreign 
currency bottlenecks (Icduygu, 2009). At the same time, industrialized European countries were 
in serious need of manpower. In light of these developments, Turkey signed bilateral agreement 
with Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 that allowed emigration of workers from Turkey to 
Germany (Koc and Onan, 2004). This was the leading step for the mass emigration of Turkish 
workers to European countries. The main motivations for the Turkish government in promoting 
emigration were to reduce unemployment and gain foreign currency through remittances 
(Icduygu, 2009). 
 With the opening of the corridor of emigration in 1961, the number of workers going to 
Europe increased dramatically and peaked at 66,000 people in 1964 (Icduygu, 2009). Till the 
oil crisis of 1974, mass emigration to Europe continued. 1975 is the last year of observed mass 
emigration to Europe (Icduygu, 2009). The European countries were deeply affected from the 
oil crisis and they stopped accepting immigrant workers. Turkish government, then, tried to 
find new destination routes for its excess supply of labor. The new destination was set to be oil 
rich Arab countries. Immigrant workers in Arab countries were hired for a specified amount of 
time—till their assigned project ends—and they were not allowed to bring their families with 
them (Icduygu, 2005). Over the period of 1975-1980, more than 75,000 contracted workers had 
gone to the oil-exporting countries (Icduygu, 2009). However, by the mid-1990s, due to the 
completion of large-scale infrastructural projects most of the immigrant workers had to turn 
back to Turkey. 
 With the collapse of USSR in the 1990s, newly emerging countries started 
reconstruction programs and demanded labor. The mid-1990s experienced mass emigration to 
CIS countries (former Soviet Republic countries) with a total of 65,000 emigrants (Icduygu, 
2009). 
 In the early 2000s, while Turkey’s population was around 70 million, the emigrants had 
a total of about 3.5 million. The largest share of emigrants was residing in Europe, a total of 3 
million, followed by 300,000 emigrants in Australia, Canada and U.S. The next largest emigrant 
receiving region is CIS countries with a total of 150,000. Lastly, around 100,000 emigrants 
were present in Arab countries (Icduygu, 2005). International migrants constituted 5 percent of 
Turkey’s population. 
9 
 
 Between 30 to 40 percent of past emigrants permanently returned back to Turkey 
(Icduygu, 2005). Besides having 5 percent of the population as current emigrants, this implies 
that a nonnegligible portion of the population in Turkey has direct migration experience. In 
addition, emigrants don’t lose their contacts with the families left behind and many of them 
send remittances. A huge migration experience of this sort could potentially have some effects 
on home country’s economy and migrants’ origin households. 
The most striking impact of emigration on Turkey’s economy is through remittances. 
From 1960s to 2000s, accumulated value of remittances is $75 billion. In 1967, remittances 
amounted $93 million. In 1974, the corresponding figure was $1.4 billion and, in 1978 
remittances amounted $893 million. Between 1978 and 1988 average annual remittances 
amounted to 1.5-2 billion dollars. In 1980s, remittances amounted 65 percent of trade deficit 
and 2.5 percent of GNP. During late 1980s and early 1990s, average annual remittance receipt 
was about $3 billion with a peak of $3.4 billion in 1995 (Icduygu, 2009). In 1990s remittances 
amounted one third of the trade deficit and less than 2 percent of GNP. In late 2000s, remittances 
help to cover only around 2% of Turkey’s trade deficit. Obviously, it cannot be suggested that 
the decrease of remittance share of trade deficit and GNP is due to the decrease in annual 
remittance amounts. The decrease in the share of trade deficit and GNP can be explained with 
the growth of Turkish economy and lower contribution of remittances in the corresponding 
shares compared to the contributions from tourism, exporting and other income sources 
(Icduygu, 2005). It is an undeniable fact that remittances played a major role in financing the 
import bill of Turkey since 1960s. In addition to providing foreign currency through 
remittances, emigration also relieved the pressure on unemployment rates. Turkey had 
experienced an unemployment rate of 16.7% in 1986 and it is argued that the unemployment 
rate would have reached 23.2% in 1986 in the absence of labor emigration (Barisik et al., 1990). 
As a result, it can be argued that a successful policy was run in Turkey to overcome the foreign 
currency bottlenecks and to reduce unemployment.  
 Even though Turkey has an impressive migration history and has accumulated 
significant amounts of remittances, there are very few studies regarding the impacts of 
international migration and remittances in the context of Turkey.  
 There is a well-known migration study in Turkey; 1996 Turkish International Migration 
Survey (TIMS-96). Data was collected from 28 selected districts in 8 provinces of Turkey in 
1996 and was not representative at the national level. According to TIMS-96, 12 percent of 
households received remittances and 80 percent of remittance receiving households used 
remittances to improve their standard of living. In TIMS-96, there is also evidence for regional 
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differences in the amount of remittances received. It is found that households located in less 
developed regions are more likely to receive remittances than households in developed regions. 
Koc and Onan (2004), by using data from TIMS-96, find that remittances are basically used to 
satisfy consumption needs of origin households. This is a conflicting result with findings of 
Yang (2008) who shows that increased remittance income deriving from international migrants’ 
exchange rate shocks is not associated with any change in consumption of origin households in 
Philippines. Koc and Onan (2004) also show that remittance receiving households are better off 
than non-recipient households. This implies that remittances have a positive impact on 
household welfare. Day and Icduygu (1999) use data gathered from 234 individuals in Turkey 
during 1992-1993 and show that return migrants and their close relatives have higher 
consumption levels than non-migrants. Keles (1985) conclude that remittances do not work in 
the direction of reducing imbalances between regions of Turkey, but benefit the remittance 
receiving households via improving their standards of living. Atalik and Beeley (1993) find that 
remittances are used for investment in physical capital such as acquisition of land, and cars.  
 In the Turkish context, there are some studies on the determinants of remittances1, to 
the best of our knowledge, impacts of remittances on different aspects of human capital 
accumulation were not studied thoroughly. In addition, datasets that were used in prior studies 
on impacts of migration and remittances in the context of Turkey were not nationally 
representative which poses problems for the external validity of the estimates. This study, by 
implementing a nationally representative micro level dataset, aims to fill this gap and contribute 
to the literature by studying the impacts of remittances on child schooling, child illiteracy, child 
labor, adult labor force participation and household wellbeing in the context of Turkey. 
Furthermore, much attention has been paid to solve econometric problems associated with 
estimation of binary choice models with a binary endogenous variable.   
1.2 Identification Strategy and Estimation Methodologies 
1.2.1 Econometric Identification 
 Hoddinott (1994) states that migration decision is an outcome of a utility maximization 
problem of the household solved jointly by the prospective migrant and the other household 
members. Thus, the allocation of migrants and migrant earnings across households may not be 
random. The main empirical challenge in consistently estimating the causal impacts of 
remittances on schooling/labor outcomes is due to a possible correlation of households’ 
                                                          
1 Aydas et al. (2005), Köksal (2006), Van Dalen et al. (2005) 
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remitting behavior with unobserved determinants of outcomes. For instance, the education 
mobility literature presents evidence of a positive association between parents’ heritable 
schooling endowments and their children’s educational attainment2. In addition to this linkage 
between parents’ ability and their children’s schooling outcomes, if parents with higher 
heritable genetic ability find it more appealing to migrate and remit in order to finance their 
children’s schooling expenses, then a simple comparison of remittance receiving and non-
receiving families overestimates the impacts of remittances on child schooling. Hanson and 
Woodruff (2003) presents a different scenario: households which experience negative income 
shocks may decide to send a member abroad to cover the financial losses. Children in such 
households may need to reallocate their time favoring labor over schooling to compensate for 
the short-term income shortages resulting mainly from the unfavorable shock. A comparison of 
remittance receiving and non-receiving families, in that case, will understate the education gains 
from remitting. Therefore, the direction of endogeneity bias is uncertain. Moreover, reverse 
causality problem may arise if families consider migration and remittances as a leeway for 
funding their children’s education.  
 To solve the endogeneity problem of remittances, we implement an instrumental 
variable estimation strategy and follow McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) and a number of 
studies3 in using regional level historical migration rates as instruments. International migration 
incurs some substantial costs: monetary costs related with transportation, costs of acquiring 
information about the destination country, opportunity costs in terms of lost income while 
searching for jobs in the destination country, and psychic costs related with losing contact with 
parents, beloved ones, friends and relatives (Massey, 1988). Migration networks help lowering 
these costs by providing a prospective migrant information and help about ways to enter the 
destination country, finding job, accommodation and adapting to a new culture. Households 
with better access to migrant networks bear a lower cost of migration, and thus, are more likely 
to migrate and send remittances. Migration stocks become self-perpetuating via cost lowering 
impact of migrant networks, and thus, migration networks formed earlier affect migration 
decisions of households today (Munshi, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). Migration rates 
are argued to be good indicators of migration networks present in a village, municipality or a 
                                                          
2 Holmlund, Lindahl and Plug (2011), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) 
3 Hanson and Woodruff (2003), McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) all use historical migration 
rates as instruments to predict current migration stocks. Acosta (2011) uses historical migration rates as instruments for 
receiving remittances on the household side. Alcaraz et al. (2012) and Lopez Cordova (2005) use the placement of rail lines in 
Mexico in 1920 -the distance from municipality to the rail road plus the distance from the rail road to the US-Mexico border-, 
which mainly captures migration networks present in municipalities, to instrument current remittance receipts.   
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state (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). Consequently, historical migration rates may serve as 
instrumental variable for current migration decision of households and remittance receipts. The 
migration rate we use comes from the 1985 Turkey Census data and is calculated as the share 
of international migrants in a region’s population. The international migrants are defined as 
those Turkish citizens who had changed their residence country to Turkey from a host country 
during the previous five years. There are 26 regions in Turkey which are statistical agglomerates 
of provinces and each region consists of provinces which are similar in characteristics such as 
population, socioeconomic development, geography, per capita GDP, per capita output in 
industry, agricultural output, and urbanization rate4. We calculate historical regional migration 
rates by taking a weighted average of 1985 migration rates of provinces in a given region where 
a province’s weight is equivalent to the population share of that province in the region. 
 IV estimation relies on mainly two assumptions; migration networks should be strongly 
correlated with remittances, and migration networks should not affect potential outcomes other 
than their impact through remittances. These assumptions are known as existence of first stage 
and exclusion restriction of the instrument, respectively. Existence of first stage is argued to 
hold via cost lowering impacts of migration networks which induce continuing waves of 
migratory movements from a region and continuing remittance receipts in a region because of 
the sustained migration. Furthermore, existence of first stage could be confirmed through 
running a regression of remittance receipts on migration networks. Many studies successfully 
establish a strong correlation between migration networks and remittance receipts5. The 
challenging part is to justify the exclusion restriction of the instrument.  
There are some potential threats to the exclusion restriction; hence, to the validity of the 
instrument. Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) is one of the pioneers in forming the sociological 
linkage between migration networks and current migration flows. Studies thereafter make use 
of the instrument in predicting current migration and remittances. However, for migration 
networks to instrument remittances, one needs to assume that the only impact of migration 
networks on outcomes is through remittances. If there are other impacts of migration on 
outcomes that are distinct from remittances, then the error term will capture these impacts and 
migration network will eventually be correlated with the error term since migration networks 
are good predictors of migration (McKenzie, 2005). The literature presents evidence on 
migration having impacts different than and most likely conflicting with its most apparent 
                                                          
4 The regional classification used in the study is provided by TÜİK and is at NUTS-2 level.  
5 Acosta (2011), Alcaraz et al. (2012), Lopez Cordova (2005), Bansak and Chezum (2009), Cattaneo (2012) 
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impact; remittances. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) note that migration may disrupt the family 
structure and leave children in migrant households without a guardian or a role model. In 
addition, children may be forced to participate in labor market to compensate for the lost income 
of the migrant family member. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) state that children of migrant 
families are more likely to migrate than children of non-migrant families. If there are 
differences in returns to education in source and host countries, this may incentivize children 
of migrant families to substitute education with migration or vice versa. Trying to isolate the 
impact of remittances from other impacts of migration by means of instrumenting remittances 
with migration networks may lead the instrument to capture these other impacts of migration 
which is a violation of exclusion restriction (McKenzie, 2005). Thus, to estimate pure impact 
of remittances (income effect), one may need to account for other impacts of migration while 
instrumenting remittances with migration networks6, or try to find an instrument which predicts 
not only why one household is more likely to have a migrant member compared to an 
observationally similar household, but also why one migrant family sends more remittances 
compared to an observationally similar migrant family7. Hence, most of the studies that 
instrument remittances with migration networks are likely to estimate the combined impact of 
remittances and other impacts of migration8. In other words, they implicitly estimate the overall 
impact of migration. In this study, we acknowledge that the main interest is not to estimate pure 
monetary impacts of remittances, instead it is argued that the remittance receipt status is a good 
proxy for the migration experience of a household. In our data, among remittance receiving 
households 36.5% of them have either a missing male or a missing female spouse of the 
household head. Although, information about the migration experience of household members 
or information about the household members who are absent at the survey date are not available, 
we are inclined to think that the missing male or female spouse is the source of the remittances. 
This assumption, if true, may imply either a recent or a past migration experience for a 
household. Regarding this last point, 11% of remittance recipient households with a missing 
male spouse, receive remittances in the form of pension benefits only, and almost 90% of 
                                                          
6 Bansak and Chezum (2009), in the case of Nepal, account for the household disruption impact of migration by controlling for 
the number of adults living outside the household.  
7 Yang (2008), in the case of Philippines, induces exogenous variation in amount of remittances through exchange rate shocks 
which are argued to be randomly distributed over migrant households. Yang (2008) considers only the households with 
international migrants before the unexpected Asian financial crysis in 1997 and uses the change in the exhange rate as the 
treatment which is argued to be randomly distributed across migrants and shows that the elasticity of remittances with respect 
to exchange rate is 0.6.   
8 Bansak and Chezum (2009), Yang (2008) and Lopez Cordova (2005) differ from the rest of the studies as their identification 
strategies try to isolate the impacts of remittances from other consequences of migration.  
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female household heads in these households have either lost or divorced their spouses. The 
corresponding share of households with missing female spouses which receive remittances in 
form of pension benefits only is 37%, and 74% of the male household heads either have lost or 
divorced their spouses. These statistics lead us to imagine that either the spouses that we observe 
in the data or their counterparts had a past migration experience. For households with a missing 
male spouse which receive remittances in forms other than retirement pensions, 67% of the left 
behind female partners are married and 23% of them have a passed away spouse. This may 
suggest that the husbands or the husbands’ close relatives may provide the female household 
heads with remittances, even though there is no evidence to prove the latter. This observation, 
contrary to the preceding case, suggests a recent migration impact on the household and 
provides us with more confidence in assuming that the source of the remittance is the spouse 
living outside the house. Another channel to link remittances with the migration experience of 
household is through the observation that recipient households of pension benefits from a host 
country where both partners are at home constitute 27% of all remittance receiving households. 
This is an indicator for return migration within the household. In total, almost 64% of remittance 
receiving households can be linked to the source of the remittance, and hence, can be attributed 
with a possible migration experience. The rest of the recipient households may receive the 
remittances from other household members (e.g. children, or grandchildren), close relatives to 
the family, or friends albeit there is no way to confirm the source of the remittances in this case. 
Acosta (2011) uses cross sectional data from El Salvador and finds that nearly 30% of recipient 
households receive remittances from outside their circle of close relatives. Our data is in line 
with Acosta (2011) regarding the relationship of the remitter with the family left behind. Still, 
the descriptive evidence suggests a strong relation between remittances and households’ 
migration experience. 
Migration is defined in a variety of ways in the literature. Some use narrow definitions 
of migration9 which is good at unraveling the impacts of migration that may have occurred 
concurrently with the incidence of migration. Some use broader definitions of migration10. 
Migration may have long-lasting impacts, that is, the impacts may have been preserved for a 
long period of time. The change in household resources due to the migration of a household 
member six or more years ago may still affect the households’ schooling decisions for their 
children. The negative impacts of a household member’s migration six or more years ago, for 
                                                          
9 Hanson and Woodruff (2003), Lopez Cordova (2005) define migration as the change of residency within last 5 years from 
source country to a host country. 
10 McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) define migration as ever been to another country for work or other reasons.  
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example, might have forced children to leave the school when they were young and it is likely 
that these children will not be observed at school when they get older.  
This scenario bears an impact of migration at the extensive margin, and migration 
defined as change of residency within the last 5 years or having a current migrant member may 
be insufficient to reveal the impacts of migration at the extensive margin. Especially, when the 
interest is to find the impacts of migration on schooling and child labor, making use of the broad 
definition of ever migrating allows to estimate such persistent impacts. The remittance variable 
in our study, by the inclusion of households that receive remittances as retirement pensions 
besides in cash and in-kind, capture both past, recent and current migration experience of 
households, in other words, whether households have ever engaged in migration. To sum up, 
remittance receipt of households is argued to capture not only income effect of remittances but 
also other consequences of migration experience, and is used to estimate average impact of ever 
migrating on households. To be precise, IV methods estimate local average treatment effects; 
the effects on the group of compliers. These are the units that take the treatment when they are 
exposed to the instrument, and do not take the treatment when they are not exposed to the 
instrument. In our study, households that receive remittances when they have a large migrant 
network and do not receive remittances when they have a small migrant network comprise the 
complier group. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) show that these households come from the 
lower end of the wealth distribution as they cannot afford migration unless they have access to 
a large migration network that help reduce the migration costs hugely. This is a group worth 
investigating the impacts of migration because remittances may benefit them more compared 
to households that come from upper parts of the wealth distribution.        
Another threat for the validity of the instrument is that migration networks measured by 
regional migration rates in 1985 can predict outcomes through means other than remittances. 
This is possible, in particular, if there were regional characteristics that influence migration 
historically and persist to influence outcomes of interest today. Being unable to account for all 
possible channels distinct from remittances, through which migration networks may explain 
part of the variation in outcomes, results in violation of the exclusion restriction and renders the 
instrument invalid. The initial emigration to Europe from Turkey between 1961 and 1974, 
which helped creating migration routes that prospective migrants follow, was heavily organized 
by Turkish Employment Service (TES). Unless a specific worker is demanded by the employer 
in the host country, an individual had to apply to a local TES office located mostly at city centers 
and register his name in a waiting list. Whenever a job position opens, it was offered to the 
relevant candidate in the waiting list by TES (İçduygu, 1991). Back then, the Turkish 
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government desired mass flows of emigration to Europe in order to reduce unemployment, gain 
foreign exchange earnings through remittances, and provide grounds for development projects 
for the underdeveloped regions of the country. With regard to the last point, emigrants from 
relatively poor regions of the country and from regions of natural disasters were prioritized by 
TES to migrate at once (Abadan-Unat, 2006). Day and İçduygu (1997) comment on the 
relationship between socioeconomic development of regions and emigration in Turkey, and 
show that when the regions get poorer emigration increases, but when socioeconomic 
development falls below a certain level, emigration levels start to decline as well. It can be 
considered within this context that in 1960s and 1970s, some poorest cities in less developed 
Eastern Anatolia region never achieved to become significant emigration sources whereas, 
relatively poor cities like Denizli, Afyon and Yozgat from more developed Western and Central 
Anatolia regions were the main sources of emigration to Europe (Ayhan et al. 2000). 
Apparently, the creation of migrant networks was influenced partly by regional disparities in 
development levels, and it is implausible to assume that migration networks are distributed 
randomly across regions. If historical inequality in development levels, besides helping 
determine the migration networks, also continue to influence schooling and labor today then it 
is necessary to account for historical levels of inequality to preserve the validity of the 
instrument. Historical schooling differences between regions may also pose problems for the 
exogeneity of the instrument. If historical schooling levels vary accordingly with migrant 
networks and have impacts on current schooling levels (i.e., through intergenerational 
transmission of schooling), then not addressing this channel would invalidate the instrument. It 
is likely to observe a relation between historical schooling levels and historical migration 
networks as schooling levels are good predictors for level of development in a region, and it is 
shown that historically high emigration regions are less developed (Ayhan et al. 2000). To 
account for historical schooling and historical inequality levels, we control for regional 
measures from around the same time period as our instrument: length of road per 1 km2 by 
region in 1980, the share of length of asphalt roads in total length of roads by region in 198511, 
the interaction between these two variables, development index values from 197312, school 
                                                          
11 The information necessary to create road related variables is acquired from General Directorate of Highways Maintenance 
Division. 
12 DİE (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü) 1973: 72-5. DİE estimates the development index for each province considering the 
following indicators: proportion of urban population, literacy rate, number of high school and university graduates, paid income 
tax per capita, number of hospital beds per 100,000 persons, number of persons per radio, length of road per 1 km2, average 
number of workers per workplace, per capita added value, per capita industrial added value, proportion of agricultural workers 
in total workforce, and share of industrial laborers in total workforce. We take a weighted average of provinces’ index values 
with respect to their population shares in the region (1970 Census is used to gather the information on provinces’ populations). 
The higher the index value the higher the development level is. The index value for the country is standardized at 1. 
17 
 
attendance rates for males and females aged between 6 and 10 by region in 1985, number of 
schools per 1,000 children aged between 6 and 16 by region in 198513.  
Turkish government aimed to increase the standard of living for citizens residing in 
relatively poor regions or natural disaster areas by giving them priority in migration and 
facilitating their move; however, the only interest of the government was not the welfare of the 
emigrant households. Turkish government also considered migration and remittances as a 
means of speeding up the development process of underdeveloped regions, and in order to 
achieve this goal tried to channel migrants’ earnings to employment generating activities in less 
developed regions via the installation of three development programs in 1970s (Keleş, 1985; 
Martin, 1991). Firstly, Worker’s Joint Stock Companies were founded to foster the development 
in less developed regions and hence, reduce regional disparities. Migrants’ remittances and non-
migrant households’ contribution in migrant sending regions were the main two sources of 
financing these institutions. The investments made by these institutions would benefit returning 
migrants in finding jobs and serve as a tool to develop regions of origin. Secondly, Turkish 
government initiated the establishment of Village Development Cooperatives in mostly poor 
regions of the country, and remittances served as one of the main funding through which Village 
Development Cooperatives operate. These Cooperatives had a nonnegligible impact on the 
development of various migrant sending regions; as an example, Boğazlıyan, which is a town 
of Yozgat and is one of the main migrant sending regions to Europe, experienced a rapid 
increase in the number of agricultural machineries from 300 in 1966 to 1,500 in 1975 thanks to 
investments made possible by migrants’ earnings (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976). Besides improving 
backward regions, these Cooperatives also offered migration possibilities to its members, since 
members of Village Development Cooperatives in poor regions had priority in migrating, and 
the huge increase in the number of Cooperatives from 2,000 in 1971 to almost 6,000 in 1974 
reveals the role of Cooperatives in easing migration (Abadan-Unat, 2006). It can be argued that 
there is a two-way relation between migration from and development of migrant sending 
regions: more migration might have accelerated development of the source regions for migrants 
through investments of government initiated development programs which as discussed mainly 
operate on migrant earnings, and these institutions besides contributing to the development 
process of emigrants’ source regions might have increased the stock of migrants from these 
regions via facilitating migration. Lastly, State Industry and Workers’ Investment Bank was 
                                                          
13 We benefit from National Education Statistics 1985-1986 which is published by DİE with regard to number of students 
enrolled and number of schools for related age categories, and for the total number of children in given age categories we make 
use of 1985 Turkey Census.  
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founded in 1975 to direct migrants’ earnings into establishment and development of various 
industries all around Turkey (İçduygu, 2009).  
The first two development programs were effective in developing migrant sending 
regions in need of extra funding to catch up with the development level of other parts of the 
country; however, the last program proved to be ineffective in developing the poor regions. 
These development programs suggest that flows of remittances might have generated new 
employment opportunitites and allowed infrastructural investments in migrant sending regions 
such as school facilities and health facilities which in turn, might have changed the income 
distribution and the incentives and capabilities for the households to invest in their children’s 
schooling today. Ayhan et al. (2000) argues that many migrant sending regions have better, 
more grounded, or more effective economies as a result of migration. To allow for the 
possibility of migration and remittances having differential impacts on development levels of 
regions, we control for gini of household income by region and school attendance rates for 
males and females aged 15 to 19 years old by region both measured as averages over the years 
2003 and 2011 (the years considered in this study). Furthermore, in labor market participation 
regressions we include other relevant controls that capture labor market characteristics of 
regions: share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree by region, share of 
men between 25 and 64 years old with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate 
for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural 
sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region, all calculated 
from the data as averages over the years 2003 and 2011. We apply Spearman rank correlation 
tests between our instrument and the regional controls to see whether our concern about the 
exogeneity of the instrument is valid. The results show some significant correlations: regions 
with high historical migration rates were more developed in 1973, have higher shares of asphalt 
roads in 1985, have higher school attendance for 6 to 10 years old boys and girls in 1985, have 
higher average school attendance for 15 to 19 years old girls, have higher share of men aged 
25-64 with above high school degree, and have lower share of men aged 15-64 working in 
agricultural sector. In addition to the regional characteristics we control for, we provide around 
20 years lag in our instrument to exempt from the concerns of the instrument predicting current 
economic conditions of regions and reverse causality. The first stage regression results are 
presented in Tables between 1-5 and 1-8, and show that the instrument has strong predictive 
power for households’ remittance receipt status even after controlling for numerous regional 
characteristics.  
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Migration networks may also directly affect outcomes of interest. The presence of 
migrant households in the neighborhood may change children’s attitudes towards schooling and 
labor. Although the presence of a migrant member in the household has more pronounced 
impacts on the children compared to the presence of migrants in the neighborhood, such an 
impact would threaten the validity of the instrument. Since the instrument is assumed to be 
exogenous conditional on covariates, to test the exogeneity assumption of our instrument, we 
use only the sample of non-receiving households and regress outcomes of interest (school 
attendance and labor participation of children, participation decisions of adults, and household 
well-being) on a dummy taking value 1 if the observation belongs to a high migration region in 
the past—regions that are above the median migration rate in 1985—in addition to regional 
controls and other individual and household level covariates that are relevant. The results are 
presented in Appendix Table A1, and provide further evidence on the exogeneity of the 
instrument14, and thus, the validity of the instrument.  
There is one last assumption to satisfy in an instrumental variable estimation; 
monotonicity. This assumption requires the population to be divided into three subgroups 
consisting of compliers, always-takers and never-takers. That is, population shouldn’t include 
defiers (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In our context, monotonicity assumption means that 
households that receive remittances when they have a small network should do so when they 
have a large network. Although testing monotonicity is not possible with the data in hand, it is 
a tenable assumption as migration incurs some substantial costs and households that can cover 
these costs and send remittances without relying heavily on migration networks could do so 
when they are to reside in regions with larger migrant networks. Under monotonicity 
assumption, the linear IV estimator (IV 2SLS) recovers local average treatment effect of 
remittances which is interpreted as the average treatment effect of remittances on the group of 
compliers by Imbens and Angrist (1994).      
                                                          
14 This indirect test of exogeneity is actually an empirical application of the exclusion restriction of the instrument explained 
by Abadie (2003: 234). The mathematical formulation is 𝑃(𝑌0𝑑 = 𝑌1𝑑|𝑋) = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 ∈ {0,1} where 𝑑 represents the treatment 
status, P is a probability function, X is a set of exogenous covariates, and 𝑌0𝑑, 𝑌1𝑑 are potential outcomes when not exposed to 
and exposed to the instrument, respectively. Within our context, whenever 𝑑 = 0 which corresponds to the case of non-
receiving households, this equality implies that having a large migration network—being in a region that is above the median 
migration rate in 1985—shouldn’t have any influence on outcomes of interest conditional on covariates. McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2011) employs the same strategy to check the exogeneity of their state level instrument. Abadie’s formulation 
suggests that having a large migration network shouldn’t affect outcomes for treated samples, too. Our experiments with 
remittance receiving samples yield insignificant impacts of being in a high migration region on outcomes which implies that 
having a household member engaged in migration activities is more influential compared to having a migrant in the 
neighborhood.   
20 
 
1.2.2 Other Estimation Issues 
This study tries to estimate binary choice models (i.e., school attendance, labor force 
participation) with binary endogenous regressor (i.e., receive remittances). The literature 
presents evidence on estimation of this sort of models mostly by means of linear instrumental 
variables (IV 2SLS) and maximum likelihood bivariate probit estimation methods (IV bivariate 
probit)15. There is no consensus on the preferred specification of the model: Angrist (1991, 
2001) stresses directly interpretable causal effects and robustness of linear instrumental 
variables to non-normality of error terms; while Altonji et al. (2005) argue that maximum 
likelihood bivariate probit provides more reliable coefficient estimates compared to linear IV 
estimation, and Bhattacharya et al. (2006) advocate that IV bivariate probit is slightly more 
robust to non-normality of error terms. Chiburis et al. (2011) extend the set of parameter values 
that were used in simulations by Angrist (1991) and Bhattacharya et al. (2006) and try to provide 
more insights into the best practice of action for estimating bivariate binary-choice models with 
an endogenous treatment. The findings of Chiburis et al. (2011) can be summarized as follows: 
(i) when treatment probabilities are low, for all values of outcome probabilities16 and even in 
samples with more than 10,000 observations, the confidence intervals of linear IV are much 
larger compared to confidence intervals of bivariate probit which may render hypothesis testing 
uninformative for linear IV estimation and in addition may explain some portion of the observed 
large differences between linear IV and maximum likelihood bivariate probit estimates in the 
literature; (ii) in general, confidence intervals of linear IV are too large and confidence intervals 
of IV bivariate probit are too narrow; (iii) when treatment probabilities are low and bivariate 
probit model is misspecified (i.e. when error distributions have excess skewness or excess 
kurtosis), bivariate probit estimates are severely biased and Wald tests based on bivariate probit 
estimates tend to reject a true null hypothesis too often; however, misspecification does not 
cause biased estimation of parameters in bivariate probit models with no covariates. The 
presence of covariates in the model accentuates the problem of large standard errors for linear 
IV. An important conclusion of Chiburis et al. (2011) is that bivariate probit is generally more 
efficient compared to linear IV especially when there are covariates in the model. Their study 
concludes with three main suggestions for researchers: (i) present both linear IV and bivariate 
probit estimates when there are covariates in the model and treatment probabilities are low; (ii) 
                                                          
15 Acosta (2006) implements linear IV estimation; Görlich, Toman, and Trebesch (2007) implements bivariate probit 
estimation; McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), and Acosta (2011) implement both types of estimation methods.   
16 The range for outcome probabilities is 0.1-0.9, and 0.1 chance of receiving treatment is defined as low treatment probability. 
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use bootstrapped standard errors and percentile based confidence intervals to improve over and 
undercoverage of linear IV and bivariate probit confidence intervals, unless the sample size is 
at least 10,000; (iii) and use Murphy’s score test (Murphy, 2007; Chiburis, 2010) to check the 
goodness-of-fit of bivariate probit model. In our data, the share of remittance receiving 
households is around 0.015; thus, the estimations are most likely to suffer from low probability 
of receiving treatment. Furthermore, Murphy’s score test presents evidence on departure from 
bivariate Gaussian distributed errors assumption in most of the estimations when IV bivariate 
probit is the preferred estimation method; hence, raises questions about the reliability of 
coefficient estimates from IV bivariate probit and statistical inference from linear IV estimation. 
Lastly, in some specifications17 linear IV estimates of local average treatment effect (LATE) 
are outside the unit interval; albeit, both average treatment effect (ATE) recovered from IV 
bivariate probit estimates and IV estimates of LATE must lie in interval [-1,1] (Chiburis et al., 
2011). This is an indication of linear IV estimation performing poorly when the treatment 
probabilities are low and outcome probabilities are high; an established result due to Altonji et 
al. (2005)18 and Chiburis et al. (2011). IV bivariate probit estimates of ATE, in contrast, stays 
in unit interval as IV bivariate probit fits a non-linear function through the data.  
Problems associated with parametric estimation methods for binary choice models with 
a dummy endogenous regressor direct our attention to semiparametric and nonparametric 
estimation methods. The literature presents various approaches for semiparametric estimation 
of binary choice models (see, Manski, 1975; Gallant and Nychka, 1987; Powell, Stock, and 
Stoker, 1989; Ichimura, 1993; Klein and Spady, 1993). This study benefits from the semi-
nonparametric approach of Gallant and Nychka (1987)—will be referred as SNP from now 
on—which was adapted by De Luca and Peracchi (2007) to estimate bivariate binary choice 
models19. SNP estimation applies Hermite polynomial expansions to approximate the unknown 
joint density of error terms20, and uses these approximations to derive pseudo log-likelihood 
function, and eventually, estimates the model parameters by maximizing the resulting pseudo 
log-likelihood function. A large class of densities can be approximated by this functional form 
                                                          
17 School attendance regressions for boys and girls aged 6-14 or 15-19. 
18 Altonji et al. (2005) show that linear IV estimation when applied to bivariate-binary choice problems perform well only in 
cases where binary groups have almost equal probability, within our context, proportion of students attending school is high, 
and the proportion of households receiving remittances is low.  
19 De Luca (2008) presents Stata routine for SNP estimation of univariate and bivariate binary choice models.  
20 For bivariate binary choice models, the unknown joint density of latent regression errors 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2) is aprroximated by 
Hermite polynomial expansion of the form: 𝑓∗(𝑢1, 𝑢2) =
1
𝜓𝑅
 𝜏𝑅(𝑢1, 𝑢2)
2 𝜙(𝑢1) 𝜙(𝑢2) where 𝜙(. ) is standard normal density 
function, and 𝜏𝑅(𝑢1, 𝑢2) = ∑ ∑ 𝜏ℎ𝑘𝑢1
ℎ𝑢2
𝑘𝑅2
𝑘=0
𝑅1
ℎ=0  is a polynomial in 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 of order 𝑅 = (𝑅1, 𝑅2), and 𝜓𝑅 ensures that 
𝑓∗(𝑢1, 𝑢2) is a proper density function. 
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which includes densities with arbitrary skewness and kurtosis (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). The 
main difference between bivariate probit and SNP estimation is the ability of SNP estimation 
to deal with a broader set of error distributions. Gallant and Nychka (1987) has shown that 
under weak distributional assumptions on error terms21, the pseudo maximum likelihood 
estimators for model parameters are √𝑛 consistent provided that the orders of the Hermite 
polynomial increase with sample size. SNP estimation can recover consistent parameter 
estimates whenever the bivariate standard normal distributed latent regression errors 
assumption of bivariate probit model cannot be satisfied; in other words, whenever the bivariate 
probit model is misspecified. Thus, SNP estimation can be considered as a direct extension of 
bivariate probit estimation. Although Gallant and Nychka (1987) do not provide distributional 
theory for SNP estimator, De Luca (2008) argues that for fixed orders 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 of the Hermite 
polynomial expansion statistical inference can be conducted as if the model was estimated 
parametrically. The underlying assumption is that the true joint density function of errors 
belongs to the class of densities that can be approximated by a Hermite polynomial expansion 
with orders 𝑅1 and 𝑅2. Hence, the selection of orders of the Hermite polynomial expansion 
becomes an important ingredient in the model specification. For error terms to have skewness 
and kurtosis different than that of a standard normal distribution, the values of the orders should 
satisfy 𝑅1 ≥ 2 or 𝑅2 ≥ 2. Likelihood ratio tests or model-selection criteria such as Akaike 
information criterion or Bayesian information criterion can be used to choose among possible 
values of 𝑅1 and 𝑅2. In this study, we test with values of orders 𝑅1 = 𝑅2= 3, or 4, and choose 
the model with the lowest value for model selection criteria and with lowest p-value of the Wald 
test for the instrument in the equation for the determination of remittance receipt (first stage 
equation). Monte Carlo simulations run by De Luca (2008) show that with large sample sizes 
(n=2,000) the efficiency losses of SNP estimator compared to bivariate probit estimator when 
there is no departure from bivariate Gaussianity assumption, are very small; in addition, the 
mean squared errors of the SNP estimates are very close to mean squared errors of bivariate 
probit estimates. However, when the errors have joint distributions other than bivariate 
Gaussian distribution and sample sizes are large, SNP estimator dominates bivariate probit 
estimator both in terms of efficiency and mean squared errors of the estimates. Although, De 
Luca (2008) shows that rejection rates of Wald tests for SNP estimates being equal to the true 
parameter value are lower than those of bivariate probit estimates when the bivariate probit 
                                                          
21 Error densities that exhibit violent oscillations, and error densities with too fat or too thin tails are shown to be outside the 
class of densities that can be approximated by Hermite polynomial expansions (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). 
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model is misspecified and the sample size is large, they are far from the nominal value of 5%. 
De Luca (2008), due to time constraints, only try orders 𝑅1 = 𝑅2= 4 for polynomial expansion 
and argues that this particular value of orders may not equip Hermite polynomial expansion the 
capability to approximate the true joint density of errors. This finding stresses the importance 
of making effort to choose correct values of polynomial orders in order to achieve reliable 
statistical inference. Moreover, De Luca (2008) argues that poor coverage rates of SNP 
estimator could be improved via implementing Huber-White sandwich estimator for standard 
error estimation.    
We estimate several binary choice models for school attendance of children aged 6-14 
and 15-19, illiteracy for 6-14 years old children, labor force participation of children aged 15-
19 and of adults aged 20-64, and household well-being, and present four different estimates, 
namely parametric non-IV estimates from probit models, parametric IV estimates from linear 
IV and IV bivariate probit models, and semiparametric IV estimates from SNP models.  
The binary choice models we estimate are of the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝛾 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝜂 + 𝑊𝑔
′𝜃 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔 
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 26 
(1) 
   
 
𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ = 𝜗 + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜁𝑀𝑔 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝛾𝑇 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝜂𝑇 + 𝑊𝑔
′𝜃𝑇 + 𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑔 
𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 = 1{𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ > 0} 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ = 𝜑 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜉𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝛾𝑌 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝜂𝑌 + 𝑊𝑔
′𝜃𝑌 + 𝑢𝑌𝑖𝑔 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 = 1{𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ > 0} 
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 26 
(2) 
 For the models described 𝑖 denotes individuals, 𝑗 denotes households, 𝑔 denotes regions, 
and 𝑡 denotes years. There are 26 regions, and each region 𝑔 has 𝑁𝑔 observations. The 
coefficients with a subscript 𝑡 estimate year fixed effects. 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 represents an outcome of interest 
(school attendance, labor force participation decision, etc.) from year 𝑡 for an individual 𝑖 
residing in household 𝑗 in region 𝑔. 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 takes value 1 if household 𝑗 in region 𝑔 from year 𝑡 
receives remittances, and 0 otherwise. 𝑀𝑔 corresponds to continuously distributed migration 
network variable, and is used to instrument the household’s remittance receipt status. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 is a 
vector of individual characteristics, 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔 is a vector of household characteristics, and 𝑊𝑔 is a 
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vector of regional controls that doesn’t vary across years, 𝑢(.) represents corresponding error 
terms.  
We use probit and IV 2SLS to estimate (1). IV 2SLS does not take into account the 
binary nature of the dependent variable, but addresses self-selection into treatment via 
instrumenting the remittance receipt status of households with migration networks. Probit 
estimation, on the other hand, takes into account the binary nature of the dependent variable, 
but cannot handle endogeneity of the remittance receipt. Probit estimates are presented to see 
whether self-selection of households into receiving treatment is a major issue.  
If the interest lies in modeling the joint probability of binary indicators 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 and 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔, a 
latent linear index model as in (2) can be implemented. 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗  and 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗  are unobserved latent 
variables, and the association between observable binary indicators and latent variables is 
through the rules 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 = 1{𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ > 0} and 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 = 1{𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗ > 0} where 1{. } is an indicator 
function taking value 1 if the statement inside the brackets is correct, and 0 otherwise. When 
latent regression errors 𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑔 and 𝑢𝑌𝑖𝑔 have bivariate standard normal distribution with zero 
means, unit variances and correlation coefficient ρ, model (2) is known as bivariate probit 
(Heckman, 1978). If, in addition, (𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑔, 𝑢𝑌𝑖𝑔) is independent of 𝑀𝑔, and 𝜁 > 0, then bivariate 
probit model can address self-selection of households into receiving remittances22. System of 
equations (2) corresponds to IV bivariate probit when the model is correctly specified. When 
bivariate Gaussian distribution assumption is not met, SNP model has been shown to perform 
better than IV bivariate probit model in consistent estimation of model parameters in system of 
equations (2) (De Luca, 2008).  
IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit models differ in the treatment effects they can estimate. 
IV 2SLS is only consistent in estimation of LATE; on the contrary, IV bivariate probit can 
recover consistent estimates of ATE, LATE and ATT23 (Chiburis et al., 2011). When ρ = 0—
that implies no self-selection into receiving treatment—, all treatment effects are equal, and IV 
                                                          
22 The independence between latent errors and the instrument is needed to satisfy the independence of the instrument from 
potential outcomes and potential treatment indicators; and 𝜁 > 0 is needed to satisfy the first stage assumption. Greene (1998) 
has shown that the endogeneity of 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔
∗  does not affect the form of the likelihood functions; and thus, bivariate probit models 
are capable of recovering consistent coefficient estimates and treatment effects.    
23 The coefficient estimate of remittances in IV 2SLS directly provides LATE. ATE of remittances can be derived from the 
coefficient estimates of IV bivariate probit model as follows: ∆̂𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼𝑉 𝐵𝑃=
1
𝑛
∑ [Φ(𝑛𝑖=1 ?̂? + ?̂?𝑡 + 𝜉 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝛾𝑌 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑌 + 𝑊𝑔
′𝜃𝑌) −
Φ(?̂? + ?̂?𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ 𝛾𝑌 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑌 + 𝑊𝑔
′𝜃𝑌)] where Φ(. ) is standard normal cumulative distribution function. Chiburis et al. 
(2011) has shown that ∆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼𝑉 2𝑆𝐿𝑆 and ∆𝐴𝑇𝐸
𝐼𝑉 𝐵𝑃 can be quite different when probability of treatment and probability of outcome are 
far from 
1
2
 -which is the case for most of our estimations-, and the difference in estimates increase with ρ. Average marginal 
effect of remittances estimated by Stata postestimation command “margins, dydx(.)” after bivariate probit estimation actually 
recovers the ATE of remittances on outcomes of interest.  
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2SLS and IV bivariate probit estimates are comparable. However, we argue that the 
endogeneity bias might arise due to unobserved characteristics of households that may influence 
both their remitting behavior and schooling of their children, labor force participation of left 
behind family members, etc. Hence, the correlation coefficient ρ is most likely not equal to zero 
which makes it difficult to compare estimates from IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit. 
In addition to consistent estimation of remittance impact we also put much effort to 
achieve reliable statistical inference via accurate estimation of standard errors. To account for 
the fact that instrumental variable varies only at regional level and the individuals in a region 
are prone to receive the same shocks, we implement cluster robust standard error estimation. 
The consistency of the cluster robust standard error estimation relies on two assumptions: i) the 
number of clusters goes to infinity, and ii) clusters are homogeneous for which a sufficient 
condition is that the number of observations, the error covariance matrices, and the covariate 
matrices are the same for each cluster24 (MacKinnon and Webb, 2017; Carter et al., 2017; Lee 
and Steigerwald, 2017). Cameron et al. (2008) has shown that when there are few clusters, 
cluster robust standard errors are downward biased and Wald tests based on cluster robust 
standard errors with standard normal critical values reject a true null hypothesis far too often25. 
Cameron and Miller (2015) suggest that few clusters may vary from less than 20 to less than 
50 in balanced clusters, and may even be more than 50 in unbalanced clusters26. Angrist and 
Pischke (2008) suggest 42 clusters as large enough to achieve accurate statistical inference with 
cluster robust variance estimator. On the other hand, MacKinnon and Webb (2017) based on 
their simulation results argue that for wildly unbalanced clusters even 100 clusters may not be 
                                                          
24 To elaborate on this point, let’s stack all observations in a cluster and write the model as 𝑌𝑔 =  𝑋𝑔𝛽 + 𝑢𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 where 
𝑌𝑔 and 𝑢𝑔 are 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1, 𝑋𝑔 is 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑘, β is a 𝑘 dimensional vector, and each cluster 𝑔 contains 𝑁𝑔 observations. Then, the 
accompanying cluster robust variance matrix estimator of ?̂? can be written as ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) =
(𝑋′𝑋)−1{∑ 𝑋𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑔?̂?𝑔
′ 𝑋𝑔}(𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝐺𝑔=1  where ?̂?𝑔 is the 𝑁𝑔 dimensional residual vector for cluster 𝑔. White (1984) proves that the 
Wald t statistic defined as 𝑤 =
𝑎′(?̂?−𝛽0)
√𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝑎′?̂?)
 under 𝐻0: 𝑎
′𝛽 = 𝑎′𝛽0 ,where 𝑎 is a 𝑘 dimensional selection vector with Euclidean 
norm ‖𝑎‖ = 1, and the cluster robust variance component is 𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝑎′?̂?), is distributed standard normal and ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) is 
consistent for 𝑉(?̂?) under three assumptions: 1) clusters are balanced -𝑁𝑔 does not vary over 𝑔-, 2) 𝐸(𝑋𝑔
′ 𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑔
′ 𝑋𝑔) does not 
vary over 𝑔 -an assumption also known as cluster homogeneity-, and 3) 𝐺 → ∞ as 𝑛 → ∞.    
25 The main issue is that for each cluster 𝑔 the 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑁𝑔 matrix ?̂?𝑔?̂?𝑔
′  is a poor estimate of the 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑁𝑔 error covariance matrix 
𝐸(𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑔
′ |𝑋𝑔). What makes ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) a reliable estimate for 𝑉(?̂?) is based on an averaging over the number of clusters -as is 
made apparent by the summation indices in the formula of ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?)-, and with few clusters this averaging proves to be 
inadequate: results in high mean squared error for the cluster robust variance estimator, and consequently affects the empirical 
size of the cluster robust Wald t test (Carter et al., 2017). If the number of clusters goes to infinity, then it is appropriate to use 
standard normal critical values to conduct hypothesis testing. When there are few clusters, the distribution of 𝑤 is unknown, 
and using standard normal distribution provides a poor approximation to the true distribution of Wald test statistic (Cameron 
and Miller, 2015). As an example, simulations run by Cameron et al. (2008) with 25 clusters suggest empirical test sizes that 
are almost two times of nominal size 0.05 when the Wald t statistic is based on cluster robust variance matrix estimate and is 
assumed to have standard normal distribution.     
26 Balanced clusters are of same size, and unbalanced clusters vary in the number of observations they have.  
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large enough for Wald tests to have right test sizes. Cameron et al. (2008) shows that unequal 
cluster sizes worsen the few clusters problem, and cluster robust standard error estimator, in 
that case, performs very poorly in terms of achieving empirical test sizes close to the nominal 
5% size (i.e., the rejection frequencies of the Wald test with nominal size 0.05 is 0.129 for 
balanced clusters and 0.183 for unbalanced clusters where the number of clusters is set to 10). 
Carter et al. (2017) allows both unequal cluster sizes and cluster heterogeneity, and proves that 
cluster robust variance matrix estimate of OLS estimator (?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 (?̂?) =
(𝑋′𝑋)−1{∑ 𝑋𝑔
′ ?̂?𝑔?̂?𝑔
′ 𝑋𝑔}(𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝐺𝑔=1  ) as defined in White (1984), is still consistent for 𝑉(?̂?); 
and the Wald t statistic is asymptotically standard normal distributed. The behavior of the 
cluster robust t test is governed by a measure of cluster heterogeneity which depends on three 
sample specific statistics: cluster sizes 𝑁𝑔, observed covariate matrix 𝑋𝑔, and error covariance 
matrix 𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑔
′ . Unless all clusters have the same number of observations, observed value of 
covariates, and error covariance matrix, assuming cluster homogeneity results in size distortion 
(Carter et al., 2017). The measure of cluster heterogeneity has been shown to reduce the actual 
number of clusters in order to produce effective number of clusters (𝐺∗), and Carter et al. (2017) 
finds that when the effective number of clusters is low, the cluster robust variance estimator is 
downward biased and rejection rates of cluster robust t tests exceed the nominal size 0.05. 
Unless effective number of clusters is large, Carter et al. (2017) suggests implementing critical 
values that are larger than standard normal critical values27. Their study implies incorporating 
student-𝑡(𝐺∗) critical values instead of standard normal critical values in hypothesis testing. 
MacKinnon and Webb (2017) run simulations allowing both the number of observations and 
covariates to vary across clusters, and show that tests based on 𝑡(𝐺 − 1) critical values28 
overreject and the rejection rates increase with the increase in either intra-cluster covariate 
correlation or intra-cluster error correlation, and tests based on 𝑡(𝐺∗ − 1) critical values greatly 
underreject and the rejection rates converge to zero when either intra-cluster covariate or error 
correlation converges to 1; and implementing 𝑡(𝐺∗) critical values in that case only slightly 
increases rejection rates. Their simulation results indicate that unequal cluster sizes and cluster 
heterogeneity render statistical inference with cluster robust standard errors unreliable: 𝑡(𝐺∗ −
1) critical values are too conservative and 𝑡(𝐺 − 1) critical values are not conservative enough. 
                                                          
27 Lee and Steigerwald (2017) revisit Carter et al. (2017) study, and suggest 25 effective clusters as large enough to incorporate 
asymptotic theory and carry on hypothesis testing with standard normal critical values. Whenever effective number of clusters 
is less than 25, mistakenly applying standard normal critical values leads cluster robust Wald t tests to overreject a true null 
hypothesis.     
28 G refers to the observed number of clusters. 
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MacKinnon and Webb (2017) suggest implementing wild cluster bootstrap to recover critical 
values that brings rejection rates of Wald t tests close to the nominal size 0.05. Cameron et al. 
(2008) tests various bootstrap and non-bootstrap methods in a simulation study with few 
clusters and finds that null hypothesis imposed wild cluster bootstrap t procedure provides 
asymptotic refinement and does best among alternative methods when the clusters are 
unbalanced. MacKinnon and Webb (2017), and Cameron et al. (2008) agree on the strength of 
wild cluster bootstrap in recovering nominal test size when clusters are few and heterogenous. 
Our data set contains 26 unbalanced clusters (i.e., 26 regions with varying number of 
observations). In addition, covariate values vary across clusters29; thus, even if the cluster 
heterogeneity would have been modest in our case, it supposedly decreases effective number 
of clusters below 25, and arise the need for incorporating methods that would recover more 
conservative critical values. We follow Donald and Lang (2007) and Bester et al. (2011) in 
using 𝑡(𝐺 − 1) critical values to conduct Wald tests—based on cluster robust standard errors—
for the remittance estimate being equal to zero. We additionally test with 𝑡(𝐺 − 2) critical 
values since Cameron et al. (2008) has shown that tests with 𝑡(𝐺 − 2) critical values improve 
rejection rates considerably. The degree of freedom adjustment refers to the constant and the 
clustered regressor of interest. Donald and Lang (2007) also propose using 𝑡(𝐺 − 𝐿) 
distribution if the model in consideration has 𝐿 explanatory variables that are invariant within 
cluster. In our study, to achieve the exogeneity of the instrument we make use of regional level 
covariates which are invariant within clusters; therefore, we follow their advice and perform 
tests with 𝑡(𝐺 − 𝐿) critical values30. It is obvious that critical values from student’s 𝑡 
distribution with varying degrees of freedom are larger than standard normal ones: with largest 
critical values obtained from 𝑡(𝐺 − 𝐿) distribution and smallest critical values obtained from 
𝑡(𝐺 − 1) distribution. Furthermore, we try to recover critical values larger than standard normal 
ones through null imposed wild cluster bootstrap t procedure31—will be referred as wild 
                                                          
29 Plus, tests with heteroskedastic probit model rejects in most cases equally correlated errors assumption and, thus warn us 
about the possibility of error covariance matrix 𝑢𝑔𝑢𝑔
′  varying across regions, too.  
30 For any Wald test with critical values from 𝑡 distribution with varying degrees of freedom, the symmetric p-value is presented.  
31 Consider a linear model with observations grouped in a cluster: 𝑌𝑔 =  𝑋𝑔𝛽 + 𝜀𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺, where 𝑌𝑔 and 𝜀𝑔 are 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1, 
𝑋𝑔 is  𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑘, the matrix 𝑋 has 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑁𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1  rows, β is a 𝑘 dimensional vector, and each cluster 𝑔 contains 𝑁𝑔 observations. 
We wish to test the null hypothesis that remittances have no impact on outcome. Without loss of generality, assume coefficient 
of remittances is 𝛽1, so the null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0. The cluster robust variance estimator of β̂ is ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) =
(𝑋′𝑋)−1{∑ 𝑋𝑔
′ 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂?
′ 𝑋𝑔}(𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝐺𝑔=1 . To implement null restricted wild cluster bootstrap t procedure do the following steps:  i) 
estimate the model above with OLS, and calculate cluster robust Wald t statistic (𝑡1) for 𝛽1 = 0, using the square root of the 
first diagonal entry of ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) as the denominator of 𝑡1. ii) Re-estimate the model by fixing the coefficient of remittances 
at 0 (e.g. imposing 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) in order to obtain restricted residuals 𝜀?̃? and restricted coefficient estimates ?̃?. iii) Using the 
bootstrap DGP as follows, for each bootstrap replication 𝐵, indexed by 𝑗, generate bootstrap dependent variables (𝑌𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗
)
𝑗=1
𝐵
:  
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bootstrap hereafter—. Since we apply linear instrumental variable estimation and it is suspected 
that intra-cluster error correlation exists in the model, we implement a modified version of wild 
bootstrap by Davidson and MacKinnon (2010)—wild restricted efficient residual bootstrap -
WRE—that can provide asymptotic refinement of a Wald test for the coefficient of the 
endogenous variable with a cluster robust variance estimator; that is to say, WRE yields 
asymptotically valid test for t statistic in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form 
under the assumption of strong instruments. WRE differentiates from wild bootstrap in three 
ways: firstly, linear IV consists of estimating structural and reduced-form equations; thus, there 
are two disturbances that need to be bootstrapped; secondly, the null is imposed on the 
endogenous variable’s coefficient in the structural equation; and lastly, the residuals from the 
reduced-form equation are augmented by the residuals from the restricted structural equation. 
To be more precise consider the two-equation model:    
 𝑌1𝑔 = 𝛽𝑌2𝑔 + 𝑍𝑔𝜃 + 𝑢1𝑔,    𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 (3) 
 𝑌2𝑔 = 𝑊𝑔𝛾 + 𝑢2𝑔,   𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 (4) 
Here 𝑌1𝑔 and 𝑌2𝑔 stand for endogenous variables of dimension 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1—𝑌2𝑔 is the instrumented 
remittance variable in our context—, 𝑍𝑔 is an 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑘 dimensional matrix of exogenous variables, 
𝑊𝑔 is an 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑙 dimensional matrix of exogenous instruments and 𝑙 = 𝑘 + 1 so that the system 
is just identified, 𝑢1𝑔 and 𝑢2𝑔 are 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1 matrices of disturbances. Equation (3) is a structural 
equation, and equation (4) is a reduced-form equation. The null hypothesis 𝛽 = 0 is imposed 
on the structural equation; hence, the restricted residuals from the structural equation (?̃?1𝑔) is 
obtained from a regression of 𝑌1 = (𝑌11
′  𝑌12
′  . . . 𝑌1𝐺
′ )′ on 𝑍 = (𝑍1
′  𝑍2
′  . . . 𝑍𝐺
′ )′ only. To obtain an 
efficient estimator of 𝛾 in equation (4), Davidson and MacKinnon (2010) suggest running the 
following regression:  
                                                          
𝑌𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗
=  𝑋𝑖𝑔?̃? + 𝜀?̃?𝑔𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
 where sequence of i.i.d random variables (𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
)
𝑗=1
𝐵
 is independent of (𝑌𝑖𝑔, 𝑋𝑖𝑔)𝑔=1
𝐺  with 𝐸(𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
) = 0 and 
𝐸 ([𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
]
2
) = 1, so that the product 𝜀?̃?𝑔𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
 preserves the form of heteroskedasticity found in the original error terms 𝜀𝑔. iv) For 
each bootstrap replication 𝑗, regress 𝑌∗𝑗 = ((𝑌1
∗𝑗
)
′
 (𝑌2
∗𝑗
)
′
 . . . (𝑌𝐺
∗𝑗
)
′
)′ on 𝑋 = (𝑋1
′  𝑋2
′ . . . 𝑋𝐺
′ )′ and calculate 𝑡1
∗𝑗
 using the square 
root of the first diagonal entry in ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) where bootstrap residuals from regressing 𝑌
∗𝑗 on 𝑋 replace OLS residuals in the 
summation ∑ 𝑋𝑔
′ 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂?
′ 𝑋𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 . v) Calculate symmetric p-value for the Wald t statistic 𝑡1, respectively as follows: ?̂?𝑠
∗ =
1
𝐵
∑ 𝐼(| 𝑡1
∗𝑗
| >𝐵𝑗=1 | 𝑡1|), and reject the null hypothesis when ?̂?𝑠
∗ < 𝛼, where 𝛼 is the size of the test. A key feature of wild 
bootstrap is that within a cluster, bootstrap errors of each observation depend on the same value of 𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
. Furthermore, unlike in 
nonparametric (pairs) bootstrap, wild bootstrap sets the covariate matrix 𝑋𝑔 fixed across bootstrap replications. Rademacher 
and Mammen distributions are the two most common choices for 𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
. Davidson and Flachaire (2008) suggest using 
Rademacher weights when the disturbances have symmetric distribution. When the disturbances have asymmetric distribution, 
incorporating Mammen weights offer a skewness correction. Rademacher distribution puts probability one half to values 1 and 
-1. Mammen random variable equals 
1−√5
2
 with probability 
√5+1
2√5
, and equals 
√5+1
2
 with probability 1 −
√5+1
2√5
. 
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 𝑌2 = 𝑊𝛾 + 𝜗𝑀𝑧𝑌1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 (5) 
Where 𝑌2 = (𝑌21
′  𝑌22
′  . . . 𝑌2𝐺
′ )′, 𝑊 = (𝑊1
′ 𝑊2
′ . . . 𝑊𝐺
′ )′, and 𝑀𝑧 is the annihilator matrix 
producing the restricted residuals (?̃?1𝑔) from the structural equation. 𝛾, and ?̂? are the coefficient 
estimates and the residuals in equation (5) that is augmented by ?̃?1𝑔 can be calculated as ?̃?2 =
𝑌2 − 𝑊𝛾 which is equal to the estimate of error from equation (5) plus ?̂?𝑀𝑧𝑌1.  
 ?̃?1𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗 =  ?̃?1𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 (6) 
 ?̃?2𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗 = 𝑊𝑖𝑔𝛾 + ?̃?2𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗 ,      𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁𝑔,        𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 (7) 
The bootstrap DGP uses equation (6) as the structural equation, and equation (7) as the reduced-
form equation. Since the true value of 𝜃 does not have an influence on the t statistic for 𝛽, we 
can omit 𝑍𝑖𝑔𝜃 in equation (6) (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2010). The bootstrap errors for any 
bootstrap replication 𝑗 are generated by 
 [
?̃?1𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗
?̃?2𝑖𝑔
∗𝑗 ] = [
?̃?1𝑖𝑔𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
?̃?2𝑖𝑔𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗] (8) 
Where 𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
 is a random variable independent of the data having either Rademacher or Mammen 
distribution as is in the wild bootstrap (see, e.g., Liu [1988], and Mammen [1993]). Davidson 
and Flachaire (2008) find out that whenever the residuals are not too asymmetrically distributed, 
it is better to use Rademacher distribution for the two-point random variable 𝑣𝑔
∗𝑗
. Since IV 
estimation yields usually biased estimates of 𝛽, IV t statistics can have greater probability of 
rejecting in one direction than in the other one—the t statistic may have a non-symmetric 
distribution (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2010). Thus, we also present equal-tail bootstrap p-
value of the Wald t statistic for 𝛽 = 0 32.  
 For nonlinear models, the wild bootstrap method is no longer available as nonlinear 
models lack conventional residuals (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Esarey and Menger, 2018). 
Kline and Santos (2012) develop a variant of wild bootstrap method—score cluster bootstrap—
that can be employed in nonlinear models including models estimated by maximum likelihood 
such as probit and bivariate probit. Within our context, wild bootstrap can be viewed as a means 
of generating bootstrap residuals that preserves between clusters independence of and intra-
cluster correlations of original error terms. Score cluster bootstrap, in accord with its name, 
generates bootstrap scores that preserve the heteroskedasticity present in the original scores 
(Kline and Santos, 2012). Score cluster bootstrap procedure includes: i) estimating the model 
                                                          
32 ?̂?𝑒𝑡
∗ = 2 min (
1
𝐵
∑ 𝐼(𝑡1
∗𝑗
<𝐵𝑗=1 𝑡1),
1
𝐵
∑ 𝐼(𝑡1
∗𝑗
>𝐵𝑗=1 𝑡1)), and the null hypothesis is rejected when ?̂?𝑒𝑡
∗ < 𝛼.   
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once and obtaining the restricted individual score contributions—the restriction consists of the 
null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 where 𝛽1 is the coefficient on remittances—; ii) bootstrapping the 
restricted score contributions by weighting all individual scores in a given cluster with the same 
Rademacher or Mammen weights; iii) using the perturbed scores at each replication to build a 
set of Wald statistics, and approximating the true distribution of the Wald statistic with the 
bootstrapped Wald statistic distribution. Kline and Santos (2012) run simulations with a probit 
model and varying number of clusters (e.g., 5, 10, 20, 50, 200) to obtain empirical test sizes for 
Wald statistic using both the unrestricted and restricted score cluster bootstrap. Their results 
show that the restricted score cluster bootstrap outperforms the unrestricted counterpart in 
samples with less than or equal to 50 clusters for the model with normally distributed regressor 
of interest, and performs comparably with the unrestricted score bootstrap in samples with 20 
or more clusters for the model with a heavily skewed regressor of interest, moreover, performs 
on par with pairs cluster bootstrap-t in large samples (samples with 50 or more clusters)33. For 
all sample sizes and for all probit models (with normally distributed or heavily skewed 
regressors), though, pairs cluster bootstrap-t performs moderately better than both restricted 
and unrestricted score cluster bootstrap and achieves to yield rejection rates close to nominal 
test size 0.05 34. Esarey and Menger (2018) simulation results with a probit model support 
findings of Kline and Santos (2012) on the performance of pairs cluster bootstrap-t. They find 
that pairs cluster bootstrap-t statistics have false positive rates near the nominal 0.05 value. For 
IV bivariate probit estimates of remittance coefficient, we present both symmetric and equal-
tail restricted score cluster bootstrap p-value35, and pairs cluster bootstrap-t p-value in addition 
to p-values from 𝑡(𝐺 − 1), 𝑡(𝐺 − 2), and 𝑡(𝐺 − 𝐿) with cluster robust standard errors in the 
                                                          
33 For the model 𝑌𝑔 =  𝑋𝑔𝛽 + 𝑢𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 where 𝑌𝑔 and 𝑢𝑔 are 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1, 𝑋𝑔 is 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑘, and 𝛽 is a 𝑘 dimensional vector of 
coefficients, pairs cluster bootstrap-t (percentile t bootstrap) procedure is implemented as follows: 1) For the original model, 
form the Wald t statistic 𝑤 =
(?̂?1−𝛽0)
𝑠𝑒(?̂?1)
 where the null hypothesis is 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽0 and 𝑠𝑒(?̂?1) is the cluster robust standard error 
of ?̂?1—without loss of generality 𝛽1 is the first row entry of parameter vector 𝛽—. 2) Draw with replacement G times from the 
original G clusters and form the bootstrap sample {(𝑌1
∗, 𝑋1
∗), (𝑌2
∗, 𝑋2
∗), . . . , (𝑌𝐺
∗, 𝑋𝐺
∗)} which consists of exactly G clusters, 
repeat this step B times. 3) Calculate the t statistic 𝑤𝑏
∗ =
(?̂?1,𝑏
∗ −?̂?1)
𝑠𝑒(?̂?1,𝑏
∗ )
 for the bth bootstrap replication by estimating the model using 
the bth bootstrap sample. ?̂?1,𝑏
∗  is the estimate of 𝛽1, and 𝑠𝑒(?̂?1,𝑏
∗ ) is the cluster robust standard error of the estimate of 𝛽1 from 
bth bootstrap replication, and Wald statistic is centered on the estimate of 𝛽1 from the original sample as the bootstrap considers 
the sample as the population. 4) Let 𝑤(1)
∗ , 𝑤(2)
∗ , . . ., 𝑤(𝐵)
∗  be an ascending ordering of bootstrap Wald t statistics which is argued 
to trace out the density of Wald test by replacing the normal approximation (Cameron and Miller, 2015). The symmetric p-
value of the Wald test is the proportion of times that |𝑤| < |𝑤𝑏
∗| for 𝑏 = 1,2, … , 𝐵, or in other words ?̂?𝑠
∗ =
1
𝐵
∑ 𝐼(| 𝑤𝑏
∗| >𝐵𝑗=1 | 𝑤|), and we reject the null when ?̂?𝑠
∗ < 𝛼. 
34 Rejection rates of pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure vary from 0.048 to 0.060 for a test size of 0.05. 
35 Each test is performed separately with both Rademacher and Mammen weights.  
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denominator of the t statistic36. When α is the size of the test, Davidson and MacKinnon (2010) 
advice 𝛼(𝐵 + 1) to be an integer where 𝐵 is the number of bootstrap replications. For wild 
restricted efficient residual bootstrap and score cluster bootstrap, we choose 𝛼 = 9,999; while 
for pairs cluster bootstrap-t we choose 𝛼 = 1,999 37. Since wild restricted efficient residual 
bootstrap runs linear regressions and score cluster bootstrap estimates the model only once, they 
took considerably less time compared to pairs cluster bootstrap-t in which the model is 
estimated repeatedly at each bootstrap replication.  
 Moulton (1986) approximates the difference between default OLS standard errors based 
on 𝑠2(𝑋′𝑋)−1 and cluster robust standard errors with unbalanced clusters for a regressor 
(without loss of generality let’s take kth regressor, in our case it is the remittances) by inflation 
factor 𝜏𝑘 ≅ √1 + 𝜌𝑥𝑘𝜌𝑢((
𝑉[𝑁𝑔]
?̅?𝑔
) + ?̅?𝑔 − 1) 
38. 𝜌𝑥𝑘  represents the within cluster correlation of 
kth regressor 𝑥𝑖𝑔𝑘, 𝜌𝑢 is a measure of the within cluster error correlation, ?̅?𝑔 is the average 
cluster size and 𝑉[𝑁𝑔] is the variance of cluster size with 𝑔 = 1, … , 𝐺. To decrease efficiency 
losses and to avoid degrading of the performance of Wald tests with 𝑡(. ) critical values, we 
restrict our estimation samples to include only the oldest observation in a household for the age 
category under consideration39 (e.g., 6-14, or 15-19). Allowing other household members to 
enter the sample will most likely increase within cluster regressor correlation (𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑥𝑖𝑔𝑘, 𝑥𝑗𝑔𝑘) 
for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) and within cluster error correlation as individuals in a household living in the same 
region have the same remittance receiving status and tend to receive the same unobserved 
shocks. We also want to intentionally minimize the difference between standard OLS standard 
errors and cluster robust standard errors for remittance coefficient estimate due to the fact that 
SNP estimation does not allow for cluster robust standard error estimation. Including more than 
one observation from households where possible would further increase the average cluster size 
as well as possibly increasing within cluster error and within cluster regressor correlation. This 
would result in hypothetically larger cluster robust standard errors for remittances that we 
couldn’t manage to estimate and consequently, in elevated concern for the reliability of 
                                                          
36 Wild restricted efficient residual bootstrap and score cluster bootstrap was implemented in Stata by boottest command by 
David Roodman. 
37 Cameron and Miller (2015) suggest 999 bootstrap replications as enough to trace out the true distribution of the Wald t 
statistic via wild cluster bootstrap or pairs cluster bootstrap-t. 
38 This approximation assumes equicorrelated errors within clusters: 𝐶𝑜𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑔, 𝑢𝑗𝑔) = 𝜌 for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and for each 𝑔, and number 
of clusters going to infinity. Cluster robust standard error of ?̂?𝑘 is approximately 𝜏𝑘 times larger than its standard OLS standard 
error.  
39 MacKinnon and Webb (2017) find out that the performance of Wald tests with t(G-1) critical values deteriorate with the 
increase in either within cluster regressor or within cluster error correlation.  
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statistical inference with the SNP estimation. For 6-14 years old girls, the average cluster size 
would have increased by 311 from a base level of 929 which is almost 33% increase in the 
average cluster size if the estimation samples would have contained sisters. For 6-14 years old 
boys, the increase in the average cluster size is 293 from a base level of 978 which is almost a 
30% increase if the estimation samples would have included brothers. The multipliers 𝜌𝑥𝑘 and 
𝜌𝑢 in Moulton’s correction formula would have increased too, which in total would have created 
an enormous difference between standard errors estimated with SNP model and standard errors 
that should have been estimated to account for intra-cluster dependency of observations40. It is 
possible to estimate cluster robust variance matrix of ?̂? within SNP estimation through pairs 
cluster bootstrap-se procedure41. Pairs cluster bootstrap-se variance estimates and traditional 
cluster robust variance estimates are asymptotically equivalent; however, around 400 bootstrap 
replications is suggested to achieve consistent estimation of 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?). However, due to time 
constraints this is infeasible42 (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
 Pooled cross-sectional nature of the data introduces the time dimension that may require 
the standard errors to be clustered besides region. If individuals receive shocks that are 
correlated within years but independent across years, then standard errors should account for 
that and be clustered both by regions and years. We assume that all individuals in a year receive 
the same shocks, and no event has occurred that we know of between 2003 and 2011 that 
influence individuals from a given year differently based on their characteristics such as the 
regions they live in, educational attainment they have, etc. Therefore, we include year fixed 
effects in our estimation models that absorb the within year clustering, and one-way clustering 
on regions suffice to have reliable inference (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
 Our results present coefficient estimates of remittances, and additionally for school 
attendance and labor supply estimations of children between 15-19 years of age present 
                                                          
40 Intuitively, when the data has a group structure, any new observation does not bring out a new piece of information as in the 
case of i.i.d observations. Including units that have correlated errors and correlated regressors with the pre-existing observations 
would have simply contributed to the impreciseness of the estimation.  
41 For the model 𝑌𝑔 =  𝑋𝑔𝛽 + 𝑢𝑔, 𝑔 = 1, . . . , 𝐺 where 𝑌𝑔 and 𝑢𝑔 are 𝑁𝑔𝑥 1, 𝑋𝑔 is 𝑁𝑔𝑥 𝑘, and 𝛽 is a 𝑘 dimensional vector of 
coefficients, pairs cluster bootstrap-se procedure is implemented as follows : (1) Resample the clusters with replacement G 
times from the original clusters and form G clusters {(𝑌1
∗, 𝑋1
∗), (𝑌2
∗, 𝑋2
∗), . . . , (𝑌𝐺
∗, 𝑋𝐺
∗)} (2) Repeat first step B times. (3) At 
each replication estimate β, for bth bootstrap sample the estimate of β is denoted by ?̂?𝑏. (4) use B estimates of β; ?̂?1, ?̂?2, . . . , ?̂?𝐵 
to estimate the variance matrix of estimates as ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡  (?̂?) =  
1
𝐵−1
∑ (𝐵𝑖=1 ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?)(?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?)
′ where ?̂? =  
1
𝐵
∑ ?̂?𝑖
𝐵
𝑖=1 , and 
cluster robust standard errors are obtained by taking the square root of the diagonal entries in ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟,𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡  (?̂?). It is important 
to have the bootstrap over the clusters and not over the individuals. Each bootstrap sample contains exactly G clusters where 
some of the clusters from the original data may not appear in the bootstrap resample and some other clusters may appear more 
than once.  
42 The semi-parametric estimation of the model is computationally demanding with each estimation of SNP model taking 
around 6 to 8 hours.  
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coefficient estimates of a dummy variable that captures whether a child is affected by the 
educational system reform that took place simultaneously across all regions in Turkey in 1997-
1998 education year. The coefficient estimates do not recover treatment effects except for IV 
2SLS, but points to the direction of the treatment effect—whether it has a positive or negative 
impact on outcome. Although SNP estimation is a direct extension of bivariate probit, IV 
bivariate probit and SNP coefficient estimates are not comparable due to a scale difference 
between variances of error terms43. There are two ways to take into account the differences in 
the scale of error terms: one is to compare the ratio of estimated coefficients by using Stata’s 
“nlcom” command, and the other is to compare estimates of marginal effects of remittances. 
We prefer the latter one and present average marginal effects of remittances from IV bivariate 
probit and SNP models in Table 1-25. 
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
1.3.1 Data and Sample Definition 
This paper uses data from cross-sectional household budget surveys, “Hanehalkı Bütçe 
Anketi” conducted by Turkey’s national statistical agency (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu). To 
construct the data, we pool nine waves of the household budget surveys including the years 
between 2003 and 2011. Each wave of the survey is representative at urban, rural and national 
levels. The surveys contain information on demographic characteristics in addition to 
socioeconomic indicators such as the last finished schooling level, current and previous 
employment status, earnings both in cash and in-kind, expenditures, and transfers received from 
abroad (remittances). The data set has 395,117 observations from 98,568 households. 
Concerning remittances, the survey questions include the amount of remittances 
received by household members in the last 12 months. Transfers from abroad to any household 
member consist of 3 categories: pension benefit, in-kind income, and cash receipts from 
spouses, friends, or relatives. If at least one member of a household reports receiving nonzero 
value of remittances of any sort, then the household is called a remittance receiving household. 
If none of the members of a household receives remittances, then the corresponding household 
is considered a non-receiving household. As explained in section 1.2.1, we include households 
that receive pension benefits from host countries to capture past migration experience. Even 
though the amount of remittances a household receives is reported in our data, for the reasons 
                                                          
43 Bivariate probit model assumes latent errors to have bivariate Gaussian distribution with zero means, unit variances and 
correlation coefficient ρ. SNP model does not require latent errors to have unit variances (De Luca, 2008).  
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explained in section 1.2.1 and for the possibility of having measurement errors in the amount 
of remittances due to households’ tendency in pooling income from labor and non-labor sources 
which results in recall bias when remittances are reported, we instead use an identifier for the 
remittance receipt status of a household. There are 1,529 households out of 98,568 that receives 
remittances in our data set. This corresponds to a share of 0.015. In other words, out of every 
1,000 households, 15 of them receive remittances. This ratio is considerably lower than the 
share of migrant households (0.22) in McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), the share of remittance 
receiving households (0.19) in Acosta (2011), and the proportion of migrant households (0.076) 
in Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009), and is the main reason for the linear 
instrumental variable estimation producing treatment effects and predicted outcomes out of the 
unit interval.  
The analysis regarding child human capital accumulation outcomes focuses on children 
between ages 6 and 19. The analyses are carried out separately for boys and girls. In addition, 
the age range is divided into two categories, ages between 6 and 14, and ages between 15 and 
19. The particular choice of age groups has intrinsic importance because in Turkey, primary 
and lower secondary education became mandatory with the 1997-1998 education year which 
covers the ages 6 and 14. Prior to the 1997 education reform, a student in Turkish education 
system followed the following successive steps: compulsory primary education (5 years), lower 
secondary education (3 years), upper secondary education (3 years), and higher education 
(university education). Turkey implemented an education system reform in 1997 which 
extended the duration of compulsory schooling from 5 to 8 years44 by combining and redefining 
primary and lower secondary education as compulsory schooling. This education reform took 
effect simultaneously in each part of the country. In addition, the education reform was 
unexpected in the sense that the date of the reform did not coincide with the macroeconomic 
developments in the country (Aydemir and Kırdar, 2015). The education reform affected 
children who at the end of 1996-1997 education year have finished grade 4 or lower, and forced 
them to stay in school till they graduate from lower secondary school. Children who have 
finished grade 5 at the end of 1996-1997 education year were not affected by the education 
reform. Children generally start school at 6 years old in Turkey; hence, those born in 1987 or 
later are affected by the education reform45 (Aydemir and Kırdar, 2015). In our data set, the 
                                                          
44 5.1.1961 tarih ve 222 Sayılı İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu 2.Maddesi. 
45 07.08.1992 Cuma tarihli 21308 Sayılı T.C. Resmi Gazete: For a given year, children who are going to be 72 months old at 
the end of December have the right to start school in that year. A child has to be at least 52
3
 years old in September to begin 
school in that year. So, a birth cohort always begins school at the same year. However, children who are physically undeveloped 
but are supposed to start school in a given year can delay starting school one year with the formal request of their parents. 
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birth year of an individual can be obtained by subtracting the reported age from the survey year. 
We create a dummy variable taking value one if a child is born in 1987 or later, and takes value 
zero otherwise. This variable is included in child human capital investment regressions and 
captures the impact of the education reform on schooling and labor supply of children aged 15- 
to 19-years-old. All children aged 6 to 14 in our sample are subject to the education reform. 
Thus, there is no variation in schooling attainment due to the different exposure to education 
reform for this age group. On the other hand, for children between ages 15 and 19 there is 
variation in the education reform dummy for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2003, children 
aged 15 and 16; in 2004, children aged 15, 16 and 17; in 2005, children aged 15, 16, 17, and 18 
were affected by the education reform. After 2005, all children aged 15 to 19 were supposed to 
comply with the education reform. Children between 15 and 19 years old generally go to high 
school in Turkey (upper secondary education). Therefore, by controlling for the education 
reform in child schooling regressions what we aim to capture is the spillover effect of the 
education reform to further one’s education beyond the lower secondary school. Aydemir and 
Kırdar (2015) show that the spillover effect for high school continuation is more pronounced 
for females than males. Aydemir and Kırdar (2015) also state that there is no spillover effect of 
the education reform for university education. Although it would have been nice to see whether 
findings of Aydemir and Kırdar (2015) hold in our sample on the spillover effect of the 
education reform for university education, we are unable to construct the education reform 
dummy for the years between 2007 and 2010 in which there is variation in education reform 
dummy of individuals aged 20 to 24 who are supposed to be attending university46.  
In principal, education services for primary and lower secondary education (grades 1 
through 8) are provided for free by the Ministry of National Education. It is expected to observe 
high rates of school attendance for both boys and girls between ages 6 and 14. Therefore, 
remittances are not expected to be a significant determinant of school attendance due to the free 
of charge provision of education services and its mandatory feature. Child labor which is an 
important aspect of human capital accumulation is observed in the data from the beginning of 
age 15. Below this age, there is no information about whether a child is in labor force or not. 
Since labor force participation of a child reduces the time available for schooling, child labor 
adversely affects school attendance. Moreover, upper secondary education is not obligatory in 
                                                          
Children born in 1987 (and later) can start school in 1993 (and afterwards) and have finished grade 4 (or lower) at the end of 
1996-1997 education year; hence were the subjects of the education reform.    
46 In our data, the age variable is reported seprately for each age only for years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2011, and for the 
remaining years it is reported in groups. 
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Turkey. Children have the freedom to leave school and take part in other activities, such as 
labor. For this specific age group, remittances may play an important role in keeping children 
out of work and in school, especially for children in low income families.  
The samples for child human capital accumulation outcomes are restricted to children 
who are sons or daughters of the household head47. This helps ensure that investigation of the 
impacts of remittances is on children for whom the parents and not someone else make 
decisions about the children’s schooling and labor force participation. Furthermore, from each 
given household with children between the ages 6 and 19, we take only the oldest child in the 
corresponding age category for the reasons explained in section 1.2.2. The resulting samples 
include 78,761 children between ages 6 and 19 from 50,137 households48.  
Following the practice in the literature we cover a broad interval of ages to estimate the 
impacts of remittances on adult labor force participation decisions49. Our analysis includes three 
age categories for men and women: 20-24, 24-49, and 50-64. Individuals between ages 20 and 
24 may still receive some education; and thus, we consider them as a separate group from prime-
age working individuals. Our second group consists of prime-age men and women50, and the 
last group includes elderly citizens. We again take the oldest individual in the corresponding 
age group in a household as the unit of observation for our analysis. Also, our setup selects the 
household head as the unit of observation for any age group if the household head is in the age 
interval under consideration. This is something desired as what we want to learn is the impact 
of remittances on employment patterns for individuals closely related to the household head—
either the household head or the spouse of the household head—instead of other relatives of the 
household head for whom the remittances may not have an influence on employment 
                                                          
47 There are 129 remittance receiving households where the household head is a grandparent of the children aged 6 to 19 
(extended families). These households do not include any child of the household head belonging to the corresponding age 
groups 6-14 and 15-19. We exclude children from these households in our regressions because it is not possible to identify 
their parents, and there is no way to learn about their parents’ background characteristics. Furthermore, including these 
households would most likely bring up sample selection issues as household budget surveys do not present information about 
households that have emigrated as a whole. Separate estimations for children living in extended families may provide more 
insights for the impacts of remittances; though, small sample sizes make it extremely difficult to estimate treatment effects (i.e., 
there are 11 remittance receiving households with a granddaughter aged 15 to 19, and the corresponding figure for non-recipient 
households is 638). 
48 One of the households have missing information about the remittance receipt status, and hence omitted from analysis yielding 
a sample size of 78,759 from 50,136 households.  
49 Acosta (2006) considers males and females aged 22 to 65; Binzel and Assaad (2011) restrict analysis to prime-age women 
aged 20 to 49; Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) include in their analysis men and women aged 12 to 65; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) restrict their sample to men and women between ages 16 and 64; Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009) 
investigate the impacts of male migration on left behind prime-age women with ages between 18 and 60.  
50 Since early retirement for individuals at the end of 40s is a possibility in Turkey, we do not consider ages 50 to 54 as a part 
of prime-age.  
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probabilities51. Household heads may have responsibilities different than the ones of the other 
family members such as satisfying the basic needs of the family by providing food, clothing 
and shelter, or looking after children and taking care of the chores, hence being a household 
head may have an influence on employment patterns. We control for being the household head 
by means of a dummy variable which takes the value one if the observation is the household 
head and zero otherwise52. The adult labor force participation regressions include 208,447 
observations from 92,894 households53.  
Lastly, to assess the impact of remittances on household well-being we implement 
definitions of poverty based on the distribution of households’ adult equivalent yearly 
disposable income and the distribution of households’ adult equivalent monthly expenditure 
amounts (both relative poverty definitions are by TÜİK), and international measures of poverty 
defined as households’ adult equivalent daily expenditure amounts of 1$, 2.15$, and 4.30$. The 
samples include 98,567 households. One of the households reports missing value for remittance 
receipt status and therefore is omitted from the analysis.  
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics  
We present four tables to summarize the key variables in our analysis. The first table 
presents the distribution of remittance receipts, amount remitted and corresponding shares of 
cash, in-kind and pension benefits in the amount remitted. According to our data, 1.37% of the 
population live in households that receive remittances. The likelihood for households to receive 
remittances increases with household income which may be rationalized by the hypothesis that 
sending a family member abroad and receiving remittances in return is costly, and liquidity 
constraints become less binding with the increase in income that makes high income families 
more able to finance migration of a member and more likely to receive remittances. Recipient 
households mostly reside in urban areas, and Central Anatolia accounts for the highest share of 
                                                          
51 33,6% of recipient households are female headed. Among recipient households with a missing male spouse all except one 
are female headed, and among remittance receiving households with a male head, 80% of the women included in our analysis 
are spouses of household head. For non-recipient households, 11% are female headed. For non-recipient households with a 
female head, our samples identify 78% of household heads, and for non-recipient households with a male head, our samples 
identify 89% of spouses of household heads. We exclude women aged 20 to 24 in calculating the corresponding shares as for 
remittance receiving households 71% of women (ages 20-24 years) live with their parents or grandparents, and since the impact 
of remittances on labor force participation may vary with the role in the household (spouse, child, etc.) we estimate separate 
regressions for women aged 20 to 24 who live with their parents.   
52 There is a significant difference between recipient and non-recipient households in the share of women household heads 
(ages 25-64 years). For recipient households 29% of women aged 25 to 64 are household heads, and for non-recipient 
households the corresponding share is 0,08. In labor force participation regressions of females, the household head and the 
receipt of remittances may be simultaneously determined. This may result in finding biased estimates for the coefficient of 
household head.   
53 One household with missing information about remittance receipt status is omitted from the analysis yielding a total of 
208,445 observations from 92,893 households. 
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recipient households among the seven geographical regions of Turkey. Central Anatolia, 
Marmara and Mediterranean, combined, account for more than 60% of recipient households. 
On average recipient households received remittances amounting 5,062 TL per adult per year54. 
Remitted amount increases monotonically with household income. There is a substantial 
difference in the average amount remitted for the richest quintile and the remaining four 
quintiles: the average amount remitted for the richest quintile is more than double the average 
amount remitted for the fourth quintile. Eastern part of the country, on average, receive less 
remittances compared to other parts of the country. Black Sea region, although accounting for 
the third smallest share of recipient households, receive on average the highest amount of 
remittances among all regions. The fourth column in Table 1-1 shows that the contribution of 
remittances in household income decreases as household income increases. However, the 
richest quintile breaks the pattern: the contribution of remittances is highest for the richest 
quintile. Our data suggests a channel for this observation. Column 6 of Table 1-1 points to an 
enormous difference in pension benefit share of remittances between the richest quintile and 
the remaining quintiles. In addition, the average pension benefit for the richest quintile is more 
than 4 times larger than the corresponding value for the fourth quintile. These combined with 
the number of foreign retirees for the richest quintile being more than double the corresponding 
number for the fourth quintile result in household income share of remittances for the richest 
quintile exceeding the contribution of remittances to household income in remaining quintiles. 
For recipient households, the average remittance share of household income is 41%; with cash 
receipts, retirement pensions and in-kind receipts constituting 63%, 28%, and 8% of 
remittances, respectively.  
Table 1-2 shows the main characteristics of households with children aged 6-19, and of 
the regions the children live in, plus the summary statistics of the children’s outcome variables, 
all categorized by the remittance receipt status55. Regarding the outcome variables, 6-19-years-
old boys in recipient households are more likely to attend school compared to their non-
recipient counterparts. The situation is the same for 6-19-years-old girls but the gap in average 
school attendance rates for recipient and non-recipient households is smaller compared to the 
corresponding difference in the male sample. A lower proportion of recipient boys and girls 
aged 6-14 are illiterate. 15-19-years-old girls from recipient households are less likely to take 
                                                          
54 To have comparable TL figures across households, we inflate prices to December 2011 using TÜİK’s consumer price index. 
To calculate adult equivalent household size, we use modified version of OECD’s equivalence scale which counts the first 
adult in the household as 1, the remaining members older than 14 as 0.5 and younger than 14 as 0.3. 
55 There are two restrictions for a child to be in the sample: he/she needs to be the child of the household head and needs to be 
the oldest child in the household in corresponding age groups: 6-14 or 15-19.  
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part in market labor force, and are less likely to work for wage or as unpaid family workers56. 
There is no variation in self-employment for recipient girls aged 15 to 19 which brings about 
some serious estimation problems in identifying the remittance impact on girls’ likelihood to 
be self-employed. A lower proportion of boys aged 15-19 from recipient households participate 
in labor force or work as unpaid family workers. On the other hand, the share of wage workers 
for 15-19-years-old boys is slightly larger for recipient households.  
Other differences concerning recipient and non-recipient 6-19-years-old children are 
associated with their household and region characteristics. As expected, recipient households 
have a smaller number of adult equivalent members57, fewer children aged 0-5 and 6-19, and 
fewer 20-64-years-old working age adults. Recipient households have a higher proportion of 
female household heads compared to non-recipient households with the difference in shares of 
female head coming close to 34 percentage points. On average, the adult equivalent yearly 
disposable income is almost 400 TL less for recipient households. Children from recipient 
households have parents with a lower educational attainment, measured by the last finished 
schooling level, which is consistent with the lower average income figures for recipient 
households. Another important difference in household characteristics is the higher share of 
rural settlement for recipient households58.  
Children from recipient households live in regions with a higher historical migration 
rate. This observation lays the ground for regional historical migration network to be a relevant 
instrument for households’ remittance recipient status. The evidence on regional characteristics 
suggest that recipient households are located in historically less developed regions. Gross 
enrollment ratios, both historically and contemporaneous, are equivalent for recipient and non-
recipient households. The shares of 25- to 64-years-old males in a region with varying 
educational attainment do not change much with respect to remittance receipt status of 
households. Lastly, recipient households are located in regions with a more pronounced 
agricultural employment rate for 15-64-years-old males, and with a higher unemployment ratio 
for 15-64-years-old males.  
Table 1-3 presents the summary statistics for the adult sample defined in section 1.3.1. 
With regard to labor force participation outcome variables, males from recipient households 
                                                          
56 The survey questions on employment patterns of individuals are aimed to bring about the main job done in the last 4 weeks 
prior to the interview.   
57 For children from recipient households 42% of them have a parent absent at the household at the survey date. For children 
from non-recipient households this share is only  6%.  
58 Settlements with population less than 20,000 are defined as rural, and settlements with population equal to or larger than 
20,001 are defined as urban.  
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regardless of their age and the kind of work in consideration have lower participation rate 
compared to their non-recipient counterparts. Only exception is the higher take up of unpaid 
family work by prime-age males from recipient households with the gap in unpaid family work 
shares reaching 1.5 percentage points. Even though deducing any kind of causality from this 
observation is not possible, it may still direct the attention to the income effect of remittances 
for the left behind male household members. 20-24-years-old and prime-age women from 
recipient households are less likely to work for wage and more likely to work as self-employed. 
In addition, 20-24-years-old females from recipient households have a higher share of non-
wage workers (i.e., females who are either self-employed or work as unpaid family worker) 
compared to their non-recipient counterparts. For elder women, the share of self-employed 
females is higher for recipient households. Hence, women from recipient households 
irrespective of their age are more frequently observed to be self-employed. Prime-age and elder 
females are less likely to participate in labor force whereas the situation is reversed for 20-24-
years old women. These observations about labor supply behaviors of females may suggest 
both an income effect of remittances and substitution effect of migration which results from the 
absence of the migrant member and from productive uses of remittances in household 
enterprises. Regarding individual characteristics, adults from recipient households appear to be 
less educated, less likely to be married and more likely to be household heads compared to 
adults from non-recipient households. Differences in adults’ household characteristics include; 
a higher share of rural settlement, better access to water services, a smaller adult equivalent 
household size, fewer children and adults for recipient households. Recipient households also 
have lower chance of including highly educated members. Recipient households are more likely 
to be located in regions with a higher historical migration prevalence. Though, these regions 
also appear to be historically less developed. Other regional characteristics do not vary much 
with the remittance receipt status of adults. 
Table 1-4 presents summary statistics for households categorized by remittance receipt 
status. Contrary to the earlier descriptive statistics, the unit of observation is households in 
Table 1-4. Regarding the main variable of interest, 1.55% of households receive remittances, 
and recipient households seem to be doing better with respect to household well-being measures 
compared to non-recipient households. A lower share of recipient households has per adult 
equivalent yearly disposable income below various proportions of the median of the per adult 
equivalent yearly disposable household income distribution. Moreover, a higher share of 
recipient households manages to be located relatively better in the per adult equivalent monthly 
household expenditure distribution. None of the recipient households and only 10 of the non-
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recipient households live under daily per adult equivalent 1$ cutoff which causes models 
regarding this dependent variable being inestimable. A higher proportion of recipient 
households has maximum educational attainment equal to junior high or below, and a lower 
proportion of recipient households has maximum educational attainment equal to high school 
or above. Household heads of recipient households appear to be older, less likely to be married, 
and more likely to be female. Recipient households appear to earn more income on yearly basis 
and spend more on monthly basis which is consistent with recipient households being better off 
with respect to poverty indicators. Recipient households have a lower number of adult 
equivalent members, fewer children (aged 6-19) and adults, better access to water services, a 
lower share of natural gas system ownership, and more chance of living in rural areas. 
Regarding the regional level variables, the pattern in earlier descriptive statistics preserves in 
Table 1-4: recipient households appear to live in regions with a higher historical migration rate, 
a lower historical development level, a more pronounced unemployment rate, and an agriculture 
dense sector.  
1.4 Results 
We begin this section by presenting results for the likelihood of receiving remittances. 
We run first stage regressions for samples of children aged 6-14 and 15-19; adults aged 20-24, 
25-49 and 50-64; and households. These samples constitute of the observations for which we 
aim to find the impact of remittances on various outcomes. For each age group, we run separate 
first stage regressions for males and females.  
Secondly, we estimate the impact of remittances on child human capital accumulation, 
child labor, adult labor force participation and household well-being, respectively. For each 
outcome, we present the coefficient estimate of remittances from parametric non-IV probit 
model, parametric IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit models, and semiparametric IV SNP model. 
The reason for reporting coefficient estimates rather than treatment effects is to address 
problems in accurate standard error estimation when the model errors are correlated within 
cluster and the number of clusters is few. We estimate both White heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors and cluster robust standard errors for remittances to gauge the importance of 
caring about the grouped nature of the observations. Since the data is grouped into 26 clusters, 
we pay much attention to recover nominal test sizes by applying various methods that have 
been shown to provide asymptotic refinement for Wald test (of remittance coefficient estimate 
being equal to zero) including: hypothesis testing with 𝑡(𝐺 − 1), 𝑡(𝐺 − 2), and 𝑡(𝐺 − 𝐿) 
critical values, wild bootstrap (wild restricted efficient residual bootstrap of Davidson and 
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MacKinnon [2010]) symmetric and equal-tail Wald test for IV 2SLS estimations (calculated 
with both Rademacher and Mammen weights), null restricted score bootstrap symmetric and 
equal-tail Wald test (calculated with both Rademacher and Mammen weights) for non-IV probit 
and IV bivariate probit regressions, plus pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure for IV bivariate 
probit regressions.  
Lastly, to be able to compare treatment effects from parametric non-IV probit, 
parametric IV bivariate probit, and semiparametric IV SNP models, we estimate average 
marginal effects of remittances. As mentioned before, estimates of average marginal effects are 
not affected by the scale difference in error variances and thus are comparable. Estimates of 
average marginal effects from these models correspond to estimates of average treatment effect 
of remittances. We report LATE of remittances from IV 2SLS models besides average marginal 
effects from nonlinear models to see the extent of change in the average effect of remittances 
for compliers and the entire population. 
1.4.1 Determinants of remittances 
We estimate both a linear probability model and a nonlinear probit specification for 
determinants of remittances; the latter is to account for the binary nature of the dependent 
variable. To assess the relevance of the continuously distributed instrument, we report: p-value 
of the Wald test for instrument’s coefficient estimate if the first stage regression is nonlinear; 
and effective F statistic (Olea and Pflueger, 2013) for the coefficient estimate of the instrument 
whenever the first stage is instead a linear probability model. Effective F statistic, by adjusting 
the first stage non-robust F statistic, accounts for violations of i.i.d model errors assumption 
through heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and/or clustering. Effective F statistic is 
equivalent to robust F statistic (a.k.a Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) in just identified 
2SLS and LIML models and differs in overidentified case. Cluster robust standard errors for 
coefficient estimates are reported in parenthesis. While estimating cluster robust standard 
errors, small sample modifications have been applied to reduce the downward bias in the 
standard errors resulting from finite number of clusters59.  
                                                          
59 The small sample correction includes multiplication of cluster specific residuals (𝜀?̂?) with a scalar equal to √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝐾
 in the 
formula for cluster robust variance estimator of ?̂?: ?̂?𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟  (?̂?) = (𝑋
′𝑋)−1{∑ 𝑋𝑔
′ 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂?
′ 𝑋𝑔}(𝑋
′𝑋)−1𝐺𝑔=1  where G is the number 
of clusters, N is the number of observations, and K is the number of regressors, and using t(G-1) distribution in calculating p-
values of Wald tests in linear models—we use ivreg2 command in Stata to run the first stage regression of IV 2SLS—. For 
probit models, as small sample correction Stata only inflates cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 and 
uses standard normal distribution in calculating p-values. The small sample modifications result in an increase both in standard 
errors and in p-values. 
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Table 1-5 presents first stage results (coefficient estimates) for samples of children 
between ages 6 and 19 years old. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating the 
remittance receipt status of the household that the child belongs to. To begin with, the first stage 
results from IV 2SLS and probit regressions of determinants of remittances are in line with 
respect to the direction and statistical significance of the impacts. The absence of information 
about the remittance sender which is likely to influence the decision to remit makes it difficult 
to attach causal interpretation to the estimates, i.e., the schooling outcomes of the household 
head may be correlated with the schooling outcomes of the sender, especially under assortative 
mating assumption and for households in which the head is the spouse of the sender. The first 
stage regressions are best interpreted as identifying variables for households that can explain 
selection into receiving remittances. The results suggest that, regardless of age and gender of 
the child, as the educational attainment of the parent increases, the likelihood for the household 
to receive remittances decreases which is consistent with high earnings potential for highly 
educated individuals reducing the need for a member to migrate and send remittances to support 
the family. Households with older heads are more likely to receive remittances, but this impact 
is insignificant for 6-14-years-old boys and the reverse of the relation is true for 6-14-years-old 
girls; although the estimates are only marginally significant for younger girls. Households with 
married heads have higher chances of receiving remittances. Ownership of natural gas system, 
which is considered as an attribute of the house, has opposing impacts for the likelihood of 
receiving remittances for younger and older boys. For the samples of older children, as the 
number of school age children (ages 6-19 years old) increases, the probability of receiving 
remittances for the households they belong to decreases. An increase in the number of working 
age males (ages 20-64 years old) in a household influences the incidence of remittance receipt 
adversely. An increase in the number of adult males may imply an increase in earnings potential 
for the family, which in return may decrease the need for the family to rely on remittances. An 
increase in the number of adult females, though increases the likelihood of receiving 
remittances for samples of 6-14-years old children. The increase in the number of adult females 
may increase the dependency ratio and may inflate the need to have higher income for which 
one of the channels may be to send a migrant and receive remittances in return. The region level 
estimates suggest that remittance receipts are more frequent in historically underdeveloped 
regions. As regions’ development levels and emigration frequencies were negatively correlated 
in the past (Ayhan et al., 2000) and the initial mass emigration from regions helped create the 
migrant networks that are predictive of current migration flows and remittance receipts, the 
historical regional development level variable is most likely to capture some part of the 
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variation in historical migration network. The collinearity between historical development 
levels and migrant networks, in return, may prevent precise estimation of the coefficient 
estimate of migrant networks in first stage regression, and eventually leads to a decrease in the 
predictive power of the instrument. In section 1.2.1, we argue that some other regional level 
covariates should also be controlled for in the structural and reduced-form equations to have a 
valid instrument. However, the inclusion of other regional level covariates in the first stage 
would further decrease the predictive power of the instrument (further decreases the effective 
F statistic of the instrument). Nevertheless, our first stage results show that except for one 
specification (15-19-years-old females) the instrument proves to be strong. Unemployment rate 
of a region is a significant determinant of remittance receipts with more unemployment 
inducing more occurrences of remittances. Share of men in a region working in agriculture is 
positively associated with the remittance receipts. Households from years 2008, 2009 and 2010 
are also more likely to receive remittances. Last two findings may suggest that as economic 
risks increase in an environment, remittances may serve the function of insurance mechanisms 
(Yang and Choi, 2005). The historical migration rate by region proves to be a relevant 
instrumental variable. The instrument is statistically significant with a large coefficient estimate 
at 1% level in probit models and effective F statistic for the instrument is above the Staiger and 
Stock (1997) rule of thumb critical value 10 except for 15-19-years-old girls sample. A 
widespread practice among researchers to test weak identification in linear IV models with non-
i.i.d errors is to present first stage robust F statistic and compare it to Staiger and Stock (1997), 
or Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. However, there is no theoretical or empirical 
justification for this exercise as Staiger and Stock (1997), and Stock and Yogo (2005) critical 
values are determined for the case of conditionally homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated 
errors60 (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007; Olea and Pflueger, 2013). Olea and Pflueger 
(2013), besides providing an alternative non-i.i.d robust pretest for weak instruments, also 
adjusts the critical values. Their rule of thumb critical value for 2SLS is equal to 23.1 for the 
null hypothesis that the Nagar (1959) bias of the 2SLS estimator is larger than 10% of the 
“worst-case” bias with a test size of 5%. To clarify this point, the “worst-case” bias corresponds 
                                                          
60 Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) point out that the use of Wald F statistic (robust F statistic) based on Kleibergen-Paap 
rk statistic as a robust alternative to Cragg-Donald F statistic has not been justified in the context of weak identification of IV 
model, and thus is not a formal test for weak identification. Yet, they argue that Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is superior 
to Cragg-Donald F statistic in the presence of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or clustering. They additionally suggest using 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic as a test for weak identification with Staiger and Stock (1997) critical value of 10 in models 
with non-i.i.d errors. Olea and Pflueger (2013), by showing that both non-robust and robust F statistics may yield high values 
even when instruments are weak, provide grounds for the warnings that Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007) express regarding 
the usage of Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic as a pretest for weak identification. 
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to the bias in the 2SLS estimator when instruments are completely weak and an effective F 
statistic of order 23.1 or higher leads to rejection of the null at 5% significance level and 
eventually one can conclude that the instruments are strong in the sense that the bias of the 
2SLS estimator is no more than 10% of the “worst-case” benchmark. With respect to Olea and 
Pflueger’s (2013) weak instrument pretest methodology, the instrument proves to be strong for 
the sample of children between ages 6 and 14, and for sample of boys aged 15 to 19 as the 
corresponding effective F statistics are larger than 23.1. For sample of girls aged 15 to 19, the 
instrument may be weak and the bias resulting from weak instrumental variable identification 
may push 2SLS estimates towards OLS estimates (Bound et al., 1995). We offer two solutions 
to this problem. Even though the best remedy is to find additional instruments that satisfy strong 
identification, it is extremely difficult to apply this method in our case. Albeit, we present 
Anderson-Rubin (1949) test for the coefficient estimate of the endogenous regressor in IV 2SLS 
estimation which is a weak instrument robust test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
estimate of the endogenous regressor equals to zero in the structural equation. Plus, we test with 
parametric and semiparametric IV models by excluding region level covariates that capture the 
labor market characteristics including share of men aged 20 to 64 with high school and above 
high school degree, unemployment rates for males of ages 15-64, share of men aged 15-64 
working in agriculture and the share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector. Omitting 
labor market determinants for samples of 15-19-years-old girls results in effective F statistic for 
the instrument of order 11.89 which in turn leads to a strong instrument by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) critical value, or by Olea and Pflueger (2013) critical value if one is willing to tolerate 
a bias for the 2SLS estimator that is up to approximately 30% of the worst-case bias. We try to 
assess whether the endogenous variable is sensitive to the exclusion of the labor market 
characteristics from both the structural and the reduced form equations. By the help of this test, 
we will also be able to see whether the instrument affects the outcome through labor market 
characteristics in addition to its influence through remittances. Lastly, experimenting with 
different IV estimators may help lessen the bias that is brought about by 2SLS estimator61. One 
such estimator is LIML estimator which is known to be more robust to weak instruments—has 
lower bias and lower mean squared error—compared to 2SLS. Fuller’s modified LIML is an 
alternative k-class estimator which has better finite-sample performance under weak 
instruments compared to 2SLS but neither LIML nor Fuller’s LIML are robust to deviations 
                                                          
61 Different estimators have differing power in detecting treatment effects under weak instruments. 2SLS is one of the least 
robust estimators for weak instruments. It has been shown that critical values for weak-instruments test are larger for 2SLS 
compared to alternative estimators (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007; Olea and Pflueger, 2013).  
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from i.i.d disturbances (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). One last alternative considered is 
the “continuously updated” GMM estimator (CUE) of Hansen, Heaton and Yaron (1996) which 
is a GMM generalization of LIML estimator to the case of non-i.i.d errors. CUE uses numerical 
optimization methods to derive coefficient estimates and we couldn’t achieve convergence for 
the models with suspected weak identification problem. Therefore, we couldn’t make use of the 
LIML, Fuller’s LIML or CUE estimators. One last point about pretests which try to assess the 
strength of the instrument is that both robust F statistic and effective F statistic could be applied 
to test weak instruments in the context of linear IV models only. The first stage of a linear IV 
model consists of a linear probability model but the underlying relation between the endogenous 
variable and the included and excluded exogenous regressors may be better explained by a 
nonlinear fit to the data, and this may produce different power schemes for the same instrument 
in linear and nonlinear IV models. Actually, the relevance of an instrument is established based 
on results from two tests. Firstly, for an exactly identified model, the coefficient estimate of the 
instrument in the regression of the endogenous variable on exogenous variables (included and 
excluded ones) should prove to be statistically different than zero. This is the test for 
underidentification of the model. A sufficiently small p-value for the instrument leads to 
rejection of the null that the model is underidentified. This step helps to establish a significant 
nonzero correlation between the endogenous regressor and the excluded instrument. However, 
having an adequately identified model is not sufficient to obtain correct inference. That being 
said, having an instrument that is uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor results in the IV 
estimator to have a bias that is equivalent to the bias of the OLS estimator and a larger mean 
squared error. Plus, the IV estimator becomes inconsistent (Hahn and Hausman, 2002; Baum, 
Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). After establishing a significant nonzero correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the instrument, the second step involves determining the size of the 
correlation. A coefficient estimate for the instrument that is close to zero but statistically 
significant in the regression of the endogenous variable on the exogenous regressors implies a 
weak correlation between the endogenous variable and the instrument. In that case, similar 
serious bias problems arise with IV GMM and 2SLS models (Bound et al., 1995; Baum, 
Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). Cragg-Donald F statistic and its robust counterparts are used to 
test for weak identification of linear IV models. As pretests for weak identification do not exist 
for nonlinear models such as IV bivariate probit and (IV) SNP, by analogy to the linear case, 
we check the p-value of the instrument in the regression of the endogenous variable on 
exogenous regressors and the size of the coefficient estimate of the instrument. A low p-value 
and a large coefficient estimate are considered to indicate a strong instrument in our nonlinear 
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regressions. Most of our nonlinear specifications do reveal a strong identification based on the 
above definition of a weak instrument.    
Table 1-6 and Table 1-7 present the estimates of the determinants of remittance receipt 
for samples of adult males and females (aged 20-64), respectively. The dependent variable is a 
dummy indicating whether an adult lives in a recipient household. For males, a systematic 
difference with respect to educational attainment on the likelihood of living in a recipient 
household seems to occur only for prime-age group. For this age group, educational attainment 
is negatively associated with the likelihood of being in a recipient household (the omitted base 
category is being illiterate). For males over 25 years of age being the household head decreases 
the chances of receiving remittances for their households. This finding may be due to the 
relationship between the sender and receiver of remittances. Most of the remittance receiving 
households with a missing spouse constitute of female headed households which implies a 
negative association between the presence of a male household head and remittance receipt. For 
20-24-years-old males being married is negatively associated with living in a recipient 
household. 85% of 20-24-years-old males still live with their parents. 18% of 20-24-years-old 
males are married with only 1% of married 20-24-years-olds report receiving remittances. Since 
a high fraction of recipient males aged 20 to 24 live with their parents, a better comparison 
group for them is non-recipient males of same age who live with their parents. Therefore, we 
experiment with both the unrestricted and restricted sample of 20 to 24 years old males to assess 
the impact of remittances on their labor supply behaviors. The highest level of educational 
attainment of household members do not seem to influence the likelihood of receiving 
remittances. A better infrastructure of the household seems to increase the probability of 
receiving remittances. Living in rural areas is positively associated with remittance receipt only 
for 20-24-years-old males. The number of children aged 0 to 5 and of school aged females have 
a negative influence on the likelihood of being in a recipient household. Number of adult males 
and females have remarkably similar impacts on receiving remittances as in the first stage 
regressions for samples of children.  Households in historically underdeveloped regions appear 
to be more likely to receive remittances. For 20-24-years-old males, the income inequality in a 
region is positively associated with the probability of receiving remittances. Share of men aged 
25-64 in a region with above high school education has a negative impact on a household’s 
chances of receiving remittances. A high fraction of men with above high school education may 
reflect the economic prosperity of the region and abundance of employment opportunities for 
young individuals which may result in a reduced demand for foreign earnings. Unemployment 
rate is again a significant determinant of remittance receipt. Share of men in agriculture and 
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share of men in private sector have positive impacts on remittance receipt for 50-64-years-old 
and 20-24-years-old males, respectively. The global recession in 2008 seems to manifest its 
impact on households’ remitting behavior beginning in year 2008 and lasting till the end of 
2010. The evidence presented in Table 1-6 suggests that concerns of weak identification are not 
likely to be a major issue. The instrument is always statistically significant at 1% level with a 
large coefficient estimate and the effective F statistic is over 10; only slightly less than the 
threshold level for elderly males. With respect to Olea and Pflueger (2013) critical values, the 
instrument is strong in the sense that the maximal bias of the 2SLS estimator is no more than 
5% of the worst-case benchmark for young males, and is no more than 20% of the worst-case 
benchmark for prime-age males. For elderly males, Olea and Pflueger (2013) methodology 
provides evidence for weak identification of the model. 
 The first stage results for adult females are presented in Table 1-7. On contrary to first 
stage regression results of adult males, highest level of educational attainment in the household 
matters especially for women over 50 years of age. The impacts of older women’s own 
educational attainment and the highest level of educational attainment of household members 
counteract on the likelihood of living in a recipient household. Prime-age women are less likely 
to live in a recipient household if they have more than high school education. This is reasonable 
as earnings potential is higher for highly educated individuals and an increase in household 
income would be accompanied with a decrease in the need for foreign earnings to support the 
household. The opposite holds for 20-24-years-old women. The results suggest that households 
with female heads are more likely to be recipients. Married females are more likely to reside in 
recipient households except for women of ages 20-24. Almost 55% of recipient women of ages 
20-24 live with their parents which makes non-recipient women of same age who live with their 
parents a better comparison group for them. As is with the male sample of ages 20-24, we test 
the impact of remittances for women of ages 20-24 both with and without restricting them to 
live with their parents. Number of preschool children and of school age females negatively 
affects the remittance receipts for prime-age women. The estimates of coefficients on number 
of adult males and females are on par with the corresponding results from the regressions of 
adult males. The signs of the region level covariates that capture the economic conditions of 
regions in the past seem to support the hypothesis of Ayhan et al. (2000); although most of the 
estimates are not statistically significant. The unemployment rate and year dummies have 
similar impacts as in the preceding cases on the likelihood of living in a recipient household 
with a more pronounced statistical significance for the year 2009. The effective F statistic and 
p-value of the Wald test for the historical migration rate provides evidence on the strength of 
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the instrument and confidence in the identification strategy when weak-instruments tests are 
based on Staiger and Stock (1997) critical values. With respect to Olea and Pflueger (2013) 
critical values, the effective F statistic is large enough to reject the null of 2SLS bias being no 
more than approximately 20% of the worst-case benchmark for prime-age and elderly women. 
For younger females, the instrument does not appear to be strong in the sense that the null of 
2SLS estimator bias exceeding 30% of the worst-case benchmark cannot be rejected.    
 Table 1-8 presents estimates of determinants of remittances for households. The 
dependent variable is a binary capturing the remittance receipt status of a household. 
Households with medium level of educational attainment for the member with highest 
schooling outcome are more likely to receive remittances compared to households with all 
members illiterate. This result is in line with migration incurring significant costs and 
households with very low educational levels (low earnings potential) being unable to afford to 
migrate and receive remittances in return. Age of the household head only slightly matters for 
households with older heads. A better infrastructure of the household is associated with higher 
chance of receiving remittances. Number of preschool children has a negative influence on the 
probability of receiving remittances. Number of male adults and female adults have impacts 
that are comparable to the preceding cases. Unemployment rate of a region and year fixed 
effects for 2008, 2009, and 2010 are statistically significant determinants of remittance receipt. 
The instrument is statistically significant at 1% level with a large coefficient estimate and with 
an effective F statistic of order 16 which is considered to be large enough for strong 
identification. For all samples, the first stage results of the instrumental variable suggest that 
households which are located in historically high emigrating regions are more likely to receive 
remittances. 
1.4.2 Main Results  
1.4.2.1 Child human capital investment decisions 
In this section, we try to assess whether receiving remittances alters household spending 
on child human capital accumulation. We use school attendance and literacy of children as a 
means to measure investments on child human capital by their families. The focus is on children 
between ages 6-14 and 15-19. We run separate regressions by gender for each age group.  
Delays in starting school and grade repetition cannot be captured by the current school 
attendance of children. This is more of a concern especially if there is a systematic difference 
in school starting age between recipient and non-recipient children since grade repetition of a 
student in compulsory schooling level is an extraordinary situation in Turkey and can only be 
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agreed upon if the parents of the student give written consent for it. Possibility of grade 
repetition thus cannot compromise the results for children at compulsory schooling level. 
However, if a particular group of children (recipient or non-recipient) systematically delays 
starting schooling, then it is possible to observe the other group catching up at older ages. The 
greater attendance at older ages for the late starters would then be artificially attributed to the 
remittance receipt status of the household. Nevertheless, our data does not provide evidence for 
a significant difference in school attendance rates at age 5 for recipient and non-recipient 
children. Grade years accumulated by a child at a given age is an alternative measure of child 
human capital investment which is implemented in the context of migration impacts on 
schooling by Hanson and Woodruff (2003), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2011). Our data 
provides last finished schooling of children instead of accumulated years of schooling. 
Therefore, we couldn’t test the robustness of our measure of child human capital investment 
with this alternative measure.     
Each presented table of results consists of three panels. Panel A includes coefficient 
estimates for the impact of remittances on various outcomes from four models: parametric non-
IV probit, parametric IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit, and semi-parametric IV SNP. For 
remittance coefficient estimate, both Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and 
cluster robust standard errors are presented. We provide both types of standard errors to 
highlight the importance of accounting for the grouped nature of the observations. Though, 
statistical inference will always be based on the cluster robust standard errors. Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis and cluster robust 
standard errors are presented in brackets. Panel B includes p-values for the Wald test of 
remittances from various methods which correct for the downward bias in standard errors of 
remittances resulting mainly due to the finite number of clusters. Corrections are applied for all 
non-IV and IV models other than SNP. For all parametric models, asymptotic refinement of the 
Wald test is basically achieved through recalculating p-values based on larger than standard 
normal critical values which come from t distribution with varying degrees of freedom. Besides 
calculating p-values based on t distributions, we make use of wild restricted efficient residual 
bootstrap of Davidson and MacKinnon (2010); restricted score cluster bootstrap of Kline and 
Santos (2012); and pairs cluster bootstrap-t and calculate p-values accordingly. The latter two 
methods are implemented for IV bivariate probit and the former method is applied for IV 2SLS. 
For non-IV probit model asymptotic refinement is provided through restricted score cluster 
bootstrap in addition to t distributed Wald test statistic. Unfortunately, for (IV) SNP model 
estimating cluster robust standard errors is extremely time consuming, and hence neither 
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estimated standard errors account for intra-cluster error correlation nor asymptotic refinement 
of the Wald test through recalculating p-values based on t distribution, score cluster bootstrap, 
or pairs cluster bootstrap-t methods could be achieved. Panel C mainly constitutes of test 
statistics regarding: the endogeneity of the remittance variable; the strength of the instrument; 
the statistical significance of the estimated remittance impact in IV 2SLS models for which 
weak identification is suspected to be a threat; and the bivariate normality of errors in bivariate 
probit models. These tests include in order: Wald test of ρ=0 in IV bivariate probit, endogeneity 
test of suspected regressor in IV 2SLS via Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test which accounts 
for the intra-cluster correlation of errors62; p-value for the Wald test of the excluded instrument 
in the regression for the determinants of remittances in IV bivariate probit and SNP, effective 
F statistic for the instrument in the first stage of IV 2SLS; p-value of Anderson-Rubin test in 
IV 2SLS; and p-value of score test of normality for bivariate probit models63.  
Based on findings of Maddala (1983) whenever the latent regression errors 𝑢𝑇𝑖𝑔 and 
𝑢𝑌𝑖𝑔 in system of equations (2) are independent, then one can consistently estimate parameter 
vectors of the model by separately estimating two univariate probit models, one for 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 and 
one for 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔. However, when latent regression errors are not independent, then separate 
estimation of two univariate probit models results in inconsistent parameter estimates in the 
equation for 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔. The endogeneity of remittances implies a nonzero correlation between latent 
regression errors. Knapp and Seaks (1998) has shown that a likelihood ratio test of ρ=0 (a zero 
correlation between latent regression errors) has the power to unravel the endogeneity of a 
dummy variable in a bivariate probit model. Stata reports Wald test of ρ=0 in place of likelihood 
ratio test when the bivariate probit model is estimated with robust standard errors. This is the 
test we present as an empirical evidence for the endogeneity of remittances and is simply 
comparing the sum of log likelihoods from univariate probit regressions of 𝑇𝑗𝑡𝑔 and 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔 with 
the log likelihood from IV bivariate probit model. Under the null of exogeneity of remittances 
the sum of log likelihoods from univariate probit regressions is equal to log likelihood from 
bivariate probit model. 
Anderson-Rubin test is a weak instrument robust test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the endogenous variable is equal to zero in the structural equation. This test is 
also robust to violations of i.i.d errors assumption through heteroskedasticity, serial 
                                                          
62 Wooldridge’s (1995) score test is implemented in Stata by “estat endogenous” postestimation command of Stata’s built-in 
ivregress command. 
63 Score test of normality for bivariate probit used in this study is a modified version of Murphy’s score test by Chiburis (2010) 
and is implemented in Stata by “scoregof” command.  
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autocorrelation, or clustering64. Anderson-Rubin test is not efficient whenever the instrument 
is strong. In other words, with strong instruments Wald t test is more powerful compared to 
Anderson-Rubin test. Thus, Anderson-Rubin test is only presented for 2SLS models where the 
efficient F statistic is not large enough to reject the null of 2SLS bias exceeding one tenth of 
the worst-case bias.   
Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score cluster bootstraps use 9,999; pairs 
cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. Pairs cluster bootstrap-t p-values are only 
reported for IV bivariate probit models and only for models where the Wald test of remittances 
based on clustered standard errors reject at statistical significance levels 10% and lower. This 
is due to the necessity of excessive amount of time for Stata to estimate bivariate probit 
regression equations 1,999 times. On the other hand, WRE and score bootstraps need to run the 
corresponding models (IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit) only once; thus, need considerably 
less time compared to pairs cluster bootstrap-t and are presented for IV 2SLS and IV bivariate 
probit even though the p-value of Wald test of remittances is larger than 0.10.  
1.4.2.1.1 Child school attendance and illiteracy 
Tables 1-9, 1-10, and 1-11 present results of the impact of remittances on school 
attendance of children aged 6 to 14, on illiteracy among children between 6 and 14 years of 
age, and on school attendance for older children of ages 15-19, respectively.  
We first begin by examining the differences in school attendance of 6- to 14-year-old 
males and females owing to the remittance receipt status of their households. The dependent 
variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the child attends school and 0 otherwise. Besides the main 
regressor of interest (remittances) all models also include year fixed effects in addition to 
individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest 
child in the household, last finished schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and age 
of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and 
female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership 
of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index 
in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, 
interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 
to 16 in 1985 by region, gross enrollment ratio of children aged 6 to 10 in 1985 by region, and 
gini of household income by region. It is important to point out that for any outcome that we 
                                                          
64 Anderson-Rubin test for IV 2SLS model is implemented in Stata by “weakiv” command. 
53 
 
investigate the impact of remittances on, household income/wealth is never included in the set 
of controls, although it proves to be an important determinant of various outcomes in our 
context (see, e.g., Acosta [2006], Acosta [2011]). Household income/wealth is a function of 
migration because of the monetary and in-kind funds that can be provided to the household 
thanks to migration, and the changes in the allocation of labor supply in the household that is 
induced by migration. Controlling for household income/wealth, thus, shuts down several key 
channels through which migration affects outcomes, especially the mediator that we focus on 
in this study—remittances. Omitting household income/wealth would result only in an increase 
in error variation as our identification strategy does not require to condition on household 
income/wealth65. 
OLS (probit) results suggest that receiving remittances is associated with higher school 
attendance of both males and females aged 6 to 14, although the impact is imprecisely 
estimated. After accounting for the endogeneity of remittances, for both genders the direction 
of the impact on school attendance remains; however, IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit 
estimates of remittance impact are statistically insignificant at conventional levels for the 
sample of boys. Murphy’s score test of normality rejects the null hypothesis that latent 
regression errors have bivariate gaussian distribution in IV bivariate probit specifications for 
girls’ and boys’ school attendance66. Thus, to test the robustness of IV bivariate probit results 
columns (4) and (8) present IV SNP estimates which point to positive and marginally significant 
effect of remittances on school attendance of both girls and boys with the size of the impact 
being larger for girls. Unlike estimates from IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit specifications for 
boys, both estimators yield statistically significant effect of remittances for girls. IV 2SLS 
estimate in column (6) proves to be statistically significant at 5% level under any alternative 
method that corrects for the downward bias in estimated standard errors due to few clusters. 
The IV bivariate probit estimate of remittances in column (7) remains statistically significant 
when pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure is implemented. Restricted score cluster bootstrap, 
though, suggests that there is not enough evidence in the data to reject a zero impact of 
remittances on school attendance of girls. Using t distribution for the Wald t statistic produces 
p-values that are more in line with the pairs cluster bootstrap-t p-value compared to restricted 
                                                          
65 Since our instrument is at regional level, the possibility of regional income inequality that is persistent both in the past and 
in the present would threaten its validity, hence the identification strategy in this study. We include regional income gini to 
address this particular concern. 
66 Murphy’s score test almost always reject the hypothesis that errors have bivariate standard normal distribution in IV bivariate 
probit specifications, except for the regression of labor supply choice of 20-24-year-old females who currently live with their 
parents. 
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score cluster bootstrap p-values. Mostly in our analysis, restricted score cluster bootstrap—
regardless of the weights used in bootstrapping the scores and the assumed shape of the 
distribution of the Wald statistic—produces significantly larger p-values compared to those 
from t distributed Wald statistic and pairs cluster bootstrap-t technique. In columns (3), (5), and 
(6) cluster robust standard errors are estimated to be smaller than heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors despite the relation is expected to hold in the other direction as cluster robust 
standard errors are both heteroskedastic and cluster robust (see, e.g., Cameron and Miller 
[2015]), which may emphasize the extent of the downward bias in cluster robust standard errors 
when there are few clusters67.   
The instrument proves to be a strong predictor of the likelihood of receiving remittances: 
effective F statistic is larger than Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb critical value and also 
is large enough to reject the null that the Nagar bias of the IV 2SLS estimator is more than 10% 
of the “worst-case” bias; the instrument is statistically significant at 1% level in the regression 
for determinants of remittances in IV bivariate probit and IV SNP specifications. The 
corresponding rows in Table A1 provides evidence for the exogeneity of the instrument to the 
households’ school attendance decisions for their children aged 6 to 14. Woolridge’s score test 
suggests that remittances should be treated as endogenous in IV 2SLS, however the Wald tests 
of ρ=0 yield large p-values which implies that there is no evidence against the hypothesis that 
receiving remittances is exogenous in IV bivariate probit specifications of young children’s 
school attendance. Maddala (1983) notes that maximum-likelihood estimates from univariate 
probit regressions are consistent and asymptotically efficient when ρ=0, but are biased and 
inconsistent when ρ≠0. On the other hand, IV bivariate probit estimates are consistent 
regardless of the correlation between latent regression errors. Albeit the evidence in the data, 
trading off some noise in the estimates with relief from concerns of potential inconsistencies is, 
thus a good practice.   
The coefficient estimates in Table 1-9, as noted before, are not directly comparable to 
each other. Therefore, in Table 1-25 we present treatment effects of remittances—LATE and 
ATE (AME)—, which we can compare with each other, on school attendance and other 
outcomes. The first two rows in Table 1-25 summarize the treatment effect of remittances on 
school attendance of children aged 6 to 14. Probit results show a small and insignificant impact 
of remittances on school attendance of both genders. When we instrument the remittance receipt 
                                                          
67 Theoretically when errors are negatively correlated in clusters or intra-group correlation has a modest impact, cluster robust 
standard errors could be smaller than Huber-White heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, although in practice it is more likely 
to have larger cluster robust standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
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status of the household, the effects become larger, although for boys the effects are insignificant 
in IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit specifications. Evidence from IV SNP estimation suggest 
that, on average, boys from recipient households are 2.4 percentage points more likely to attend 
school with the effect being statistically significant at 1% level. For girls, the same estimation 
method shows that being in a recipient household increases the likelihood of attending school 
by 3.2 percentage points. For girls, the average marginal effect of remittances is significantly 
larger from IV bivariate probit estimates compared to the marginal effect from IV SNP 
estimates. The difference in the marginal effects may be an indicator of the extent of the bias in 
IV bivariate probit estimates when bivariate standard normal distributed errors assumption is 
violated. Still, the positive impact from IV SNP remains in IV bivariate probit. The IV 2SLS 
estimate for girls is positive, large, and statistically significant. Though, it is impossible to 
interpret the LATE as it is outside the unit interval. Simply, difference between two 
probabilities can never exceed 1 in absolute value. The mechanical interpretation of the effect, 
though, is that being in a recipient household increases the chances of attending school by 250 
percentage points for girls from households whose remittance receipt status complies with the 
instrument. There is always a large difference between LATE of IV 2SLS and ATE of IV 
bivariate probit, and confidence intervals of IV 2SLS estimates are large—thus leading to point 
estimates mostly outside of the unit interval—, which as noted by Chiburis et. al. (2011) may 
be a flaw of IV 2SLS estimator due to having a low share of remittance receiving households 
in the sample.  
The change in the size of the effects between non-IV and IV methods reveal that children 
aged 6 to 14 from recipient households have unobserved characteristics which make them seem 
less likely to attend school compared to their non-recipient counterparts. In other words, in the 
absence of migration and remittance receipt, children who are currently in remittance receiving 
households would have lower school attendance rates compared to children from 
observationally similar non-recipient households. Experiencing negative income shocks on the 
side of remittance-recipient households would be consistent with the results. 
To sum up, OLS (probit) results suggest a zero impact of remittances on school 
attendance of children between ages 6 and 14. After addressing self-selection of remittance-
recipient households, robust evidence shows that children indeed benefit from remittances by 
increasing their chances to attend school by around 2-3 percentage points. This may be 
consistent with remittances alleviating liquidity constraints and help parents attain the desired 
level of schooling for their children, even in compulsory schooling level where resource 
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constraints are assumed to be not that much of a concern in sending children to school due to 
free of charge provision of the education services.  
Table 1-10 presents the estimates of the impact of being in a recipient household on 
illiteracy of children between ages 6 and 14. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 
1 if the child is illiterate and 0 otherwise. The same set of controls as in Table 1-9 is used in 
estimating child illiteracy regressions. Probit estimates of remittance coefficient are negative, 
small and insignificant. For boys, the claim still holds when we instrument for receiving 
remittances, except for a very large, negative and significant effect that IV 2SLS yields. Once 
we test with different rejection methods though, the impact becomes insignificant. For girls, IV 
bivariate probit result suggests a negative and statistically significant effect of remittances. 
However, when we account for the downward bias in the cluster robust standard errors with 
restricted score cluster bootstraps and pairs cluster bootstrap-t, the impact becomes statistically 
insignificant. The IV 2SLS point estimate is, as in for boys, very large, negative, statistically 
significant and the effect is robust under alternative rejection methods. Treatment effects 
calculated using the IV estimates in Table 1-10 suggest that boys from recipient households, on 
average, are 2 to 5 percentage points less likely to be illiterate; and girls from recipient 
households, on average, are 6 to 7 percentage points less likely to be illiterate compared to their 
non-recipient counterparts.  
Next, we examine the differences in school attendance of children aged 15-19 years old 
due to remittance-receipt status of their households. For this age group schooling is not 
compulsory and further, outside work opportunities are available. Remittances may reduce the 
household’s need to rely on children’s labor via substituting labor income of children. Thus, 
children may free up some time from work that they can allocate to schooling activities and 
eventually increase their human capital. In addition, remittances may be used to finance 
schooling expenses of children that wouldn’t be possible to defray in the absence of migration 
of a household member and the remittances sent in return. Columns 1-4 in Table 1-11 refers to 
schooling outcomes of boys, and the rest of the columns refer to the schooling outcomes of 
girls. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the child attends school and 0 
otherwise. Besides remittances and educational reform dummy, models in columns 1-8 also 
include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a 
dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished schooling of 
the parent, dummies for marital status and age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old 
children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult 
males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for 
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rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, 
share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, 
number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of 
children aged 15 to 19 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 
25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, 
share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 
working in private sector by region.  
First thing to notice is that regardless of the gender, in any model educational system 
reform is estimated to have a positive and highly significant impact on school attendance of 15-
19-year-old children. This implies a positive spillover effect of the reform on high school 
attendance and is in line with the findings of Aydemir and Kırdar (2017). For males, probit and 
IV bivariate probit results show a zero impact of remittances on school attendance, although 
the point estimates have opposite signs. IV 2SLS and IV SNP model estimates of remittances 
also have opposite signs but they are both statistically significant68. IV 2SLS estimate is also 
robust to alternative calculation methods of p-value of the Wald test. The discrepancy in the 
direction of the impact between IV 2SLS and IV SNP highlights the importance of checking 
for the validity of the model assumptions and using alternative estimators if possible. As a 
result, robust evidence suggests that boys aged 15-19 from recipient households are more likely 
to attend school compared to observationally similar boys from non-recipient households. This 
result is consistent with remittances reducing household budget constraints and helping finance 
schooling expenses of children.  
For females we first consider the results in columns 5 to 8. Probit estimate of remittances 
in column (5) is positive and insignificant. However, all IV methods in the remaining three 
columns present a negative and significant impact of remittances on school attendance. The 
change in the sign of the impact between non-IV and IV methods reveal that 
migration/remittances decision and school attendance of girls are positively correlated, i.e. 
initially, girls who are currently in remittance receiving households are more likely to attend 
school compared to their non-receiving counterparts. The migration of a caring parent—in 
regard to schooling activities of the girl—is consistent with the result. The absence of the caring 
parent due to migration reduces the parental input into the girl’s schooling acquisition and it 
seems that the negative impacts of migration (e.g., the absence of a parent/role model, the 
                                                          
68 The SNP estimate is marginally significant with a p-value of 0.096. 
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disruption of the family structure, the additional workload on children both in and outside of 
the house to replace the migrant’s labor) outweighs the positive impacts of remittances for 15-
19-year-old females.  
The significance of IV bivariate probit estimate of the remittance impact in column (7) 
is only robust under hypothesis testing based on t distribution with varying degrees of freedom. 
It is important to state that the significant difference in p-values that pairs cluster bootstrap-t 
and restricted score cluster bootstraps yield may be due to being unable to successfully run all 
bootstrap replications for pairs cluster bootstrap-t procedure. Kline and Santos (2012), in that 
case, suggest that one should approach pairs cluster bootstrap-t results with caution. Another 
concern with estimation results from columns 5 to 8 is having a weak instrument. The effective 
F statistic is only 3.62 and the instrument in the regression of determinants of remittances in IV 
bivariate probit specification is only marginally significant with a p-value of 0.099. The p-value 
of the Wald test of the instrument in SNP model is even worse: 0.407. We implement two 
approaches to attack the weak instrument problem. Firstly, we run Anderson-Rubin test of the 
coefficient estimate of remittances being equal to zero in the structural equation. Anderson-
Rubin test is a weak instrument robust test that allows for violations of i.i.d errors assumption 
in IV 2SLS models, and basically runs the reduced form estimation of outcome on all excluded 
and included instruments. If the excluded instruments are jointly significant in the reduced 
form, then the test concludes that there is enough evidence to reject the hypothesis of zero 
impact of remittances in the structural equation. p-value of Anderson-Rubin test in column (6) 
is small enough to reject zero impact of remittances in favor of the negative impact that IV 
2SLS estimator produced. Secondly, the abundance of regional level controls may create 
collinearity in the first stage and reduce the predictive power of the instrument. Hence, we 
exclude regional labor market characteristics69, and consequently the effective F statistic of the 
instrument increases to a level that is large enough to reject IV 2SLS bias of order 30% or higher 
of the “worst-case” bias; the p-value of the Wald test of the instrument drops to 0.004 and 0.06 
in IV bivariate probit and IV SNP specifications, respectively. The results in columns 9 to 12 
are qualitatively similar to those in columns 5 to 8; even the significance levels of the estimates 
agree except for the IV 2SLS model in which the impact of remittances is estimated to be 
statistically insignificant and the size of the impact is attenuated towards zero. Since the size of 
                                                          
69 The excluded regional labor market characteristics are: share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree 
and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or 
older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in 
private sector by region. 
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the coefficient on remittances stays almost the same in regressions with and without regional 
labor market characteristics as controls, one is inclined to argue that excluding labor market 
controls would not threaten the exogeneity of the instrument. However, Table A1 presents 
evidence against this hypothesis. Being in a historically high migration region is shown to have 
a direct impact on school attendance of girls from non-receiving households aged 15-19—
distinct than its impact through migration and remittances, most likely capturing impacts of 
omitted labor market characteristics on school attendance—when regional labor market 
characteristics are omitted; on the contrary, there is no evidence against a zero impact of the 
instrument on school attendance of the same group when regional labor market controls are 
included. The estimates in columns 9 to 12 may be inconsistent as the instrument may be 
invalid. Only the negative estimate of the impact in column (6) seems to be robust to alternative 
methods of rejection and weak instruments. The average marginal effect of remittances from 
SNP estimates in Table 1-11 is statistically significant and on average, boys aged 15-19 from 
recipient households are 8 percentage points more likely to attend school compared to their 
non-receiving counterparts; and the corresponding effect for girls from IV bivariate probit and 
SNP estimates are negative and sizable 15 to 29 percentage points. 
Summing up, boys of ages 6 to 19 increase their school attendance; girls between ages 
6 and 14 increase both their school attendance and their literacy rates; and girls aged 15 to 19 
decrease their school attendance in response to receiving remittances. Where do our findings 
stand in the literature? The increase in boys’ (aged 6 to 19) school attendance is in line with the 
finding of remittances reducing dropout hazard rates of 6 to 24 years old males in El Salvador 
(Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003). Lopez Cordova’s (2005) finding of a significant negative 
impact of remittances on illiteracy of children between ages 6 and 14 is comparable to our result 
for girls aged 6 to 14. The extent of the decrease in girls’ (aged 16 to 18) likelihood to attend 
school in response to the migration of a household member found by McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2011) is in the range of the extent of the decrease in the likelihood of school attendance for 
girls aged 15 to 19 in our study. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) found a significant decrease 
in school attendance of boys aged 12 to 18 which is in stark contrast with our finding of a 
positive impact of remittances on school attendance of 6-19-year-old males.  
1.4.2.1.2 Child labor 
In this section, we focus on the labor force participation decisions of children aged 15 
to 19. We mainly investigate the extent of the change in take up rates of overall market work, 
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wage work, unpaid family work, and self-employment for children from remittance-recipient 
households.  
Table 1-12 presents the point estimates of the impact of remittances on boys’ labor 
supply choices. The dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation 
decisions of boys: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, 
and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a 
salary or working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a 
household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone 
for a wage or employing unpaid family workers, and being employed in any of the 
aforementioned market work, respectively. The same set of controls in the corresponding 
columns for boys in Table 1-11 is used to estimate boys’ labor supply behavior regressions.  
In any model, being affected by the education system reform is estimated to decrease 
both boys’ and girls’ likelihood to do any kind of work. This finding suggests that children who 
were forced to stay three more years in lower secondary school are more likely to substitute 
market work with schooling activities even later in their lives. The education reform 
implemented in 1997 seems to benefit the children in accumulating human capital even after 8 
years of compulsory schooling period has ended. 
IV bivariate probit estimates of the remittance impact in Table 1-12 are statistically 
insignificant regardless of the outcome variable. IV 2SLS and IV SNP estimates disagree in the 
size of the effect in regressions of overall labor market participation and wage work; and 
disagree in the sign of the impact in regressions of unpaid family work and self-employment. 
Since SNP estimator is more robust to non-normal errors and performs better when treatment 
probabilities are low compared to IV 2SLS estimator, we prefer to rely on IV SNP estimates. 
Boys from remittance receiving households are less likely to work as unpaid family workers 
and more likely to be self-employed compared to their counterparts from non-recipient 
households, and the effects of remittances are highly significant. There is no impact of 
remittances on overall labor force participation and wage work. The change in the sign of the 
impact between probit and IV SNP estimates suggest that the decision to send remittances and 
self-employment of boys are negatively correlated, i.e. boys from remittance-recipient 
households are initially less likely to be self-employed compared to their counterparts. For a 
prospective migrant to decide on migrating and sending remittances, it may be necessary to 
have household members that can replace the migrant’s labor, and in this case, it seems that 
remittances are more likely to be received by households where participation rates for 15- to 
19-year-old males are low. Having said that, Table A1 provides evidence against the exogeneity 
61 
 
of the instrument in the model for a 15- to 19-year-old male’s likelihood to be self-employed 
and the p-value of the coefficient on the instrument in the determination of remittances from IV 
SNP model is 0.064 which may result in the identification to be weak. Thus, the only reliable 
result is the reduction in a boy’s likelihood to do unpaid family work in response to receiving 
remittances. The average treatment effect of remittances from IV SNP estimates suggest that 
boys from recipient households are 7 percentage points less likely to perform unpaid family 
work. This result reveals that for boys the income effect of remittances outweighs other impacts 
of migration. For boys of ages 15 to 19 it seems that some time reallocation takes place favoring 
schooling activities over unpaid family work. Taking together the results from school 
attendance and child labor determination, the robust evidence suggests that boys of ages 6 to 
19 from remittance-recipient households are better off with respect to human capital 
accumulation compared to their counterparts.  
Tables 1-13 and 1-14 present the estimates of being in a remittance-recipient household 
on labor supply decisions of girls aged 15 to 19. The estimates in Table 1-13 suffer from weak 
instrument problem; thus, as in school attendance decisions of girls aged 15 to 19, we run 
separate regressions of labor supply choices for girls omitting regional labor market 
characteristics in Table 1-14. From both regressions—with and without labor market 
characteristics—, one robust result follows: receiving remittances reduces a girl’s likelihood to 
be self-employed. In Table 1-13, Anderson-Rubin test rejects a zero impact of remittances on 
wage work and self-employment; nevertheless, the IV 2SLS estimates are statistically 
insignificant but point to a negative impact on these outcomes and the direction of the effect 
agrees with the statistically significantly estimated impact from IV SNP method for wage 
work70. However, the instrument appears to be redundant in the IV SNP specification of wage 
work as the p-value of the instrument in the regression for determinants of remittances is close 
to 1. In Table 1-14, the predictive power of the instrument for remittances is large enough—the 
effective F statistic exceeds Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb critical value—and the 
impact of remittances on wage work and self-employment is estimated to be negative and highly 
significant from both IV 2SLS and IV SNP methods71. The Anderson-Rubin test also rejects a 
zero impact of remittances on wage work and self-employment in favor of the negative estimate 
at a 5% statistical significance level. We may not be able to satisfy exogeneity assumption of 
                                                          
70 The IV SNP estimate of remittance impact is not available for self-employment. Since there is no variation in self-
employment for girls in recipient households and a very small variation for girls in non-recipient households, nonlinear models 
(e.g., probit, IV bivariate probit, and IV SNP) have difficulties in estimation process.   
71 Though in Table 1-14, the instrument in IV SNP method never proves to be a significant determinant of remittances; the p-
value of the instrument is always larger than 0.10.  
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the instrument in overall market work and unpaid family work specifications in regressions 
with and without labor market controls, plus in wage work specification where we do not 
control for the regional labor market characteristics. This leaves us with self-employment 
specifications where we might achieve strong and valid identification. There is also evidence 
in Table 1-14 for a decrease in a girl’s overall labor market participation from IV bivariate 
probit specification; however, once we check with the IV SNP estimator to account for the non-
normality of errors, the impact vanishes, plus the IV bivariate probit estimate of remittance 
impact becomes statistically insignificant when we implement restricted score cluster bootstrap 
techniques. The average treatment effect of remittances on self-employment is estimated to be 
very close to zero; whereas, the local average treatment effect suggests a lower probability of 
self-employment for girls from recipient households of order 21 percentage points. The large 
difference in treatment effects on self-employment may stem from the differences in sub-groups 
for which the effects are estimated. As for the boys in the same age group, the income effect of 
remittances dominates other impacts of migration for girls. 
Girls of ages 15 to 19 from recipient households reduce their school attendance, and the 
robust evidence argues that the time that is freed up from school is not allocated to market work. 
An important question arises: what are those girls from recipient households doing instead of 
continuing their education or participating in the labor market? A reasonable answer would be 
to help with household chores, especially if the labor of the migrant is substituted by the 
household member who were responsible of taking care of the household chores. Another 
answer would be to engage in activities other than schooling and market work. There is no 
information in the data on a household member’s engagement in household/subsistence work 
or time spent on other kinds of activities such as taking computer courses, sewing courses, etc. 
Therefore, the question will be left unanswered.  
Yang (2008) shows that a positive exchange rate shock results in a decline in hours 
worked in unpaid family work for boys between ages 10 and 17. Acosta (2011) finds a lower 
probability for wage work and non-wage work for girls of ages 10-18 from recipient 
households. Alcaraz, Chiquiar and Salcedo (2012) contribute to the literature by finding of a 
negative effect of remittances on child labor. Our results of a decline in unpaid family work for 
boys aged 15-19 from recipient households; and a decline in non-wage work for girls aged 15-
19 from recipient households are in line with these preceding results in the literature.  
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1.4.2.2 Adult labor supply responses 
In this section, we examine the labor supply responses of left behind household 
members aged 20 to 64. The income effect of remittances may increase the reservation wage of 
household members, and consequently result in a decrease in market work participation. On the 
other hand, members of the household may need to substitute for the absent migrant’s 
labor/income which translates into an increase in the labor supply or a shift between different 
employment types (wage to non-wage, non-wage to non-wage, or non-wage to wage work). 
Observing a decrease in the labor supply of left behind adults implies a pure income effect; 
however, an increase in the labor supply may stem from replacing migrant’s labor/income or 
from productive use of remittance income in household enterprises. We examine the impact of 
remittances on adult labor supply responses discriminating by gender and age of the respondent.  
1.4.2.2.1 Labor supply responses of adult males 
1.4.2.2.1.1 20-24-years-old males 
As is described in section 1.4.1, a high share of 20-24-years-old males currently live 
with their parents, so restricting the estimation sample to males aged 20-24 who live with their 
parents is an alternative way to investigate the impacts of remittances on a young male’s labor 
supply response with the data in hand. We run regressions for labor supply responses of young 
males first without restricting the sample and then by restricting the sample. Tables 1-15 and 1-
17 present the estimates of being in a recipient household on labor supply responses of young 
males without and with the sample restriction, respectively.  
In both model specifications—with and without sample restriction—, the dependent 
variables are the same as in child labor regressions. Besides the main regressor of interest, all 
models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level 
covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the 
household head, a dummy for the marital status of the individual, the highest schooling level 
attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years 
old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including 
the individual in consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, 
dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 
1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of 
roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of 
household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree 
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and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment 
rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural 
sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. In Table 1-
17, we exclude from model specification the dummy for the observation being the household 
head, since all 20-24-years-old males live with their parents, this covariate becomes redundant.  
The common impact of remittances for the samples of 20-24-years-old males is a 
significant decline in overall market participation. In Table 1-15 this decline appears to be the 
result of a simultaneous decline in wage work and self-employment; whereas in Table 1-17 it 
is a consequence of a simultaneous decline in unpaid family work and self-employment. 
However, unpaid family work results from both samples may prove to be inconsistent as there 
is enough evidence in the data against the exogeneity of the instrument. In both samples, the 
instrument has a very strong predictive power on the likelihood of receiving remittances; 
although, its power is somewhat reduced in the first stage for sample of males who live with 
their parents. The exogeneity of remittances in the structural equation in both samples cannot 
be rejected for any employment type either by Wooldridge’s score test or Wald test of ρ=0, 
except for unpaid family work regression for the whole sample of young males which, as noted 
before, might have already violated assumptions of IV estimation by making use of an invalid 
instrument. The probit estimates and the estimates from IV estimators have the same sign in 
both samples; nonetheless, only the negative point estimate on overall labor force participation 
from probit model is statistically significant and robust to rejection method based on using t 
distribution for Wald statistic. IV 2SLS estimator is unable to ravel significant point estimates 
for any employment type in either of the samples. IV bivariate probit estimates find significant 
negative impacts of remittances on overall labor market participation and self-employment for 
the whole sample of young males. These point estimates from IV bivariate probit become 
marginally significant at 10% and 11% levels, respectively once we implement pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t technique to correct for the downward bias in the estimated standard errors. Pairs 
cluster bootstrap-t results should be taken with a grain of salt as Wald statistic could not be 
estimated in some bootstrap replications. IV SNP estimator, which is the preferred econometric 
estimation method, finds negative, and significant impacts of remittances on overall labor force 
participation, wage work and self-employment for the sample of whole young males. The 
remittance effect does not change much when we exclude young males living on their own from 
regression analysis: the negative impact on wage work for the whole sample of young males 
remains but it becomes statistically insignificant; the negative insignificant impact on unpaid 
family work becomes statistically significant, however, as noted before, results from unpaid 
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family work regressions may be inconsistent. Average treatment effect of remittances for the 
whole sample of young males suggests that being in a recipient household is estimated to 
significantly lower: overall market work of young males by 10 to 45 percentage points, wage 
work by 23 to 29 percentage points, unpaid family work by 4 to 14 percentage points, and self-
employment by 3 to 6 percentage points depending on the estimator. The corresponding ATEs 
from point estimates in the restricted sample suggest that receiving remittances reduces: overall 
labor market participation by 10 to 24 percentage points, wage work by 16 percentage points, 
unpaid family work by 4 to 15 percentage points, and self-employment by 2 to 5 percentage 
points. The evidence is suggestive of the dominance of income effect on 20-24-years-old males’ 
labor supply responses. Observing a decline in labor market participation brings about the 
possibility of a time reallocation by 20-24-years-old males favoring schooling activities over 
market work. Remittances by reducing liquidity constraints may help finance schooling of 20-
24-years-old males and allow an increase in human capital of young males which may translate 
into higher earnings for them in the future. However, robust evidence suggests that young males 
from recipient households are less likely to attend school compared to non-recipient 
counterparts72. This result may imply that remittances are sent for reasons other than financing 
of a 20-24-years-old male’s schooling expenses.      
The change in the size of the effects between probit and IV methods imply that young 
males from recipient households have unobserved characteristics which make them look more 
likely to engage in market work compared to non-receiving counterparts. Financial losses of 
the household such as job loss of a member would have required other members to contribute 
to the household budget in the absence of remittances. With the migration of a member and the 
non-labor income provided to the family by means of remittances, the household’s need for 
other members to supply their labor might have vanished.  
1.4.2.2.1.2 25-49-years-old males 
Table 1-19 presents the estimates of the impact of remittances on labor supply decisions 
of prime-age men. The same set of covariates as in Table 1-15 are used in model specifications 
for prime-age men. 
The results suggest that there is a decline in wage work of prime-age men in response 
to receiving remittances, and an increase in unpaid family work and self-employment. The 
decrease in wage work more than offsets the increase in non-wage work which results in a 
                                                          
72 The results on a 20-24-years-old male’s likelihood to attend school are available from authors upon request.    
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significant decline in labor force participation. The evidence reveals that to some extent, time 
substitution takes place favoring non-wage work over wage work, but income effect dominates 
substitution effect in overall. The results imply that for some remittance receiving families, left 
behind male members need to substitute the absent migrant’s labor, and for the rest the 
additional income through remittances is large enough to incentivize prime-age men to quit the 
labor market.  
The point estimate from probit model in column (1) proves to be negative, statistically 
significant under any alternative rejection method, and contradicts with the point estimate from 
IV bivariate probit in column (3) regarding the sign of the impact. IV bivariate probit estimate 
on overall labor force participation proves also to be statistically significant under rejection 
methods based on t distribution and pairs-cluster bootstrap-t. It would be misleading to rely on 
IV bivariate probit estimate of remittances in this particular case, as the robust estimator to non-
normality of errors find a negative, and statistically significant point estimate at 1% level.  
For wage work, all the estimators point to a significant, negative effect of remittances. 
All the alternative rejection methods for probit, IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit agree on the 
statistical significance of the point estimates. For unpaid family work, the point estimates from 
available estimators are all positive, and statistically significant in IV SNP specifications and 
in IV 2SLS under different rejection methods. For self-employment, robust estimators to 
endogeneity of remittances find positive and statistically significant estimates, and the 
significance levels of the estimates remain under different rejection methods for IV 2SLS and 
IV bivariate probit.  
The instrument is strong enough to reject IV 2SLS bias of order 20% or higher of worst-
case bias. Still, we present Anderson-Rubin test results which support the statistical inference 
on remittances in wage and non-wage work regressions. Table A1 shows that there is no 
evidence in the data to reject the exogeneity of the instrument to labor supply decisions of 
prime-age men.  
The results in Table 1-25 on average treatment effect of remittances suggest that 
receiving remittances is estimated to significantly lower the chances of overall market work of 
prime-age men by 10 to 23 percentage points depending on the estimator. The decline in wage 
work ranges between 9 to 50 percentage points, the increase in unpaid family work is between 
2 to 10 percentage points, and lastly the increase in chances of being self-employed varies from 
4 to 40 percentage points. ATEs from IV SNP estimates are more conservative compared to 
ATEs from IV bivariate probit which are two to eight times larger. The change in the size of 
the effects between non-IV and IV results in Table 1-25 reveal that remittance decision is 
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positively correlated with both wage-work and overall labor market participation of prime-age 
men. In addition, there is a negative correlation between remittance decision and non-wage 
work. That is, in the absence of remittances, prime-age men from remittance receiving 
households are more likely to work for wage and participate in the labor market; and are less 
likely to be self-employed and work as unpaid family worker compared to non-receiving 
counterparts. For a prospective migrant having household members that could replace his labor 
in household enterprises is an important factor in deciding to migrate, and the evidence justifies 
this hypothesis by finding an initially lower participation rate for prime-age men in recipient 
households.   
1.4.2.2.1.3 50-64-years-old males 
Table 1-21 presents the estimates for the impact of being in a recipient household on 
labor supply of 50-64-years-old males. We use the same set of independent variables as in labor 
supply response specifications for prime-age men. First thing to notice is the low predictable 
power of the instrument on the likelihood of receiving remittances in IV 2SLS models. The 
effective F statistic of the instrument in the first stage is 8.87 which is less than Staiger and 
Stock (1997) critical value. On the other hand, the instrument is statistically significant at 1% 
level in the regression for determinants of remittances with nonlinear models. Thus, the 
instrument may prove to be strong in nonlinear models.  
The IV bivariate probit estimates suggest that elder males shift from unpaid family work 
to self-employment in response to receiving remittances, and the increase in self-employment 
more than offsets the decrease in unpaid family work resulting in an overall increase in labor 
market participation. IV SNP estimate supports the claim of a significant increase in overall 
market work; however, for unpaid family work and self-employment the point estimates from 
IV SNP become insignificant even though the direction of the impacts agrees with the ones 
from IV bivariate probit. Estimates from IV bivariate probit regressions of labor market 
participation, wage work and self-employment appear to be robust to reject a zero-impact null 
hypothesis with testing based on t critical values. Restricted score cluster bootstrap runs into 
some problems in calculating p-values and hence, p-values are not available. Pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t could not estimate Wald statistics in each bootstrap replication; nonetheless, 
suggests that receiving remittances significantly increases the likelihood of elder males to 
engage in self-employment.  
IV 2SLS estimator yields a negative and significant estimate of the impact on wage 
work and this point estimate is robust to weak instrument identification—with a test size of 
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10%. However, WRE bootstraps reveal that there is a sizable downward bias in standard errors 
due to having few heterogenous clusters. Therefore, statistical inference with IV 2SLS estimator 
may be unreliable. On the other hand, Wooldridge’s score test presents evidence against the 
exogeneity of remittances, so probit results might be misleading, too. Alternative IV methods 
suggest a zero impact of remittances on an elder man’s likelihood to work for a wage.  
The last of the problems with regressions of 50-64-years-old males’ labor supply 
decisions is about the validity of the instrument. There is enough evidence to support the claim 
that the instrument has a direct impact on self-employment and overall labor market 
participation of elder males. As a consequence, for 50-64-years-old males we might have been 
unsuccessful in fully addressing the endogeneity of remittances.  
In a nutshell, probit results find a significant decline in an elder male’s likelihood to 
work for a wage and engage in self-employment, resulting in an overall significant decline in 
labor force participation. On the other hand, the robust evidence from IV bivariate probit reveals 
a significant increase in labor force participation of elder males which decomposes into a 
simultaneous significant increase in self-employment and a decline in unpaid family work. 
When we account for the observed differences between recipients and non-recipients, OLS 
results are consistent with the observational evidence. Once we account for the endogeneity of 
remittances, IV bivariate probit results suggest an increase in labor supply of elder males—
mainly resulting from the increase in self-employment—which is consistent with remittances 
being sent to invest in the origin country in household enterprises. ATE of remittances from 
probit estimates suggest that being in a recipient household significantly reduces likelihood of 
overall labor force participation by 17 percentage points, wage work by 5 percentage points, 
and self-employment by 11 percentage points. ATE of remittances from IV bivariate probit 
reveals a significant increase in self-employment of order 38 percentage points, a significant 
increase in labor market participation of order 34 percentage points, and a significant but mere 
1 percentage point decrease in unpaid family work. ATE of remittances from IV SNP estimate 
on elder men’s overall market work is a significant increase by 25 percentage points. The 
consistency in ATEs of remittances on labor supply choices from probit and IV bivariate probit 
models does not remain in IV SNP model, e.g. in probit specification the decrease in overall 
labor force participation is due to a simultaneous decrease in wage work and self-employment; 
in IV bivariate probit specification the increase in overall market work is brought about by an 
increase in self-employment; however, in IV SNP specification the increase in overall market 
labor force participation cannot be explained by a change in participation in any employment 
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type. This discrepancy might also be a result of the estimation issues inherent with regressions 
of elder males’ labor supply responses.    
To sum up, we find a significant negative impact of remittances on 20-49-years-old 
men’s overall market work. For 20-24-years-old males this negative impact is brought about by 
a decrease in wage work and self-employment; for prime-age men the decline appears to be the 
result of a decrease in wage work. Prime-age men also increase to an extent unpaid family work 
and self-employment in response to receiving remittances but compared to the decline in the 
likelihood of working for a wage, the increase in non-wage work is not sizable. The impact of 
remittances on a 20-24-years-old male’s labor supply behaviors does not change much once we 
run separate regressions for young males who currently live with their parents. The 
observational evidence on the dominance of income effect for adult males appears to have a 
causal interpretation for 20-49-years-olds. The robust evidence on a 50-64-years-old male’s 
labor supply response reveals a dominant substitution effect. Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) 
find that migration reduces labor force participation of 15-64-years-old males in Philippines, 
which is due to the income effect of remittances dominating the substitution effect of migration. 
Our results show dominance of income effect on labor supply decisions of adult males aged 20- 
to 49-years-old in Turkish context. As explained before, there also exists a sizable substitution 
effect for prime-age men. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) show that Mexican males 
substitute formal wage work with informal wage work in response to a household member’s 
migration to defray migration costs and replace the absent migrant’s labor income. In our case, 
the motivations for prime-age and elder males to increase non-wage work seem to be a result 
of productive use of the remittances in household enterprises or of the need to replace absent 
migrant’s labor, but not his income.  
1.4.2.2.2 Labor supply responses of adult females     
Migration of a household member and the remittances sent may provide opportunities 
for left behind females to enter the labor market and earn their own income. Females through 
reallocating time from household chores to productive market work may increase their 
bargaining power and strengthen their position in the household. In allocating household 
resources females may play a more important role compared to the counterfactual situation in 
the absence of remittances. On the other hand, remittances might have been large enough to 
increase females’ reservation wages and have not been channeled into productive uses which 
simply translate into a decline in females’ market labor force participation. In this section, we 
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investigate the change in the labor supply of females due to receiving remittances. We try to 
quantify the impact discriminating by age of the respondent.  
1.4.2.2.2.1 20-24-years-old females    
As is with the sample for 20-24-years-old males, a high share (49%) of 20-24-years-old 
females still live with their parents which makes testing the impacts of remittances on labor 
supply choices of young females discriminating by their residence a reasonable alternative. The 
dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of females: 
working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in 
any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a 
seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without 
getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing 
unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned market work, 
respectively. Besides remittances all models also include year fixed effects in addition to 
individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a 
dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 
years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years 
old adult males and females (including the individual in consideration), dummies for ownership 
of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index 
in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, 
interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 
to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 
years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school 
degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men 
aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in 
private sector by region. We discard a dummy variable which indicates whether the observation 
is the household head from regression specifications for 20-24-years-old females who currently 
live with their parents. 
Table 1-16 presents the estimates of the impact of remittances on labor supply choices 
of whole sample of 20-24-years-old females. Probit results, which do not account for the 
endogeneity of remittances, cannot reject zero impact hypothesis for any employment type but 
are suggestive of an increase in non-wage work and a decrease in wage work and overall labor 
market participation. Probit results are in line with the observational evidence. IV results, on 
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the contrary, find a significant, negative impact on young women’s overall labor force 
participation which appears to be a result of a simultaneous and significant decline in both wage 
work and self-employment. Remittances appear to affect labor supply choices of 20-24-years-
old males and females in the same way: income effect of remittances increase to an extent the 
prices of labor for left behind 20-24-years-old males and females that is large enough to make 
them decrease their labor force participation rates. Do young females continue schooling 
instead of taking part in the labor force? IV models of school attendance could not detect a 
statistically significant change in a young female’s likelihood to attend school owing to 
receiving remittances73. It is not possible to further investigate what young females do with the 
additional time they saved from market work, though.    
IV bivariate probit estimates are negative and statistically significant for wage work and 
self-employment, and insignificant for overall labor force participation. IV SNP point estimates 
improve upon IV bivariate probit estimates by finding a statistically significant (at 1% level) 
negative impact of remittances on overall market work. The necessity to check the robustness 
of IV bivariate probit estimates are justified by very low p-values that score tests of normality 
yield. IV bivariate probit estimates on wage work and self-employment are robust to rejecting 
based on t distribution, plus point estimates on self-employment remain statistically significant 
under pairs cluster bootstrap-t correction. Interestingly, restricted score cluster bootstraps for 
IV bivariate probit estimate on wage work yield lower p-values than the controversial rejection 
method based on standard normal distribution. It looks like something goes wrong with the 
implementation of the method since the unrestricted score cluster bootstraps give p-values that 
are larger than the standard normal distribution based p-value for the Wald test. IV 2SLS 
estimates find a negative, significant effect on wage work and a significant, positive effect on 
unpaid family work. These estimates are robust to testing based on t critical values. Anderson-
Rubin test also rejects a null impact of remittances on wage work in favor of the negative effect 
which provides more confidence in the negative and significant effect that IV bivariate probit 
and IV SNP reveal. However, WRE bootstraps suggest that IV 2SLS estimates have too narrow 
confidence intervals and, therefore statistical inference from IV 2SLS may be misleading. The 
instrument is strong with a first stage effective F statistic of order 10.18; the p-values of the 
Wald tests for the instrument from nonlinear IV regressions on the likelihood of receiving 
remittances are very close to zero. The ATEs of remittances from IV SNP estimates suggest 
that 20-24-years-old girls from recipient households are 13 percentage points less likely to work 
                                                          
73 The results are available from authors upon request.  
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for a wage, merely 1 percentage point less likely to engage in self-employment, and as a result 
17 percentage points less likely to participate in labor force. 
Once we restrict the estimation sample to 20-24-years-old females who still live with 
their parents, almost all of the point estimates in Table 1-18 become insignificant, except for a 
barely significant positive impact that IV SNP method yields on overall labor market 
participation; and a significant positive impact that IV 2SLS method finds on the likelihood to 
be self-employed. The statistical inference from IV 2SLS proves to be robust to rejecting based 
on WRE bootstrap and t distribution. However, the instrument is weak with a first stage 
effective F statistic of order 5.87, and Anderson-Rubin test is unable to detect a weak 
identification robust significant impact of remittances on self-employment. Thus, the IV 2SLS 
estimate may be no better than the OLS estimate with respect to the size of the bias. The score 
test could not reject bivariate normality of errors, so for any employment type the IV bivariate 
probit model appears to be correctly specified which renders IV bivariate probit estimation 
strategy more efficient than IV SNP (De Luca, 2008). IV bivariate probit is unable to detect the 
positive, significant impact of remittances on overall labor market participation that IV SNP 
finds. Nevertheless, IV SNP estimate would most likely become statistically insignificant if we 
could have controlled for the intra-group error correlation. As a conclusion, the evidence 
suggest that remittances do not affect labor supply behaviors of 20-24-years-old girls who live 
with their parents. The income and substitution effects seem to cancel each other. Cox-Edwards 
and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) find a similar null effect of remittances on labor supply choices 
of 12-65-years-old males and females.     
As a side note, a technical issue prevents estimation of remittance impact on self-
employment by probit and IV bivariate probit: all young females from recipient households 
choose not to engage in self-employment which implies that remittances perfectly predict the 
outcome (not being self-employed). In such cases, Stata chooses to drop the independent 
variable and estimates the remaining model with nonlinear estimators such as logit, probit, and 
bivariate probit.  
1.4.2.2.2.2 25-49-years-old females  
Table 1-20 presents the estimates of the change in a 25-49-years-old female’s labor 
supply due to being in a recipient household. The same set of independent variables as in Table 
1-16 are used in model specifications for prime-age women’s labor supply behaviors. 
To begin with, the instrument has a large first stage effective F statistic, plus the point 
estimates of the instrument are statistically significant at 1% level from regressions of prime-
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age females’ likelihood to be in a recipient household in nonlinear IV models. The distributional 
assumption on the latent regression errors of IV bivariate probit model seems not to be satisfied 
which necessitates testing the results from IV bivariate probit estimator with the robust 
alternative method, IV SNP. Sample sizes for prime-age males’ and females’ labor supply 
response regressions are very large compared to those from young and elderly males’ and 
females’ regressions, still the IV 2SLS point estimates exceed 1 in absolute value which may 
empirically justify Chiburis et. al. (2011) finding of a poorly performing IV 2SLS estimator 
when treatment probabilities are low.  
Probit estimates find a null impact of remittances on labor supply behavior of prime-
age women. Once we account for the unobserved heterogeneity that affects both the likelihood 
to receive remittances and labor supply choices, the coefficient of interest is estimated to 
significantly lower the probability of working for a wage and overall market work, and increase 
the likelihood to engage in self-employment. The robust evidence suggests that to some extent 
prime-age women shift from wage work to self-employment in response to receiving 
remittances; however, a significant decline in overall labor force participation for women 
reveals that the income effect of remittances dominates the substitution effect.  
IV point estimates of the impact of remittances on wage work and overall labor market 
participation appear to be undisputed. For wage work, all IV estimates are negative and highly 
significant; furthermore, statistical inference from IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit regressions 
is robust to any rejection method. However, there is evidence in the data that we were unable 
to control for all the channels—distinct than remittances—through which migration networks 
could affect likelihood of working for a wage74. This finding may cloud the reliability of the 
results on wage work. For overall market work, IV bivariate probit estimate of the impact is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Rejection methods based on t distribution, 
restricted score cluster bootstrap and pairs cluster bootstrap-t all reject a null impact of 
remittances at conventional significance levels. Pairs cluster bootstrap-t was unable to estimate 
the Wald statistic in 5 bootstrap replications; however, once we further analyze the results, we 
became aware of a pattern: for labor supply regressions of males and females regardless of the 
age, and for household well-being regressions, pairs cluster bootstrap-t cannot estimate the 
Wald statistics in the exact same 5 bootstrap replications which implies that the problem stems 
from the seed that is used to randomly draw clusters in Stata’s bootstrap command. If the 
                                                          
74 When we include fixed effects for broad geographical regions, the instrument exogeneity appears to be satisfied; however, 
it leads to less precise estimation of remittance impact in main regressions.  
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resultant 5 bootstrap samples have no or very limited variation in treatment and this causes 
missing t statistics, then it is unexpected to have valid inference by making use of the remaining 
bootstrap distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2015). On the other hand, if the missing t statistics 
occur by chance, then its impact on having valid inference would be minor. Since nonparametric 
pairs resampling method takes too much time to estimate the bootstrap distribution of Wald 
statistic, we couldn’t test our claim by making use of another seed.  IV SNP estimate of the 
impact confirms the finding of a negative and significant effect of remittances by IV bivariate 
probit. For unpaid family work, IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit suggest a positive impact of 
remittances but the results are only robust to rejecting based on t critical values. Besides, IV 
SNP estimator cannot detect a significant impact of remittances on unpaid family work. Only 
IV SNP estimator finds a significant positive impact of remittances on prime-age women’s 
likelihood to engage in self-employment. ATE of remittances from IV SNP estimates suggest 
that prime-age women decrease their overall market work by 6 percentage points and wage 
work by 8 percentage points, and increase self-employment by 16 percentage points—although 
the coefficient of remittances on self-employment is marginally significant—in response to 
receiving remittances. The robust evidence on labor supply choices of prime-age women is 
consistent with the observational evidence and with findings of a significant decline in labor 
force participation for women by Acosta (2006), Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009), Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006), and Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001).  
1.4.2.2.2.3 50-64-years-old females 
Table 1-22 presents the estimates of the impact of being in a recipient household on 
labor supply decisions of 50-64-years-old females. If the family uses remittances to make 
investments on behalf of the absent migrant—through setting up a new household enterprise or 
maintaining an existing one—, then it is expected to observe an increase in the labor supply of 
left behind family members and it would be easier for those members who would have lower 
participation rates in the absence of remittances to increase their labor supply: elderly males 
and elderly females. The robust evidence on labor supply behavior of 50- to 64-years-old males 
reveal a significant increase in overall market labor force participation which appears to be 
resulting from a significant increase in self-employment. Females of ages 50- to 64-years-old 
decrease wage work in response to receiving remittances and do not differ from non-recipient 
counterparts with respect to their labor supply in non-wage work and overall market work. This 
finding may imply that elderly males in the family are more likely to replace the absent 
migrant’s duties in managing the household enterprise.  
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OLS results on 50-64-years-old females’ labor supply responses suggest a null impact 
of remittances, except for a statistically significant negative effect on unpaid family work; IV 
results suggest a statistically significant negative impact of remittances on wage work only, and 
the point estimates from IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit are robust to alternative rejection 
methods. Moreover, tests of exogeneity show that remittances should be treated as endogenous 
both in IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit models of wage work which reveals that the point 
estimate from probit model is biased. The change in the sign of the impact on wage work for 
50-64-years-old females shows that females from recipient households are initially more likely 
to work for a wage in the absence of remittances maybe due to the household receiving a 
negative income shock which is not observed by the econometrician. The ATE of remittances 
on wage work for elderly females is a statistically significant decline of order 3 to 4 percentage 
points depending on the estimator.  
To sum up, females regardless of their age appear to decrease wage work in response to 
receiving remittances. The decline in wage work is not large enough to significantly affect 
overall market work for 50-64-years-old females, but for women of ages 20- to 49-years-old 
the decline in wage work causes a significant decline in market labor force participation rates. 
Recipient women of ages 20- to 24-years-old are also less likely to engage in self-employment. 
Prime-age women substitute wage labor with self-employment to an extent, but the increase in 
self-employment is not large enough to neutralize the decline in wage work.    
1.4.2.3 Remittances and the welfare of households 
For a household, one of the main motivations behind the decision to send a member 
abroad is to accumulate foreign exchange earnings, and by means of this funding improve living 
conditions of the left behind family members. Remittances by providing investment 
opportunities may diversify income sources of the household. Even if remittances are not 
channeled into productive uses, it may be used to achieve higher consumption levels for the 
household. Yang (2011) states that neither of the uses—consumption or investment—can be 
argued to be better as a priori: on one hand, it may be the best choice for the household to spend 
remittances on consumption, especially if they suffer from very low income levels; on the other 
hand, for households with sufficient income levels it may be optimal to use remittances on 
household investments, particularly if the productive investments would not have been 
achieved without the extra income derived from remittances due to the resource constraints. In 
times of monetary crisis, households may also benefit from the insurance role of remittances 
and survive through difficult times more easily (Cox, Eser, and Jimenez, 1998; Gubert, 2002). 
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Lastly, remittances sent may not be large enough to improve welfare of the household to an 
extent that consumption levels of recipient households exceed subsistence consumption levels.  
There are various channels through which remittances may affect household welfare, 
and in this section, we try to quantify the impact of remittances on household well-being. To 
measure the welfare status of a household, we make use of poverty indicators that determine 
the relative position of the household in household income or expenditure distributions. It is 
extremely difficult to use absolute poverty measures in our analysis because the amount of the 
expenditure on durable goods and non-food items in a month by a household must be subtracted 
from a household’s monthly expenditure and the basket of durable goods are unknown to us. 
Moreover, food poverty lines are no more calculated by TÜİK since 2011. Therefore, we prefer 
to rely on relative measures of poverty. The calculation of relative poverty measures based on 
household income do not change much from country to country and thus, organizations like 
OECD, EUROSTAT and TÜİK prefer to use this measure75. TÜİK uses different proportions 
of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly disposable household income distribution as 
cutoffs for poverty line (i.e., 40%, 50%, 60% and 70%) and suggests implementing 50% and 
60% cutoffs in studies on poverty. In international comparisons of household well-being, 
another widely used measure is per adult equivalent daily expenditure levels of 1$, 2.15$ and 
4.30$. TÜİK adds another expenditure based measure to the set of poverty indicators in which 
the cutoff for a household to be considered poor is set to 50% of the median of the per adult 
equivalent monthly household expenditure. We use all three kinds of poverty measures.  
Table 1-23 presents the estimates of the impact of being a recipient household on 
welfare status of the household measured by the relative position of the household in the income 
distribution. The dependent variables are dummies capturing household well-being taking 
values 1 if the household is located below 40%, 50%, 60% or 70% of the median of the per 
adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution, and taking values 0 
otherwise. Since households come from different years, to have comparable income and 
expenditure values we inflate the prices to December 2011 using TÜİK’s consumer price index. 
To have comparable household sizes, we make use of a modified version of OECD’s 
equivalence scale which counts the first adult in the household as 1, and the remaining members 
who are older than 14 years of age as 0.5 and younger than 14 years of age as 0.3. Besides the 
main regressor of interest, all models also include year fixed effects in addition to household 
                                                          
75 Tüketim Harcamaları, Yoksulluk ve Gelir Dağılımı – Sorularla Resmi İstatistikler Dizisi – 6, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 
Yayın No: 3186. 
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and region level covariates: a dummy for having a married household head, dummies for the 
age of the household head, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, 
number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number 
of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural 
gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road 
per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and 
share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, 
gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school 
degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, 
unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working 
in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by 
region. 
 The instrument has a strong predicable power on a household’s likelihood to receive 
remittances, and there is no evidence in the data against the exogeneity of the instrument; thus, 
we achieve strong and valid identification for poverty regressions where measures of household 
well-being are based on the relative position of the household in the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income distribution. The impact of remittances seems to vary depending 
on the estimator and the cutoff used for the poverty line. When poverty line is set to 40% of the 
median of the per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution, IV 2SLS 
estimate points to a negative and statistically significant impact of remittances on poverty. The 
point estimate is robust under alternative rejection methods. Anderson-Rubin test rejects a null 
impact of remittances in favor of the negative effect. IV bivariate probit shows a negative and 
statistically significant impact of remittances but the point estimate is not robust under restricted 
score cluster bootstrap and pairs cluster bootstrap-t. IV SNP finds a negative but insignificant 
impact of remittances. The coefficient of remittances from probit regression is negative and 
statistically insignificant; however, both tests of exogeneity reveal that remittances are 
endogenous and should be treated accordingly. The evidence on poverty with 40% cutoff is 
mixed with respect to the statistical significance of the estimate of the impact, though the 
direction of the impact is in favor of recipient households.  
When poverty line is set to 50%, the only statistically significant estimate comes from 
probit regression; although the point estimate may prove to be biased. The statistical 
significance of the IV 2SLS estimate is not robust to the downward bias in the standard errors 
due to having few clusters. All estimates show a negative impact of remittances on poverty with 
50% cutoff but IV results are not statistically significant. Therefore, it is safe to argue that once 
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we control for the endogeneity of remittances, recipient and non-recipient households are not 
significantly different than each other with respect to their position relative to the 50% cutoff 
in the income distribution.   
When the cutoff is increased to 60%, robust evidence suggests a statistically significant 
decline in poverty rates for recipient households. The preferred estimator (IV SNP) finds a 
statistically significant negative impact of remittances on poverty; whereas other IV methods 
cannot detect a significant impact of remittances. Probit result is consistent with the finding of 
IV SNP model. Therefore, if we define a poor household as one which is located below 60% of 
the median of the per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution, the 
evidence reveals that being a recipient household decreases the probability of living under 
poverty line.  
When the poverty line cutoff is further increased to 70%, IV methods cannot find a 
significant difference between recipient and non-recipient households in the likelihood of being 
poor. Probit estimate shows a negative and significant impact of remittances on poverty.  
ATEs of remittances from probit estimates suggest that regardless of the cutoff used to 
define poverty, being a recipient household reduces the chances to be poor by 2 to 4 percentage 
points. Once we account for unobserved heterogeneity that affects both selection into treatment 
and outcome variables, ATE from IV bivariate probit estimates suggests that recipient 
households are 10 percentage points less likely to be positioned below 40% of the median of 
the per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution; ATE from IV SNP 
estimate reveals that recipient households are 5 percentage points less likely to be poor based 
on the poverty measure with 60% poverty line cutoff. As a conclusion, robust evidence shows 
an improvement in the welfare of households in response to receiving remittances particularly 
for poverty indicators with 40% and 60% cutoffs.   
Table 1-24 presents the estimates of the impact of being a recipient household on 
poverty, this time to quantify household welfare, expenditure patterns of households are used 
as basis. The first dependent variable comes from TÜİK’s definition of relative poverty based 
on monthly household expenditures: households with per adult equivalent monthly household 
expenditure levels below 50% of the median of corresponding expenditure distribution, are 
considered to be poor. The latter two dependent variables are widely used definitions of relative 
poverty in international comparisons based on expenditure patterns of households: daily per 
adult equivalent expenditure levels of 1$, 2.15$, and 4.30$. There is very limited variation in 
dependent variable for 1$ expenditure level which makes it impossible to estimate the impact 
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of remittances. Therefore, we are left with 2.15$ and 4.30$ expenditure levels as outcome 
variables.  
The results are in line with the preceding findings: recipient households are better off 
compared to non-recipient counterparts. In each specification, exogeneity of remittances is 
rejected; hence, probit estimates of coefficient on remittances may be biased. IV 2SLS and IV 
bivariate probit results in columns (2) and (3) reveal conflicting impacts of remittances on 
poverty. IV 2SLS estimate suggests a statistically significant improvement in household 
welfare due to receiving remittances; however, IV bivariate probit finds a statistically 
significant worsening impact of remittances. Both estimates are robust to rejecting based on t 
critical values. Pairs cluster bootstrap-t produces some missing Wald statistics in estimation 
process; thus, may not provide valid inference. Actually, the p-value from pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t is smaller than the conventional p-value of the Wald statistic which may justify our 
concern with the validity of the inference. IV SNP result suggests a negative impact of 
remittances but the point estimate is not statistically significant. In conclusion, the robust 
evidence reveals a null impact of remittances on a household’s likelihood to be placed below 
50% of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly household expenditure distribution. 
ATEs of remittances from IV bivariate probit estimates and IV SNP estimates are in agreement: 
members of recipient households are around 7 percentage points more likely to be consuming 
less than 50% of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly household expenditure 
distribution. ATE of remittances from probit, on the contrary, suggests that recipient households 
are 3 percentage points less likely to be placed below the 50% cutoff.  
For daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels, IV 2SLS estimates show statistically 
significant and negative impacts of remittances. The point estimates are robust to rejection with 
alternative methods. In addition, Anderson-Rubin test rejects null impact of remittances on both 
2.15$ and 4.30$ expenditure levels. IV bivariate probit finds a statistically significant and 
negative impact of remittances on living under 2.15$ per day, but the estimate is not robust 
under restricted score cluster bootstraps. Pairs cluster bootstrap-t has some missing Wald 
statistics which cast some clouds on the validity of the inference. IV SNP point estimates 
suggest that remittances do not affect the likelihood of living under 2.15$ or 4.30$ per day. 
Probit estimates find a significant negative impact on the likelihood of living under 4.30$ per 
day. To conclude, robust evidence from IV 2SLS models suggest that members of recipient 
households are significantly less likely to live under 2.15$ per day (by 16 percentage points) 
and under 4.30$ per day. The corresponding ATEs of remittances from IV bivariate probit 
estimates suggest a significant 0.3 percent decline in the likelihood to live under 2.15$ per day, 
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and an insignificant 0.6 percent decline in the probability to live under 4.30$ per day. ATEs of 
remittances from IV SNP are insignificant on both expenditure levels and are similar in 
magnitude to ATEs from IV bivariate probit estimates. ATEs from probit estimates suggest a 
zero impact on the likelihood to live under 2.15$ per day and a significant mere 1 percent 
decline in the likelihood to live under 4.30$ per day.  
The empirical analysis with both income and expenditure based poverty measures 
shows an important result: recipient households are doing better compared to non-recipients 
even after accounting for observable and unobservable differences between households. This 
result is consistent with the observational evidence and with the Adams and Page’s (2003) 
finding of a decline in the share of people living under 1$ per day in response to an increase in 
received remittances. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This study explores the impact of remittances on child human capital investment 
decisions, child labor, adult labor supply choices and household well-being. We acknowledge 
that our identification strategy cannot isolate the impacts of remittances from other impacts of 
accompanying migration, and hence the results are best interpreted as joint effect of remittances 
and other impacts of migration. We pay much attention to deal with the endogeneity of 
remittances in the analysis. We present IV estimates with a widely used instrument in the 
literature of the impact of migration on various household outcomes, which is historical 
migration rates by region. To achieve a valid instrument, regression analysis includes numerous 
region level covariates through which the instrument is suspected to affect outcome variables. 
We do not control for broad geographical regions in our regressions. Including indicators for 
geographical regions does not significantly affect the size of the coefficient estimates; though 
it leads to less precise estimation of remittance impact as expected. An indirect test of the 
exogeneity of the instrument is presented in an Appendix, and the results provide more 
confidence in our identification strategy. We make use of a semiparametric IV estimator in 
addition to IV 2SLS and IV bivariate probit estimators which are the most frequently used 
estimators recently in the literature that estimates bivariate binary choice models. The 
semiparametric IV estimator improves upon others by allowing less restrictive assumptions on 
error distributions. The evidence shows that being unable to satisfy model assumptions have 
important consequences on the estimates. Lastly, to account for possible intra-group error 
correlation, we use cluster robust variance matrix estimator, and to correct for the downward 
bias in standard errors due to having few clusters, we implement alternative rejection methods 
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that are suggested in the literature. The results reveal that there is a great chance of rejecting a 
true null hypothesis when one relies on asymptotic cluster robust standard errors in the presence 
of heterogenous and few clusters. At least, one should make small sample modifications and 
use t(G-1) critical values for the Wald test as noted by Cameron and Miller (2015).   
We find evidence of an increase in school retention rates of 6- to 14-years-old children 
regardless of their gender, and an increase in 6- to 14-years-old girls’ literacy rates in response 
to being in a recipient household. Remittances have counteracting impacts on school attendance 
of 15- to 19-years-old boys and girls. While boys aged 15 to 19 benefit from higher schooling, 
girls of same age are less likely to be present at school. Remittances by alleviating liquidity 
constraints is expected to have a positive impact on school attainment of children; thus, the 
negative impact of remittances on school attendance of 15- to 19-years-old girls is most likely 
a result of dominance of disruptive effects of migration over income effect of remittances. The 
impact of remittances on child labor choices favor income effect hypothesis. Boys aged 15 to 
19 in recipient households are less likely to work as unpaid family worker, and girls aged 15 to 
19 in recipient households are less likely to be self-employed. There appears to be a time 
substitution favoring schooling over market work for recipient boys of ages 15-19-years-old, 
while girls of ages 15-19-years-old are losing out on both schooling and experience in labor 
market due to receiving remittances. To sum up, remittances improve schooling outcomes of 
boys of ages 6- to 19-years-old and girls of ages 6- to 14-years-old, and lead to lower school 
retention for girls aged 15-19-years-old and to lower child labor.  
We also examine the impacts of remittances on left behind males’ and females’ labor 
supply decisions. Income effect of remittances by increasing reservation wages may cause a 
decline in adult labor supply. On the other hand, the substitution effect of migration and 
productive uses of remittances in household enterprises may require adults to increase their 
labor supply. Our results are in line with these predictions. For 20- to 24-years-old males, 
remittances reduce labor force participation which appears to be a result of a simultaneous 
decline in both wage work and self-employment. For 25- to 49-years-old males (prime-age), 
remittances cause to some extent a shift from wage work to unpaid family work which may 
stem from the need to replace the absent migrant’s labor; however, the income effect is 
substantially stronger than the substitution effect that eventually causes a significant decline in 
market labor force participation. For 50-64-years-old males, receiving remittances is associated 
with an increase in overall labor market participation. Males of ages 50- to 64-years-old replace 
unpaid family work with self-employment maybe to substitute for the absent migrant’s 
responsibilities in management of household enterprise or due to productive uses of remittances 
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in setting up new household enterprises. Summing up, we find evidence on the dominance of 
income effect of remittances for 20- to 49-years-old males, and on the dominance of substitution 
effect for 50- to 64-years-old males.  
Labor supply responses of females aged 20 to 49 years-old resemble their male 
counterparts’ responses. Females of ages 20- to 24-years-old decrease their labor force 
participation in response to receiving remittances, and the decline is due to a significant and 
simultaneous decline in wage work and self-employment. Prime-age women in recipient 
households decrease wage work and increase self-employment, and the overall impact is a 
significant decline in labor force participation. For 50- to 64-years-old females, receiving 
remittances is associated with a decline in likelihood to work for a wage.  
Lastly, we look at the impacts of remittances on welfare status of the household. The 
results show a lower likelihood for recipient households to be positioned below 40% and 60% 
of per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution; and a lower chance for 
members of recipient households to live under 2.15$ and 4.30$ per day. The evidence suggests 
that recipient households are doing better compared to non-recipients.  
In Turkish context, our results on child schooling and child labor reveal dominance of 
liquidity-constraints alleviating impact of remittances for boys aged 6 to 19 and girls aged 6 to 
14, and dominance of disruptive effects of migration for girls aged 15 to 19. The income effect 
of remittances seems to shape labor supply responses of left behind adults, and in total, recipient 
households are better off in terms of household welfare. In conclusion, households and their 
members seem to benefit from remittances with respect to developmental outcomes in the case 
of Turkey. 
In this study, the estimated impacts of remittances on various outcomes are on the 
extensive margin. More can be learnt on the impacts of remittances by looking at its intensive 
margin effects. Further research is required in this regard to deepen the understanding of 
remittance impacts. Statistical inference based on IV SNP estimator requires more attention. 
Since it was not possible to account for intra-group error correlation with IV SNP estimator, we 
might have ended up with overly narrow confidence intervals and overly large t statistics. With 
the advancements in parallel programming and computer technology, it will be possible to 
overcome both problems—estimating cluster robust variance matrix and correcting for the 
downward bias in standard errors due to having few cluster—with IV SNP estimator in the near 
future.  
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Table 1-1 Distribution of remittance receipts and amount (average per year) 
 Occurrence (% of 
population) 
 
(1) 
Share (% of 
recipient 
households) 
(2) 
Yearly average 
amounta (TL per 
adult equivalent) 
(3) 
Average share (% of 
per adult equivalent 
household income) 
(4) 
Average cash 
share (% of 
remittances) 
(5) 
Average pension 
benefit share (% of 
remittances) 
(6) 
Average in-kind share 
(% of remittances) 
 
(7) 
Quintile 1 (poorest) 1.03 15.3 1,388.61 43.0 81.6 8.4 9.9 
Quintile 2 1.47 20.4 2,375.28 40.7 74.6 16.8 8.4 
Quintile 3 1.30 17.5 3,132.93 37.0 64.3 24.3 11.2 
Quintile 4 1.62 22.0 4,695.64 38.0 64.2 27.2 8.4 
Quintile 5 (richest) 1.62 24.5 11,297.21 46.1 41.3 53.1 5.4 
Settlementb        
Urban  1.50 61.3 5,227.66 40.4 62.3 28.9 8.7 
Rural 1.30 38.6 4,800.01 42.3 65.1 26.8 8.0 
Regionsc        
Mediterranean 1.93 16.6 5,079.31 49.3 76.3 14.5 9.1 
Aegean  1.24 14.1 5,111.41 32.3 53.5 30.8 15.6 
Marmara 1.04 20.0 5,200.76 34.3 49.1 45.7 5.1 
Black Sea 1.03 8.8 7,068.20 48.8 54.5 38.2 7.1 
Central Anatolia 1.98 25.0 5,727.84 46.4 67.6 27.2 5.1 
Eastern Anatolia 1.53 8.5 2,912.36 38.6 77.7 15.2 7.0 
Southeastern Anatolia .946 6.6 2,088.89 32.9 72.9 9.6 17.4 
Turkey 1.37 100 5,062.36 41.1 63.4 28.1 8.4 
Notes: Quintiles are formed by ranking households from lowest to highest and dividing them in 5 groups with respect to per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income. 
a  to have comparable income values for households, TL figures are adjusted with December 2003 based CPI and moved to December 2011.   
b communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are rural. 
c  refers to 7 geographical regions of Turkey. 
  
84 
 
Table 1-2 Descriptive statistics of key variables for households with a child aged 6 to 19 
 Number 
of observations 
Recipient households Non-recipient households 
 Mean  Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Households  50,136 .0128  .9872  
Outcome variables       
School attendance of children 6 to 14      
 
Males 25,430 .923 .266 .898 .301 
Females 24,166 .888 .315 .867 .338 
School attendance of children 15 to 19      
 Males  14,680 .617 .487 .561 .496 
Females 14,483 .481 .500 .475 .499 
Child illiteracy (ages 6-14 years)      
 Males 25,430 .047 .213 .073 .260 
 Females 24,166 .073 .261 .082 .275 
Labor force participation of females 15 to 19      
 Any kind 14,484 .108 .312 .175 .379 
 Wage work 14,484 .031 .174 .084 .277 
 Unpaid family work 14,484 .077 .268 .089 .285 
 Self-employment 14,484 0 0 .001 .040 
Labor force participation of males 15 to 19      
 Any kind 14,680 .234 .424 .297 .457 
 Wage work 14,680 .193 .396 .185 .388 
 Unpaid family work 14,680 .035 .186 .105 .307 
 Self-employment 14,680 .005 .071 .006 .081 
Household variables      
Adult equivalent household sizea 78,759 2.54 .771 2.78 .848 
Adult equivalent yearly disposable incomeb (remittances 
included) 
78,759 8,473.06 6,109.67 8,858.61 9,617.16 
Parental educational attainment      
 Illiterate 78,758 .116 .320 .054 .226 
 Junior high and below 78,758 .705 .456 .670 .470 
 High school 78,758 .141 .348 .182 .386 
 Above high school 78,758 .036 .187 .092 .290 
Age of household head      
 Below 30  78,745 .032 .177 .016 .128 
 Between 30 and 50 78,745 .799 .400 .806 .394 
 Above 50 78,745 .168 .374 .176 .381 
Married household head 78,745 .929 .256 .962 .190 
Female household head 78,745 .406 .491 .065 .247 
Ownership of piped water system 78,759 .952 .212 .935 .245 
Ownership of natural gas system 78,759 .093 .290 .135 .342 
Rural areac 78,759 .371 .483 .346 .475 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 78,759 .317 .590 .417 .723 
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Table 1-2 (continued) 
Number of school age children (ages 6-19 years) 78,759 2.32 1.17 2.42 1.35 
Number of adults (ages 20-64 years) 78,759 1.96 .970 2.33 .889 
Region level variables      
Regional migration rate in 1985 78,759 .0164 .007 .0151 .007 
Regional development index in 1973 78,759 .863 .648 1.00 .756 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 78,759 .082 .023 .086 .027 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 78,759 .143 .155 .152 .178 
Number of schools per 1000 children aged 6 to 16 in 
1985 
78,759 3.90 1.42 3.85 1.61 
Gini of household income  78,759 .371 .025 .370 .027 
Gross enrollment ratio of males aged 6 to 10 in 1985 
(only for outcomes of males aged 6 to 14) 
25,430 1.04 .110 1.06 .159 
Gross enrollment ratio of females aged 6 to 10 in 1985 
(only for outcomes of females aged 6 to 14) 
24,166 .939 .252 .983 .247 
Net enrollment ratio of males aged 15 to 19  
(only for outcomes of males aged 15 to 19) 
14,680 .576 .056 .577 .061 
Net enrollment ratio of females aged 15 to 19  
(only for outcomes of females aged 15 to 19) 
14,483 .468 .099 .477 .118 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with degreed      
 Below high school 29,163 .649 .047 .642 .049 
 High school  29,163 .198 .031 .200 .031 
 Above high school 29,163 .117 .031 .120 .037 
Unemployment for males 15 years old or olderd (in 
percentages) 
29,163 11.5 2.75 10.8 2.71 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sectord 29,163 .143 .063 .137 .071 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in private sectord 29,163 .593 .052 .593 .058 
Notes: a to estimate adult equivalent household size a measure by OECD is implemented: for the first adult in the household the count number is 1, for other household members over age 14 the 
count number is 0.5, for household members below 14 years of age the count number is 0.3. 
b to have comparable income values for households, TL figures are adjusted with December 2003 based CPI and moved to December 2011.   
c communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are rural. 
d calculated for the sample consisting of oldest children (ages 15-19 years) of household heads. 
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Table 1-3 Descriptive Statistics of key variables for households with an adult aged 20 to 64 
 Number 
of observations 
Recipient households Non-recipient households 
 Mean  Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Households  92,893 .0146  .9854  
Individual variables       
Labor force participation of females 20 to 24      
 Any kind 15,630 .292 .455 .284 .451 
 Wage work 15,630 .158 .366 .171 .377 
 Unpaid family work 15,630 .118 .324 .103 .304 
 Self-employment 15,630 .014 .121 .009 .095 
Labor force participation of males 20 to 24      
 Any kind 11,661 .524 .501 .616 .486 
 Wage work 11,661 .377 .486 .422 .494 
 Unpaid family work 11,661 .097 .298 .141 .348 
 Self-employment 11,661 .048 .216 .052 .223 
Labor force participation of females 25 to 49      
 Any kind 68,862 .286 .452 .304 .460 
 Wage work 68,862 .120 .325 .146 .353 
 Unpaid family work 68,862 .100 .301 .112 .315 
 Self-employment 68,862 .065 .247 .045 .208 
Labor force participation of males 25 to 49      
 Any kind 63,991 .763 .425 .892 .309 
 Wage work 63,991 .495 .500 .609 .487 
 Unpaid family work 63,991 .041 .199 .026 .159 
 Self-employment 63,991 .226 .418 .257 .437 
Labor force participation of females 50 to 64      
 Any kind 24,116 .197 .398 .229 .420 
 Wage work 24,116 .044 .207 .037 .189 
 Unpaid family work 24,116 .100 .301 .150 .357 
 Self-employment 24,116 .051 .221 .041 .200 
Labor force participation of males 50 to 64      
 Any kind 24,185 .380 .486 .568 .495 
 Wage work 24,185 .144 .352 .221 .414 
 Unpaid family work 24,185 .006 .079 .008 .091 
 Self-employment 24,185 .229 .421 .338 .473 
Educational attainment      
 
Illiterate 208,445 .141 .348 .096 .294 
Junior high and below 208,445 .621 .485 .623 .484 
High school 208,445 .176 .381 .188 .391 
Above high school 208,445 .061 .239 .091 .288 
Married 208,445 .774 .418 .825 .379 
Household head 208,445 .424 .494 .406 .491 
Household variables      
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Table 1-3 (continued) 
Max. household educational attainment      
 Illiterate 208,445 .009 .097 .005 .070 
 Junior high and below 208,445 .534 .498 .487 .499 
 High school 208,445 .328 .469 .334 .471 
 Above high school 208,445 .127 .333 .173 .378 
Adult equivalent household sizea 208,445 2.39 .828 2.51 .887 
Adult equivalent yearly disposable incomeb (remittances 
included) 
208,445 11,095.24 8,647.64 10,853.22 11,504.26 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 208,445 .323 .597 .446 .743 
Number of school age children (ages 6-19 years) 208,445 1.11 1.28 1.20 1.36 
Number of adults (ages 20-64 years) 208,445 2.44 1.07 2.67 1.13 
Ownership of piped water system 208,445 .974 .158 .956 .204 
Ownership of natural gas system 208,445 .147 .355 .163 .370 
Ruralc 208,445 .380 .485 .337 .472 
Region level variables      
Regional migration rate in 1985 208,445 .0174 .006 .0160 .006 
Regional development index in 1973 208,445 .915 .659 1.06 .765 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 208,445 .084 .023 .089 .027 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 208,445 .155 .153 .164 .179 
Number of schools per 1000 children aged 6 to 16 in   
1985 
208,445 3.92 1.43 3.92 1.72 
Gini of household income  208,445 .367 .026 .367 .026 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with degreed      
 Below high school 208,445 .651 .046 .642 .051 
 High school  208,445 .199 .029 .202 .030 
 Above high school 208,445 .119 .030 .124 .037 
Unemployment for males 15 years old or olderd (in 
percentages) 
208,445 11.0 2.68 10.5 2.63 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sectord 208,445 .139 .062 .131 .072 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in private sectord 208,445 .600 .051 .599 .056 
Notes: a to estimate adult equivalent household size a measure by OECD is implemented: for the first adult in the household the count number is 1, for other household members over age 14 the 
count number is 0.5, for household members below 14 years of age the count number is 0.3. 
b to have comparable income values for households TL figures are adjusted with December 2003 based CPI and moved to December 2011.   
c communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are rural. 
d calculated for the sample consisting of oldest adults by age groups 20-24, 25-49, and 50-64 in households. 
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Table 1-4 Descriptive statistics of key variables for households 
 Number 
of observations 
Recipient households Non-recipient households 
 Mean  Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Households  98,567 0.0155  0.9845  
Households below      
 40 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
98,567 .080 .272 .112 .315 
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
98,567 .124 .330 .172 .378 
 60 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
98,567 .193 .395 .237 .425 
 70 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
98,567 .260 .438 .305 .460 
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly 
household expenditure  
98,567 .117 .321 .155 .362 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 1$ 98,567 0 0 .0001 .010 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 2,15$ 98,567 .001 .036 .002 .051 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 4,30$ 98,567 .017 .129 .031 .175 
Household variables      
Max. household educational attainment      
 Illiterate 98,567 .037 .189 .021 .145 
Junior high and below 98,567 .598 .490 .520 .499 
High school 98,567 .264 .441 .298 .457 
Above high school 98,567 .100 .300 .159 .366 
Age of household head      
 Below 30 98,567 .068 .251 .078 .269 
 Between 30 and 50 98,567 .402 .490 .514 .499 
 Above 50 98,567 .529 .499 .406 .491 
Married household head 98,567 .837 .368 .889 .313 
Female household head 98,557 .336 .472 .109 .312 
Adult equivalent household sizea 98,567 2.11 .769 2.29 .822 
Adult equivalent yearly disposable incomeb (remittances 
included) 
98,567 11,807.96 9,478.14 11,071.62 12,099.68 
Adult equivalent monthly expenditureb 98,567 942.61 786.08 850.61 760.62 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 98,567 .274 .569 .401 .700 
Number of school age children (ages 6-19 years) 98,567 .988 1.24 1.12 1.32 
Number of adults (ages 20-64 years) 98,567 1.80 1.14 2.23 1.10 
Ownership of piped water system 98,567 .977 .147 .958 .199 
Ownership of natural gas system 98,567 .153 .360 .165 .371 
Ruralc 98,567 .386 .487 .337 .472 
Region level variables      
Regional migration rate in 1985 98,567 .0176 .006 .0161 .006 
Regional development index in 1973 98,567 .930 .676 1.07 .759 
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Table 1-4 (continued) 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 98,567 .085 .024 .089 .026 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 98,567 .161 .157 .165 .177 
Number of schools per 1000 children aged 6 to 16 in   
1985 
98,567 3.94 1.48 3.93 1.74 
Gini of household income  98,567 .366 .025 .366 .026 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with degreed      
 Below high school 98,567 .651 .046 .642 .051 
 High school  98,567 .199 .029 .202 .030 
 Above high school 98,567 .120 .030 .125 .037 
Unemployment for males 15 years old or olderd (in 
percentages) 
98,567 10.8 2.67 10.4 2.62 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sectord 98,567 .138 .062 .131 .071 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in private sectord 98,567 .602 .050 .600 .055 
Notes: a to estimate adult equivalent household size a measure by OECD is implemented: for the first adult in the household the count number is 1, for other household members over age 14 the 
count number is 0.5, for household members below 14 years of age the count number is 0.3. 
b to have comparable income and expenditure values for households, TL figures are adjusted with December 2003 based CPI and moved to December 2011.   
c communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are rural. 
d calculated for the sample consisting of households. 
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Table 1-5 First stage estimations (child sample) 
 Samples of children of household head (aged between 6 and 19 years old) 
 Males Females 
 6-14-years-olds 15-19-years-olds 6-14-years-olds 15-19-years-olds 
 Probit 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
Probit 
(7) 
OLS 
(8) 
Individual level covariate         
Oldest child -0.0078 
(0.0505) 
-0.0007 
(0.0011) 
-0.0707 
(0.0833) 
-0.0031 
(0.0027) 
-0.1192** 
(0.0545) 
-0.0044*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.1058 
(0.0937) 
-0.0036  
(0.0029) 
Affected by educational system reforma   -0.0232 
(0.0927) 
-0.0010 
(0.0027) 
  -0.1025 
(0.0918) 
-0.0038  
(0.0030) 
Household level covariates         
Parental educational attainment         
 Junior high and below -0.1412 
(0.1172) 
-0.0112 
(0.0068) 
-0.2025 
(0.1238) 
-0.0115* 
(0.0070) 
-0.1879* 
(0.0998) 
-0.0176** 
(0.0085) 
-0.2048* 
(0.1055) 
-0.0139* 
(0.0075) 
 High school -0.3311** 
(0.1494) 
-0.0179** 
(0.0078) 
-0.2517* 
(0.1524) 
-0.0140* 
(0.0078) 
-0.2490** 
(0.1153) 
-0.0211** 
(0.0093) 
-0.2711 
(0.1662) 
-0.0175* 
(0.0094) 
 Above high school -0.4943*** 
(0.1390) 
-0.0215*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.6114*** 
(0.2306) 
-0.0223*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.4856*** 
(0.1493) 
-0.0258*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.6400*** 
(0.2154) 
-0.0250*** 
(0.0091) 
Age of household head         
 Between 30 and 50 0.0352 
(0.1305) 
-0.0035 
(0.0062) 
2.7964*** 
(0.2150) 
0.0323*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.1910* 
(0.1144) 
-0.0151* 
(0.0085) 
2.9404*** 
(0.2130) 
0.0250*** 
(0.0069) 
 Above 50 0.1776 
(0.1227) 
0.0036 
(0.0053) 
2.6907*** 
(0.2143) 
0.0296*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.2970* 
(0.1582) 
-0.0156* 
(0.0088) 
2.8527*** 
(0.2126) 
0.0232*** 
(0.0073) 
Married household head 0.3612*** 
(0.1225) 
0.0088 
(0.0058) 
0.4106*** 
(0.1476) 
0.0123** 
(0.0051) 
0.3045*** 
(0.1174) 
0.0010 
(0.0088) 
0.2484*** 
(0.0893) 
0.0051 
(0.0054) 
Ownership of piped water system 0.0469 
(0.1507) 
0.0016 
(0.0040) 
0.0559 
(0.1567) 
0.0020 
(0.0039) 
0.1517 
(0.1682) 
0.0044 
(0.0044) 
0.0284 
(0.1526) 
0.0018 
(0.0048) 
Ownership of natural gas system -0.1686** 
(0.0788) 
-0.0032** 
(0.0016) 
0.1587** 
(0.0645) 
0.0046* 
(0.0025) 
-0.0964 
(0.0962) 
-0.0009 
(0.0021) 
0.0453 
(0.0995) 
0.0015 
(0.0028) 
Rural areab 0.0000 
(0.0614) 
0.0000 
(0.0020) 
0.0629 
(0.0839) 
0.0016 
(0.0031) 
-0.0596 
(0.0544) 
-0.0020 
(0.0016) 
0.0849 
(0.0751) 
0.0023 
(0.0026) 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 -0.1608*** 
(0.0553) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0078 
(0.0560) 
0.0004 
(0.0015) 
-0.0258 
(0.0366) 
-0.0007 
(0.0008) 
0.0017 
(0.0559) 
0.0002 
(0.0014) 
Number of male children (ages 6-19 years) -0.0496 
(0.0355) 
-0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.0799** 
(0.0356) 
-0.0023** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0415 
(0.0277) 
-0.0011 
(0.0007) 
-0.0880** 
(0.0360) 
-0.0026** 
(0.0011) 
Number of female children (ages 6-19 years) -0.0807** 
(0.0384) 
-0.0019* 
(0.0010) 
-0.0859** 
(0.0357) 
-0.0024** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0189 
(0.0298) 
-0.0002 
(0.0008) 
-0.0749** 
(0.0363) 
-0.0022** 
(0.0010) 
Number of adult males (ages 20-64 years) -0.7746*** 
(0.1092) 
-0.0238*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.4922*** 
(0.0855) 
-0.0132*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.8495*** 
(0.1011) 
-0.0225*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.5818*** 
(0.1041) 
-0.0161*** 
(0.0036) 
Number of adult females (ages 20-64 years) 0.1867*** 
(0.0483) 
0.0091*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0151 
(0.0913) 
0.0013 
(0.0029) 
0.1976*** 
(0.0445) 
0.0085*** 
(0.0021) 
0.0580 
(0.0663) 
0.0035 
(0.0021) 
Regional level covariates         
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Table 1-5 (continued) 
Regional development index in 1973 -0.4274*** 
(0.1654) 
-0.0164** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0019 
(0.2035) 
0.0009 
(0.0061) 
-0.2755 
(0.1750) 
-0.0079 
(0.0079) 
-0.2249 
(0.3649) 
-0.0080 
(0.0093) 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 0.7726 
(2.793) 
0.0407 
(0.1036) 
-3.2188 
(3.3402) 
-0.1311 
(0.1312) 
1.090 
(3.657) 
0.0620 
(0.1547) 
0.2778 
(3.3941) 
0.0635 
(0.1242) 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 -0.7443 
(0.8442) 
-0.0213 
(0.0352) 
-0.4861 
(0.8264) 
-0.0057 
(0.0343) 
-0.2639 
(1.015) 
0.0014 
(0.0441) 
0.7782 
(1.7740) 
0.0591 
(0.0543) 
Interaction of length and share of roads 7.614 
(7.354) 
0.2507 
(0.2669) 
4.5545 
(7.8000) 
0.1021 
(0.3087) 
3.582 
(8.006) 
-0.0337 
(0.3370) 
1.2308 
(15.8695) 
-0.1897 
(0.4709) 
Number of schools per 1000 children aged 6 to 
16 in 1985 
-0.0753* 
(0.0458) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
0.0378 
(0.0444) 
0.0022 
(0.0015) 
0.0106 
(0.0461) 
0.0001 
(0.0015) 
-0.0280 
(0.0724) 
-0.0002 
(0.0017) 
Gross enrollment ratio of children aged 6 to 10 
in 1985c 
-0.0364 
(0.2680) 
0.0021 
(0.0105) 
  -0.0643 
(0.1687) 
-0.0079 
(0.0090) 
  
Net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19d    1.3211 
(0.9557) 
0.0197 
(0.0382) 
  0.5629 
(1.0712) 
0.0106 
(0.0319) 
Gini of household income  0.7783 
(1.215) 
0.0362 
(0.0391) 
0.6845 
(1.7896) 
0.0072 
(0.0757) 
1.918 
(1.394) 
0.0792 
(0.0523) 
-0.4471 
(1.6697) 
0.0151 
(0.0750) 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with degreee         
 High school   0.0642 
(1.7807) 
0.0425 
(0.0724) 
  0.4243 
(1.7705) 
0.0377 
(0.0596) 
 Above high school   -1.7005 
(2.1245) 
-0.0567 
(0.0787) 
  1.5902 
(2.7412) 
0.0271 
(0.0799) 
Unemployment for males 15 years old or oldere 
(in percentages) 
  0.0756*** 
(0.0184) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0010) 
  0.0714*** 
(0.0250) 
0.0024** 
(0.0010) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in 
agricultural sectore 
  1.8503* 
(1.0592) 
0.0722 
(0.0477) 
  2.8000* 
(1.6529) 
0.0903 
(0.0672) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in private 
sectore 
  0.1382 
(0.7362) 
-0.0036 
(0.0265) 
  -0.7598 
(1.3526) 
-0.0340 
(0.0423) 
Year fixed effects         
2004 0.0859 
(0.1227) 
0.0025 
(0.0036) 
0.1941* 
(0.1107) 
0.0074 
(0.0045) 
0.0460 
(0.1126) 
0.0023 
(0.0037) 
0.1376 
(0.1422) 
0.0044 
(0.0044) 
2005 0.0000 
(0.1093) 
-0.0005 
(0.0028) 
0.2073* 
(0.1202) 
0.0064 
(0.0045) 
0.0299 
(0.0839) 
0.0008 
(0.0023) 
0.2149 
(0.1355) 
0.0071 
(0.0049) 
2006 0.0883 
(0.1287) 
0.0015 
(0.0037) 
0.0817 
(0.1339) 
0.0020 
(0.0039) 
0.0225 
(0.1201) 
0.0000 
(0.0031) 
0.1221 
(0.1745) 
0.0037 
(0.0050) 
2007 0.1095 
(0.1090) 
0.0020 
(0.0031) 
0.0729 
(0.1381) 
0.0015 
(0.0037) 
0.1221 
(0.1107) 
0.0035 
(0.0035) 
0.1953 
(0.1538) 
0.0058 
(0.0049) 
2008 0.2849** 
(0.1171) 
0.0096* 
(0.0052) 
0.3288** 
(0.1341) 
0.0136** 
(0.0063) 
0.0322 
(0.1302) 
0.0008 
(0.0036) 
0.2988** 
(0.1420) 
0.0097* 
(0.0055) 
2009 0.1617* 
(0.0953) 
0.0046 
(0.0028) 
0.1706 
(0.1231) 
0.0060 
(0.0042) 
0.0462 
(0.0961) 
0.0009 
(0.0027) 
0.2460* 
(0.1312) 
0.0070* 
(0.0040) 
2010 0.2442** 
(0.1207) 
0.0080* 
(0.0045) 
0.0569 
(0.1403) 
0.0014 
(0.0039) 
0.1556 
(0.1125) 
0.0049 
(0.0039) 
0.2431* 
(0.1365) 
0.0070 
(0.0044) 
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Table 1-5 (continued) 
2011 -0.0446 
(0.1049) 
-0.0007 
(0.0021) 
-0.1294 
(0.1375) 
-0.0028 
(0.0032) 
-0.0624 
(0.1105) 
-0.0016 
(0.0026) 
-0.0692 
(0.1803) 
-0.0007 
(0.0041) 
Constant -1.803*** 
(0.6490) 
0.0291 
(0.0240) 
-6.8426*** 
(1.1263) 
-0.0720 
(0.0439) 
-2.527*** 
(0.7318) 
0.0236 
(0.0278) 
-5.6313*** 
(1.0083) 
-0.0333 
(0.0299) 
Instrumental variable         
Regional migration rate in 1985 19.263*** 
(3.575) 
0.8016*** 
(0.1655) 
22.6797*** 
(3.9424) 
1.0461*** 
(.1377) 
22.374*** 
(4.225) 
0.9848*** 
(0.1805) 
11.2895 
(7.6999) 
0.5672* 
(.3042) 
Weak identification test statistics         
p-value of the Wald test for the excluded 
instrument 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.143  
Effective F statistic  24.40  59.94  30.93  3.62 
Number of observations 25,426 14,677 24,164 14,478 
Notes: Dependent variable: child lives in remittance receiving household 
We use “ivreg2” command by Baum et al. (2010) to estimate OLS first stages. Stata’s “ivregress” command does not take into account clustered nature of the observations in first stage regression. 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample 
modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in OLS regressions where G is the number of clusters, 
N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivreg2” command for IV 2SLS models, and uses standard normal 
distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit models with small sample modifications. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a,e Only applicable to children aged 15 to 19.  
b Communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are rural. 
c Historical enrollment rates of males being reported for 6-14-years-old boys samples and historical enrollment rates of females being reported for 6-14-years-old girls samples. 
d Average enrollment rates of males being reported for 15-19-years-old boys samples and average enrollment rates of females being reported for 15-19-years-old girls samples. 
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Table 1-6 First stage estimations (samples of working age adult males) 
 Males 
 20-24-years-olds 25-49-years-olds 50-64-years-olds 
 
Probit 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
Individual level covariate       
Educational attainment       
 Junior high and below 
-0.1326 
(0.2152) 
-0.0059 
(0.0087) 
-0.1636* 
(0.0931) 
-0.0050 
(0.0033) 
-0.0870 
(0.1102) 
-0.0026 
(0.0037) 
 High school 
-0.1409 
(0.3031) 
0.0121 
(0.0121) 
-0.1996* 
(0.1068) 
-0.0059 
(0.0036) 
-0.2216 
(0.1679) 
-0.0065 
(0.0053) 
 Above high school 
-0.0852 
(0.3397) 
-0.0062 
(0.0128) 
-0.2737* 
(0.1558) 
-0.0076* 
(0.0046) 
-0.3164 
(0.2042) 
-0.0090 
(0.0056) 
Household head 
-0.1663 
(0.1600) 
-0.0030 
(0.0050) 
-0.3519*** 
(0.0494) 
-0.0099*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.4009*** 
(0.0958) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0052) 
Married 
-0.1893* 
(0.1098) 
-0.0065* 
(0.0033) 
-0.0085 
(0.0659) 
-0.0002 
(0.0019) 
-0.1135 
(0.1098) 
-0.0051 
(0.0048) 
Household level covariates       
Max. household educational 
attainment 
      
 Junior high and below 
-0.6453 
(0.5627) 
-0.0534 
(0.0727) 
0.1746 
(0.4070) 
0.0049 
(0.0096) 
0.3138 
(0.2495) 
0.0108 
(0.0080) 
 High school 
-0.6202 
(0.6353) 
-0.0520 
(0.0742) 
0.2941 
(0.4191) 
0.0077 
(0.0100) 
0.2717 
(0.2737) 
0.0084 
(0.0086) 
 Above high school 
-0.8964 
(0.6128) 
-0.0582 
(0.0740) 
0.2754 
(0.4163) 
0.0074 
(0.0099) 
0.1692 
(0.2731) 
0.0060 
(0.0085) 
Ownership of piped water system 
0.0875 
(0.1862) 
0.0024 
(0.0037) 
-0.0083 
(0.1264) 
-0.0001 
(0.0024) 
0.1528 
(0.1581) 
0.0033 
(0.0040) 
Ownership of natural gas system 
0.2176*** 
(0.0702) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0264 
(0.0590) 
-0.0005 
(0.0012) 
0.2073*** 
(0.0600) 
0.0076*** 
(0.0021) 
Rural areaa 
0.1745** 
(0.0728) 
0.0052* 
(0.0028) 
0.0526 
(0.0458) 
0.0013 
(0.0011) 
0.0580 
(0.0757) 
0.0020 
(0.0026) 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 
-0.0219 
(0.0524) 
-0.0003 
(0.0013) 
-0.0761*** 
(0.0285) 
-0.0015** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0701 
(0.0490) 
-0.0015 
(0.0010) 
Number of male children (ages 6-
19 years) 
0.0525 
(0.0536) 
0.0008 
(0.0015) 
0.0189 
(0.0192) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0135 
(0.0292) 
-0.0005 
(0.0008) 
Number of female children (ages 
6-19 years) 
-0.0079 
(0.0380) 
-0.0001 
(0.0011) 
-0.0043 
(0.0204) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0872** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.0009) 
Number of adult males (ages 20-
64 years) 
-0.4039*** 
(0.0729) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.1884*** 
(0.0308) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.2197*** 
(0.0390) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0010) 
Number of adult females (ages 
20-64 years) 
0.1571*** 
(0.0446) 
0.0056*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0558* 
(0.0312) 
0.0014 
(0.0009) 
-0.0051 
(0.0343) 
-9.03e-06 
(0.0010) 
Regional level covariates       
Regional development index in 1973  
0.2250 
(0.1583) 
0.0019 
(0.0040) 
-0.0233 
(0.2546) 
0.0000 
(0.0054) 
0.0042 
(0.2556) 
-0.0022 
(0.0073) 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 
2.6613 
(2.3539) 
0.0903 
(0.0725) 
-5.1029 
(3.2663) 
-0.1326* 
(0.0700) 
-2.0894 
(2.8393) 
-0.0329 
(0.1220) 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 
1.4162** 
(0.7112) 
0.0417 
(0.0293) 
0.1401 
(0.9335) 
0.0075 
(0.0220) 
1.5091 
(1.0088) 
0.0666 
(0.0458) 
Interaction of length and share of 
roads 
-25.394*** 
(6.4629) 
-0.6606*** 
(0.2200) 
2.9366 
(9.5511) 
0.0596 
(0.2095) 
-11.4932 
(10.0899) 
-0.4440 
(0.3392) 
Number of schools per 1000 
children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 
0.0248 
(0.0413) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0289 
(0.0399) 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
-0.0830* 
(0.0469) 
-0.0009 
(0.0016) 
Gini of household income  
6.0083*** 
(1.8697) 
0.1654*** 
(0.0530) 
-2.0898 
(1.7929) 
-0.0695 
(0.0505) 
-2.3102 
(1.8496) 
-0.0397 
(0.0894) 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with 
degree 
      
 High school 
1.7783 
(1.3485) 
0.0381 
(0.0373) 
1.0173 
(1.4286) 
0.0140 
(0.0371) 
1.8211 
(1.4044) 
0.0407 
(0.0603) 
 Above high school 
-6.8872*** 
(1.8205) 
-0.1984*** 
(0.0481) 
-0.4048 
(2.3287) 
-0.0060 
(0.0565) 
-2.8867 
(2.3963) 
-0.1074 
(0.0931) 
Unemployment for males 15 
years old or older (in percentages) 
0.0135 
(0.0119) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0541*** 
(0.0183) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0590*** 
(0.0194) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working 
in agricultural sector 
-0.6011 
(1.0604) 
-0.0155 
(0.0291) 
1.5327 
(1.1070) 
0.0517* 
(0.0289) 
2.3093** 
(0.9903) 
0.0694* 
(0.0366) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working 
in private sector 
2.1418*** 
(0.7869) 
0.0335* 
(0.0202) 
0.5935 
(0.8493) 
-0.0033 
(0.0208) 
-0.3352 
(0.9262) 
-0.0400 
(0.0420) 
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Table 1-6 (continued) 
Year fixed effects       
2004 
0.1250 
(0.1294) 
0.0045 
(0.0040) 
0.0740 
(0.1335) 
0.0010 
(0.0026) 
0.0157 
(0.1496) 
0.0002 
(0.0046) 
2005 
0.2580** 
(0.1282) 
0.0057 
(0.0036) 
0.2284*** 
(0.0812) 
0.0042** 
(0.0017) 
0.1147 
(0.0954) 
0.0032 
(0.0032) 
2006 
0.0465 
(0.1622) 
0.0016 
(0.0040) 
0.2096*** 
(0.0799) 
0.0037** 
(0.0016) 
0.0524 
(0.0959) 
0.0017 
(0.0030) 
2007 
0.0249 
(0.1531) 
0.0000 
(0.0036) 
0.1824** 
(0.0859) 
0.0031* 
(0.0017) 
-0.0341 
(0.0968) 
-0.0007 
(0.0026) 
2008 
0.3101*** 
(0.1062) 
0.0104** 
(0.0048) 
0.3487*** 
(0.0798) 
0.0081*** 
(0.0025) 
0.1305 
(0.0994) 
0.0050 
(0.0040) 
2009 
0.2082* 
(0.1264) 
0.0056 
(0.0041) 
0.3367*** 
(0.0914) 
0.0076*** 
(0.0027) 
0.2329*** 
(0.0835) 
0.0090** 
(0.0036) 
2010 
0.3242*** 
(0.1078) 
0.0107** 
(0.0044) 
0.3300*** 
(0.0842) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0025) 
0.1331 
(0.1063) 
0.0051 
(0.0044) 
2011 
-0.0382 
(0.1447) 
-0.0009 
(0.0027) 
0.0979 
(0.0891) 
0.0015 
(0.0015) 
-0.2662*** 
(0.0935) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0019) 
Constant 
-5.3495*** 
(1.2984) 
-0.0245 
(0.0804) 
-2.7225** 
(1.1864) 
0.0171 
(0.0291) 
-1.6470 
(1.1632) 
0.0283 
(0.0525) 
Instrumental variable       
Regional migration rate in 1985 
45.0946*** 
(4.7975) 
1.6112*** 
(0.1742) 
19.7422*** 
(5.0222) 
0.6355*** 
(0.1658) 
25.0418*** 
(5.7219) 
1.2294*** 
0.4210 
Weak identification test statistics       
p-value of the Wald test for the 
excluded instrument 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
Effective F statistic  88.86  15.28  8.87 
Number of observations 11,661 63,991 24,185 
Notes: Dependent variable: working age male lives in remittance receiving household 
We use “ivreg2” command by Baum et al. (2010) to estimate OLS first stages. Stata’s “ivregress” command does not take into 
account clustered nature of the observations in first stage regressions. 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward 
bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error 
estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in OLS regressions where G is the number of     
clusters, N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution 
with “ivreg2” command for IV 2SLS models, and uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit 
models with small sample modifications. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are 
rural. 
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Table 1-7 First stage estimations (samples of working age adult females)  
 Females 
 20-24-years-olds 25-49-years-olds 50-64-years-olds 
 
Probit 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Probit 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Probit 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
Individual level covariate       
Educational attainment       
 Junior high and below 
0.1437 
(0.1314) 
0.0038 
(0.0029) 
-0.0662 
(0.0479) 
-.0022 
(.0019) 
-0.1399*** 
(0.0480) 
-0.0078** 
(0.0031) 
 High school 
0.1660 
(0.1672) 
0.0028 
(0.0036) 
0.0057 
(0.0633) 
.0004 
(.0024) 
-0.2517* 
(0.1476) 
-0.0133* 
(0.0069) 
 Above high school 
0.4358** 
(0.2194) 
0.0086* 
(0.0050) 
-0.2251** 
(0.1100) 
-.0061** 
(.0030) 
-0.2461** 
(0.1125) 
-0.0138** 
(0.0061) 
Household head 
0.4055** 
(0.1851) 
0.0425* 
(0.0255) 
0.7574*** 
(0.0662) 
.0608*** 
(.0108) 
0.2549*** 
(0.0751) 
0.0163*** 
(0.0056) 
Married 
0.0928 
(0.1191) 
0.0033 
(0.0037) 
0.2915*** 
(0.0645) 
.0186*** 
(.0048) 
0.2150*** 
(0.0717) 
0.0123** 
(0.0048) 
Household level covariates       
Max. household educational 
attainment 
      
 Junior high and below 
-0.1732 
(0.5488) 
-0.0018 
(0.0267) 
-0.0526 
(0.1759) 
-0.0095 
(0.0129) 
0.2794** 
(0.1316) 
0.0137** 
(0.0069) 
 High school 
-0.3247 
(0.5231) 
-0.0054 
(0.0259) 
-0.0994 
(0.1975) 
-0.0116 
(0.0137) 
0.3079** 
(0.1229) 
0.0150** 
(0.0065) 
 Above high school 
-0.5579 
(0.5496) 
-0.0101 
(0.0264) 
-0.2082 
(0.1692) 
-0.0150 
(0.0127) 
0.2571** 
(0.1090) 
0.0135** 
(0.0060) 
Ownership of piped water system 
0.3347 
(0.2537) 
0.0071* 
(0.0040) 
0.1880 
(0.1289) 
0.0050 
(0.0034) 
0.1858 
(0.1618) 
0.0057 
(0.0051) 
Ownership of natural gas system 
0.2253*** 
(0.0816) 
0.0063** 
(0.0029) 
0.0642 
(0.0417) 
0.0023 
(0.0014) 
0.1710** 
(0.0850) 
0.0088** 
(0.0039) 
Rural areaa 
0.0476 
(0.0687) 
0.0015 
(0.0022) 
0.0586 
(0.0422) 
0.0018 
(0.0015) 
0.0614 
(0.0813) 
0.0028 
(0.0039) 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 
-0.0780 
(0.0523) 
-0.0019 
(0.0014) 
-0.0813*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0024*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0373 
(0.0386) 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
Number of male children (ages 6-
19 years) 
0.0376 
(0.0358) 
0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0155 
(0.0197) 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 
0.0376 
(0.0303) 
0.0016 
(0.0013) 
Number of female children (ages 
6-19 years) 
0.0348 
(0.0357) 
0.0013 
(0.0012) 
-0.0387** 
(0.0188) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
0.0054 
(0.0394) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
Number of adult males (ages 20-
64 years) 
-0.3434*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.0090*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.2318*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.2299*** 
(0.0293) 
-0.0090*** 
(0.0016) 
Number of adult females (ages 
20-64 years) 
0.1351** 
(0.0567) 
0.0057** 
(0.0027) 
0.1664*** 
(0.0231) 
0.0077*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0348 
(0.0328) 
0.0020 
(0.0017) 
Regional level covariates       
Regional development index in 
1973 
0.0466 
(0.3323) 
-0.0026 
(0.0076) 
-0.1139 
(0.2164) 
-0.0035 
(0.0068) 
0.0725 
(0.2732) 
0.0002 
(0.0110) 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 
-0.7669 
(3.2960) 
0.0461 
(0.1533) 
-2.8952 
(2.9692) 
-0.0737 
(0.1204) 
-2.9552 
(3.2934) 
-0.1415 
(0.1596) 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 
2.4339** 
(1.1614) 
0.1265** 
(0.0596) 
0.3916 
(0.9078) 
0.0351 
(0.0437) 
1.0914 
(0.9840) 
0.0667 
(0.0538) 
Interaction of length and share of 
roads 
-16.8213 
(11.5335) 
-0.7982* 
(0.4331) 
-0.3575 
(8.9903) 
-0.1606 
(0.3628) 
-9.2204 
(10.1774) 
-0.4401 
(0.4253) 
Number of schools per 1000 
children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 
0.0742 
(0.0703) 
0.0010 
(0.0021) 
0.0225 
(0.0406) 
0.0010 
(0.0014) 
0.0114 
(0.0517) 
0.0005 
(0.0024) 
Gini of household income  
3.5253 
(3.2268) 
0.0657 
(0.1275) 
0.1182 
(1.7300) 
0.0139 
(0.0822) 
-1.1431 
(2.2170) 
-0.0876 
(0.1252) 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with 
degree 
      
 High school 
3.9298** 
(1.8764) 
0.1237* 
(0.0691) 
1.6608 
(1.2507) 
0.0547 
(0.0502) 
0.3774 
(1.6917) 
0.0092 
(0.0850) 
 Above high school 
-4.1434 
(3.6039) 
-0.1596 
(0.1210) 
-1.0884 
(2.1668) 
-0.0600 
(0.0817) 
-2.4123 
(2.7114) 
-0.1217 
(0.1272) 
Unemployment for males 15 years 
old or older (in percentages) 
0.0643*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0020** 
(0.0008) 
0.0387* 
(0.0227) 
0.0019* 
(0.0011) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working 
in agricultural sector 
1.9358 
(1.2014) 
0.0834 
(0.0549) 
1.0794 
(1.0462) 
0.0477 
(0.0409) 
0.8802 
(1.1632) 
0.0702 
(0.0623) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working 
in private sector 
0.5782 
(1.0717) 
-0.0483 
(0.0405) 
0.8494 
(0.7930) 
0.0036 
(0.0256) 
0.4924 
(0.9271) 
-0.0361 
(0.0554) 
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Table 1-7 (continued) 
Year fixed effects       
2004 
0.1886 
(0.1502) 
0.0064 
(0.0051) 
0.0678 
(0.0856) 
0.0020 
(0.0026) 
0.1807 
(0.1258) 
0.0080 
(0.0064) 
2005 
0.1769 
(0.1293) 
0.0046 
(0.0041) 
0.1470* 
(0.0847) 
0.0036 
(0.0026) 
0.2330** 
(0.1005) 
0.0097* 
(0.0050) 
2006 
0.2525* 
(0.1419) 
0.0073 
(0.0048) 
0.1049 
(0.0665) 
0.0023 
(0.0020) 
0.1673* 
(0.0981) 
0.0066 
(0.0043) 
2007 
-0.2169 
(0.1668) 
-0.0039 
(0.0026) 
0.0834 
(0.0714) 
0.0018 
(0.0023) 
0.0880 
(0.1082) 
0.0034 
(0.0043) 
2008 
0.1840 
(0.1578) 
0.0063 
(0.0059) 
0.2023*** 
(0.0766) 
0.0061* 
(0.0035) 
0.1157 
(0.1101) 
0.0050 
(0.0051) 
2009 
0.3047*** 
(0.1152) 
0.0107** 
(0.0046) 
0.2205*** 
(0.0695) 
0.0064** 
(0.0028) 
0.3065*** 
(0.0736) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0041) 
2010 
0.3261*** 
(0.1073) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0038) 
0.1895** 
(0.0777) 
0.0049* 
(0.0028) 
0.1933* 
(0.1122) 
0.0079 
(0.0056) 
2011 
-0.1155 
(0.1397) 
-0.0026 
(0.0031) 
-0.0069 
(0.0603) 
-0.0009 
(0.0015) 
-0.0611 
(0.1091) 
-0.0026 
(0.0032) 
Constant 
-6.4156*** 
(1.9623) 
-0.0677 
(0.0713) 
-4.2606*** 
(1.1248) 
-0.0518 
(0.0481) 
-3.2195** 
(1.3084) 
0.0058 
(0.0688) 
Instrumental variable       
Regional migration rate in 1985 
36.9069*** 
(9.2353) 
1.5556*** 
(0.4971) 
21.8964*** 
(5.1619) 
0.9977*** 
(0.2550) 
30.9536*** 
(6.6546) 
2.0257*** 
(0.5490) 
Weak identification test statistics       
p-value of the Wald test for the 
excluded instrument 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
Effective F statistic  10.18  15.92  14.16 
Number of observations 15,630 68,862 24,116 
Notes: Dependent variable: working age female lives in remittance receiving household  
We use “ivreg2” command by Baum et al. (2010) to estimate OLS first stages. Stata’s “ivregress” command does not take into 
account clustered nature of the observations in first stage regressions. 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward 
bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error 
estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in OLS regressions where G is the number of     
clusters, N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution 
with “ivreg2” command for IV 2SLS models, and uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit 
models with small sample modifications. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a Communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 20,000 are 
rural. 
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Table 1-8 First stage estimations (sample of households) 
 Probit 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Household level covariates   
Max. household educational attainment   
 Junior high and below 0.1497*** 
(0.0567) 
0.0050 
(0.0031) 
 High school 0.1405* 
(0.0721) 
0.0040 
(0.0036) 
 Above high school -0.0262 
(0.0793) 
-0.0013 
(0.0037) 
Age of household head   
 Between 30 and 50 -0.0535 
(0.0667) 
-0.0021 
(0.0027) 
 Above 50 0.0931 
(0.0671) 
0.0049* 
(0.0025) 
Married household head 0.0346 
(0.0378) 
-0.00008 
(0.0017) 
Ownership of piped water system 
0.1937* 
(0.1169) 
0.0058* 
(0.0034) 
Ownership of natural gas system 
0.0997*** 
(0.0357) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0015) 
Rural areaa 
0.0585 
(0.0451) 
0.0024 
(0.0019) 
Number of children aged 0 to 5 
-0.0672*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
Number of male children (ages 6-19 years) 
0.0186 
(0.0179) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
Number of female children (ages 6-19 years) 
-0.0058 
(0.0179) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Number of adult males (ages 20-64 years) 
-0.3753*** 
(0.0281) 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0018) 
Number of adult females (ages 20-64 years) 
0.0810*** 
(0.0251) 
0.0032** 
(0.0014) 
Regional level covariates   
Regional development index in 1973 
-0.1614 
(0.2054) 
-0.0064 
(0.0069) 
Length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 
-2.7158 
(2.5778) 
-0.0906 
(0.1136) 
Share of asphalt roads in 1985 
0.4675 
(0.8592) 
0.0359 
(0.0430) 
Interaction of length and share of roads 
-0.2491 
(8.7737) 
-0.1150 
(0.3648) 
Number of schools per 1000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 
0.0126 
(0.0376) 
0.0004 
0.0015 
Gini of household income  
0.2214 
(1.7528) 
0.0024 
(0.0843) 
Share of men aged 25 to 64 with degree   
 High school  1.6216 
(1.1347) 
0.0593 
(0.0483) 
 Above high school -1.4915 
(2.0910) 
-0.0827 
(0.0856) 
Unemployment for males 15 years old or older (in 
percentages) 
0.0480*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0019*** 
(0.0007) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector 
0.6608 
(0.8970) 
0.0413 
(0.0388) 
Share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector 
0.7352 
(0.7765) 
-0.0098 
(0.0297) 
Year fixed effects   
2004 0.1030 
(0.0826) 
0.0033 
(0.0030) 
2005 0.1569** 
(0.0708) 
0.0047* 
(0.0026) 
2006 0.1378** 
(0.0648) 
0.0041* 
(0.0022) 
2007 0.0961 
(0.0606) 
0.0028 
(0.0020) 
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Table 1-8 (continued) 
2008 0.1920** 
(0.0782) 
0.0071* 
(0.0038) 
2009 0.2606*** 
(0.0584) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0029) 
2010 0.2040*** 
(0.0701) 
0.0069** 
(0.0030) 
2011 0.0223 
(0.0523) 
0.0002 
(0.0015) 
Constant 
-3.7790*** 
(1.1009) 
-0.0221 
(0.0451) 
Instrumental variable   
Regional migration rate in 1985 
23.2196*** 
(5.4267) 
1.2389*** 
(.3158) 
Weak identification test statistics   
p-value of the Wald test for the excluded instrument 0.000  
Effective F statistic  16.00 
Number of observations 98,557 
Notes: Dependent variable: household receives remittances 
We use “ivreg2” command by Baum et al. (2010) to estimate OLS first stages. Stata’s “ivregress” command does 
not take into account clustered nature of the observations in first stage regressions. 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the 
downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster 
robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in OLS 
regressions where G is the number of     clusters, N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. 
Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivreg2” command for IV 2SLS models, and uses standard 
normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit models with small sample modifications. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
a a Communities with population above 20,000 are urban, and communities with population equal to or less than 
20,000 are rural. 
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Table 1-9 The impact of remittances on school attendance of children aged 6 to 14 
 Males Females 
 Probit 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(2) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(6) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
(8) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates         
Remittances 0.1680 
(0.1081) 
[0.1165] 
0.9714 
(0.5938) 
[0.6608] 
0.4419 
(0.6786) 
[0.6276] 
0.3096* 
(0.1734) 
0.1407 
(0.1019) 
[0.0973] 
2.5102*** 
(0.6875) 
[0.4970] 
0.9254* 
(0.4908) 
[0.4983] 
0.4280* 
(0.2566) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
        
N(0,1) 0.1492  0.4814 0.0741 0.1483  0.0633 0.0953 
t(G-1) 0.1616 0.1540 0.4879  0.1607 0.000032 0.0751  
t(G-2) 0.1621 0.1545 0.4881  0.1612 0.000036 0.0756  
t(G-L) 0.1655 0.1579 0.4899  0.1646 0.000071 0.0788  
WRE bootstrap:         
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.3844    0.0129   
Mammen  0.3600    0.0119   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.3420    0.0238   
 Mammen  0.2394    0.0208   
Restricted score bootstrap:         
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1236  0.5170  0.1292  0.3470  
Mammen 0.1426  0.5211  0.1263  0.3621  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1160  0.5201  0.1246  0.3564  
Mammen 0.0726  0.4772  0.1116  0.2758  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t       0.1000  
Panel C: test statistics         
p-values of endogeneity tests:         
Woolridge’s score test  0.086    0.0001   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.6439    0.1479  
Instrument relevance:         
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.001   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  24.40    30.93   
p-value- score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 25,426 24,164 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished 
schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years 
old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by 
region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gross enrollment ratio of 
children aged 6 to 10 in 1985 by region, and gini of household income by region. Historical regional gross enrollment ratios are for historical male enrollment rates in columns 1-4, and historical 
female enrollment rates in columns 5-8. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the child attends school and 0 otherwise. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. 
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L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 
1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gross enrollment ratio of children aged 6 to 10 in 1985 by 
region, and gini of household income by region. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample 
modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where 
N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample 
modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps 
use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. For sample of 6-14 years old females, the reported pairs cluster bootstrap-t p-value is based on bootstrap replications with no 
missing Wald statistics. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.    
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Table 1-10 The impact of remittances on child illiteracy (ages 6-14 years old) 
 Males Females 
 Probit 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(2) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(6) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
(8) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates         
Remittances -0.2203 
(0.1282) 
[0.1415] 
-1.1168* 
(0.5446) 
[0.5697] 
-0.7220 
(0.7551) 
[0.7024] 
-0.1943 
(0.1291) 
-0.1205 
(0.1178) 
[0.1239] 
-1.7332*** 
(0.5135) 
[0.3061] 
-1.1546** 
(0.5629) 
[0.5457] 
-0.9936 
(0.6688) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
        
N(0,1) 0.1195  0.3039 0.1322 0.3309  0.0343 0.1374 
t(G-1) 0.1321 0.0612 0.3138  0.3402 6.818e-06 0.0444  
t(G-2) 0.1326 0.0616 0.3142  0.3406 7.891e-06 0.0449  
t(G-L) 0.1360 0.0648 0.3168  0.3431 18.58e-06 0.0477  
WRE bootstrap:         
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.2420    0.0168   
Mammen  0.2367    0.0175   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.1930    0.0286   
Mammen  0.1000    0.0310   
Restricted score bootstrap:         
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0746  0.4834  0.2866  0.3552  
Mammen 0.0849  0.4927  0.2946  0.3736  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0702  0.4870  0.2886  0.3666  
Mammen 0.0480  0.4610  0.3232  0.2748  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t       0.1105  
Panel C: test statistics         
p-values of endogeneity tests:         
Woolridge’s score test  0.0120    0.0004   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.4564    0.1179  
Instrument relevance:         
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.001   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  24.40    30.93   
p-value- score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 25,426 24,164 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished 
schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years 
old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by 
region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gross enrollment ratio of 
children aged 6 to 10 in 1985 by region, and gini of household income by region. Historical regional gross enrollment ratios are for historical male enrollment rates in columns 1-4, and historical 
female enrollment rates in columns 5-8. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the child is illiterate and 0 otherwise. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. 
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L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 
1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gross enrollment ratio of children aged 6 to 10 in 1985 by 
region, and gini of household income by region. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample 
modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where 
N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample 
modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps 
use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. For sample of 6-14 years old females, the reported pairs cluster bootstrap-t p-value is based on bootstrap replications with no 
missing Wald statistics. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.    
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Table 1-11 The impact of remittances on school attendance of children aged 15 to 19 
 Males Females 
   Regressions including controls for labor market 
characteristics 
Regressions including controls for labor market 
characteristics 
Regressions omitting controls for labor market 
characteristics 
 Probit 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(2) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(6) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(10) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
(12) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates             
Remittances 0.1490 
(0.0986) 
[0.1005] 
-5.4538*** 
(1.9451) 
[1.002] 
-0.2808 
(0.6491) 
[0.8723] 
0.4172* 
(0.2505) 
0.0929 
(0.0986) 
[0.0862] 
-6.0528* 
(3.8597) 
[3.1199] 
-1.0146* 
(0.3711) 
[0.5277] 
-0.5869*** 
(0.1994) 
0.0954 
(0.0985) 
[0.0856] 
-1.7054 
(1.3360) 
[1.1175] 
-0.9799* 
(0.4059) 
[0.5436] 
-0.8192*** 
(.2908) 
Educational system reform 1.1545*** 
[0.0489] 
0.3797*** 
[0.0186] 
1.1527*** 
[0.0495] 
1.9655*** 
(0.2134) 
1.0479*** 
[0.0581] 
0.3093*** 
[0.0258] 
1.0355*** 
[0.0593] 
1.2398*** 
(0.0969) 
1.0482*** 
[0.0581] 
0.3262*** 
[0.0231] 
1.0364*** 
[0.0586] 
1.1885*** 
(0.1308) 
Panel B: p-values based on different 
rejection methods  
            
N(0,1) 0.1382  0.7474 0.0959 0.2812  0.0545 0.0033 0.2651  0.0714 0.0048 
t(G-1) 0.1507 0.000012 0.7501  0.2915 0.0637 0.0659  0.2757 0.1395 0.0835  
t(G-2) 0.1512 0.000013 0.7502  0.2919 0.0642 0.0664  0.2761 0.1400 0.0840  
t(G-L) 0.1604 0.000087 0.7521  0.2994 0.0727 0.0751  0.2790 0.1434 0.0873  
WRE bootstrap:             
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.0283    0.1291    0.2427   
Mammen  0.0241    0.0635    0.1714   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.0462    0.1402    0.2298   
Mammen  0.0410    0.0198    0.0928   
Restricted score bootstrap:             
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1418  0.7707  0.3097  0.1835  0.2949  0.2166  
Mammen 0.1380  0.7755  0.3137  0.1863  0.2967  0.2272  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1412  0.7823  0.3078  0.1916  0.2902  0.2282  
Mammen 0.1176  0.7085  0.2610  0.1378  0.2416  0.1722  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t       0.6863    0.6323  
Panel C: test statistics             
p-values of endogeneity tests:             
Woolridge’s score test  0.0000    0.0008    0.0891   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.6071    0.0652    0.0838  
Instrument relevance:             
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.002   0.099 0.407   0.004 0.060 
Effective F statistic  59.94    3.62    11.89   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test      0.0235    0.1580   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 14,677 14,478 
Notes: Models in columns 1-8 also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished schooling 
of the parent, dummies for marital status and age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies 
for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of 
length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men 
between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-
64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Models in columns 9-12 include all the controls as in columns 5-8 except for controls that capture region level 
labor market characteristics: share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older, 
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share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector. Net enrollment ratios calculated as averages over years 2003-2011 are for male net enrollment rates in 
columns 1-4, and female net enrollment rates in columns 5-12. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the child attends school and 0 otherwise. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of 
exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for columns 1-8 includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction 
of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men 
between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-
64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region; for columns 9-12 controls for regional labor market characteristics are excluded from L: share of men between 
25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working 
in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Presented p-values with asymptotic refinement are for remittances. Small sample modifications have been applied to 
account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit 
regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for 
IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted 
score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 1,336 and 1,177 bootstrap 
replications for sample of girls in IV bivariate probit models with and without controls for labor market characteristics, respectively. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.    
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Table 1-12 The impact of remittances on child labor (boys aged 15 to 19) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.2055 
(0.1058) 
[0.1325] 
4.6267*** 
(1.7317) 
[1.3553] 
-0.0014 
(0.6187) 
[0.6283] 
0.3734 
(0.2828) 
-0.0045 
(0.1083) 
[0.1390] 
2.2054*** 
(1.0303) 
[0.7533] 
-0.2564 
(0.5730) 
[0.6174] 
0.0116 
(0.9012) 
-0.5978*** 
(0.1876) 
[0.1597] 
2.6554** 
(1.0538) 
[0.9752] 
-0.7417 
(1.9941) 
[1.9285] 
-1.1907*** 
(0.4405) 
-0.1377 
(0.3523) 
[0.3542] 
-0.2340 
(0.2121) 
[0.1288] 
2.2267 
(1.7963) 
[1.3876] 
1.8500** 
(0.8579) 
Educational system reform -0.6140*** 
[0.0574] 
-0.1734*** 
[0.0171] 
-0.6136*** 
[0.0572] 
-0.9113*** 
(0.1188) 
-0.5553*** 
[0.0635] 
-0.1058*** 
[0.0153] 
-0.5553*** 
[0.0636] 
-1.1114*** 
(0.1836) 
-0.3642*** 
[0.0479] 
-0.0587*** 
[0.0130] 
-0.3644*** 
[0.0479] 
-0.5825*** 
(0.0931) 
-0.5982*** 
[0.1562] 
-0.0089*** 
[0.0026] 
-0.5943*** 
[0.1566] 
-0.9561*** 
(0.3687) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.1208  0.99820 0.1867 0.97388  0.6779 0.9896 0.0002  0.7005 0.0068 0.6974  0.1086 0.0310 
t(G-1) 0.1333 0.0021 0.99821  0.97414 0.0071 0.6814  0.0009 0.0116 0.7037  0.7007 0.0813 0.1211  
t(G-2) 0.1338 0.0022 0.99822  0.97415 0.0073 0.6815  0.0010 0.0118 0.7039  0.7008 0.0817 0.1216  
t(G-L) 0.1430 0.0041 0.99823  0.97434 0.0110 0.6841  0.0021 0.0164 0.7063  0.7032 0.0907 0.1308  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.0661    0.0605    0.1659    0.2914   
Mammen  0.0695    0.0714    0.1575    0.2671   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.0808    0.0710    0.1978    0.2828   
Mammen  0.0396    0.0706    0.1104    0.2578   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1430  n.a.  0.9755  0.6918  0.0000  0.7738  0.8492  0.4593  
Mammen 0.1463  n.a.  0.9765  0.7047  0.0019  0.7806  0.7743  0.4647  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1386  n.a.  0.9757  0.6889  0.0000  0.7657  0.8475  0.4614  
Mammen 0.0870  n.a.  0.9709  0.6551  0.0000  0.7749  0.9889  0.2728  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t                 
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.0010    0.0051    0.0074    0.0782   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.7273    0.6594    0.9417    0.1485  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.005   0.000 0.006   0.000 0.016   0.000 0.064 
Effective F statistic  59.94    59.94    59.94    59.94   
p-value - score test of normality   0.2534    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 14,677 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and 
age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural 
residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by 
region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, 
unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Net enrollment ratios calculated as averages over years 
2003-2011 are for male net enrollment rates. The dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of boys: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; 
and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone for a wage 
or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of 
road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, 
gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share 
of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Presented p-values with asymptotic refinement are for remittances. Small sample modifications have been applied to account 
for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in 
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IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard 
normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. Statistically 
significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-13 The impact of remittances on child labor (girls aged 15 to 19) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.3979*** 
(0.1267) 
[0.0788] 
-3.6078 
(2.4285) 
[4.4829] 
0.2427 
(0.9032) 
[1.1659] 
1.5211*** 
(0.4958) 
-0.6138*** 
(0.1887) 
[0.1760] 
-3.1119 
(1.9315) 
[1.9208] 
-0.4110 
(0.7802) 
[0.8137] 
-1.9613*** 
(0.6974) 
-0.1216 
(0.1554) 
[0.1350] 
-0.2190 
(1.2018) 
[2.7854] 
0.4677 
(1.6593) 
[1.9025] 
0.4062 
(1.8877) 
n.a. -0.2769 
(0.2053) 
[0.1776] 
n.a. n.a. 
Educational system reform -0.4413*** 
[0.0685] 
-0.1106*** 
[0.0270] 
-0.4387*** 
[0.0704] 
-0.7106*** 
(0.1068) 
-0.5608*** 
[0.0715] 
-0.0753*** 
[0.0195] 
-0.5600*** 
[0.0718] 
-1.1288*** 
(0.1356) 
-0.2333*** 
[0.0670] 
-0.0341** 
[0.0147] 
-0.2312*** 
[0.0692] 
-0.2762*** 
(0.1078) 
n.a. -0.0011 
[0.0018] 
n.a. n.a. 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.00000  0.8351 0.0022 0.0005  0.6134 0.0049 0.3678  0.8058 0.8296 n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
t(G-1) 0.00003 0.4285 0.8367  0.0018 0.1178 0.6178  0.3764 0.93795 0.8077  n.a. 0.1316 n.a.  
t(G-2) 0.00004 0.4288 0.8368  0.0019 0.1182 0.6180  0.3767 0.93797 0.8078  n.a. 0.1321 n.a.  
t(G-L) 0.00017 0.4343 0.8380  0.0036 0.1275 0.6213  0.3830 0.93844 0.8093  n.a. 0.1414 n.a.  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.4553    0.1779    0.9396    0.1792   
Mammen  0.4528    0.2010    0.9322    0.1900   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.2833    0.0954    0.8831    0.0670   
Mammen  0.2427    0.0506    0.8566    0.0296   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0002  0.8505  0.0002  0.6125  0.3373  0.8325  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0023  0.8560  0.0022  0.6199  0.3500  0.8287  n.a.  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0000  0.8557  0.0002  0.6013  0.3424  0.8395  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0000  0.7627  0.0000  0.5757  0.3402  0.7263  n.a.  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t                 
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.2856    0.0084    0.9405    0.0068   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.5804    0.7949    0.7526    n.a.  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.183 0.975   0.143 0.934   0.178 0.313   n.a. n.a. 
Effective F statistic  3.62    3.62    3.62    3.62   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.3445    0.0567    0.9363    0.0569   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0005    0.0004    0.0000      
Number of observations 14,478 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and 
age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural 
residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by 
region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, 
unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Net enrollment ratios calculated as averages over years 
2003-2011 are for female net enrollment rates. The dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of girls: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; 
and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage 
or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of 
road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, 
gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share 
of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Presented p-values with asymptotic refinement are for remittances. Small sample modifications have been applied to account 
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for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in 
IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard 
normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. Statistically 
significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-14 The impact of remittances on child labor (girls aged 15 to 19 – models omit controls for regional labor market characteristics) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.4144*** 
(0.1264) 
[0.0843] 
-5.8226 
(2.1477) 
[3.2732] 
-1.4508** 
(0.5539) 
[0.6144] 
-0.5525** 
(0.2262) 
-0.6412*** 
(0.1870) 
[0.1745] 
-4.0809*** 
(1.5085) 
[1.0141] 
-1.7414** 
(0.6352) 
[0.8434] 
-1.8335*** 
(0.3650) 
-0.1325 
(0.1556) 
[0.1459] 
-1.5265 
(0.8342) 
[2.5258] 
-0.8190 
(0.5482) 
[0.6548] 
-0.2490** 
(0.1046) 
n.a. -0.2151*** 
(0.1081) 
[0.0655] 
n.a. -6.6259*** 
(1.8773) 
Educational system reform -0.4391*** 
[0.0688] 
-0.1203*** 
[0.0282] 
-0.4394*** 
[0.0685] 
-1.0611*** 
(0.1228) 
-0.5523*** 
[0.0711] 
-0.0788*** 
[0.0204] 
-0.5470*** 
[0.0784] 
-0.9612*** 
(0.2946) 
-0.2386*** 
[0.0681] 
-0.0406*** 
[0.0146] 
-0.2410*** 
[0.0692] 
-0.1475*** 
(0.0457) 
n.a. -0.0009 
[0.0015] 
n.a. -0.0841 
(0.3812) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.00000  0.0182 0.0146 0.0002  0.0389 0.0000 0.3638  0.2110 0.0174 n.a.  n.a. 0.0004 
t(G-1) 0.00004 0.0874 0.0263  0.0011 0.00046 0.0494  0.3725 0.5510 0.2226  n.a. 0.0030 n.a.  
t(G-2) 0.00005 0.0879 0.0266  0.0012 0.00049 0.0499  0.3728 0.5512 0.2231  n.a. 0.0031 n.a.  
t(G-L) 0.00009 0.0912 0.0290  0.0016 0.00072 0.0528  0.3752 0.5527 0.2262  n.a. 0.0039 n.a.  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.2540    0.0391    0.6220    0.0136   
Mammen  0.2809    0.0153    0.6230    0.0305   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.1632    0.0780    0.5873    0.0102   
Mammen  0.0512    0.0224    0.5583    0.0218   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0000  0.3374  0.0001  0.3880  0.3345  0.4360  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0030  0.3366  0.0012  0.3643  0.3389  0.4432  n.a.  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0000  0.3290  0.0000  0.3792  0.3332  0.4276  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0000  0.3144  0.0000  0.2434  0.3416  0.4518  n.a.  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.6203    0.6438          
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.0086    0.0000    0.4978    0.0020   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.1807    0.3778    0.3105    n.a.  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.142   0.016 0.223   0.001 0.179   n.a. 0.191 
Effective F statistic  11.89    11.89    11.89    11.89   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.1305    0.0436    0.5419    0.0422   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0040    0.0003    0.0000    n.a.  
Number of observations 14,478 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: a dummy for the observation being the oldest child in the household, last finished schooling of the parent, dummies for marital status and 
age of the household head, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural 
residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by 
region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, and gini of household income by region. Net enrollment ratios calculated as averages over years 2003-2011 are for female net enrollment rates. The dependent variables are dummies 
capturing labor force participation decisions of girls: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a seasonal 
or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned 
market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters 
(G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of 
length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, net enrollment ratio of children aged 15 to 19 by region, and gini of household income by region. Presented p-values with asymptotic refinement 
are for remittances. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 
in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command 
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for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; 
pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 1,170 and 1,155 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for any market work 
and wage work, respectively. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-15 The impact of remittances on adult labor (males aged 20 to 24) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.2785* 
(0.1114) 
[0.1566] 
-0.0253 
(0.7102) 
[0.6266] 
-1.4942** 
(0.5485) 
[0.7459] 
-1.3859*** 
(0.2696) 
-0.1392 
(0.1129) 
[0.1424] 
-1.0612 
(0.7317) 
[0.8010] 
-1.0448 
(0.6563) 
[0.8204] 
-1.4292*** 
(0.4191) 
-0.2797 
(0.1495) 
[0.1463] 
1.1239 
(0.5572) 
[0.6598] 
-1.8397*** 
(0.3731) 
[0.2813] 
-0.3795 
(0.3068) 
-0.1180 
(0.1748) 
[0.1683] 
-0.0880 
(0.3438) 
[0.4687] 
-1.7352*** 
(0.3458) 
[0.3274] 
-1.1496*** 
(0.2996) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.0753  0.0452 0.0000 0.3285  0.2028 0.0006 0.0559  6.165e-11 0.2160 0.4831  0.000000 0.0001 
t(G-1) 0.0875 0.96806 0.0561  0.3378 0.1972 0.2145  0.0674 0.1009 7.518e-07  0.4895 0.85253 0.000017  
t(G-2) 0.0880 0.96807 0.0565  0.3382 0.1976 0.2150  0.0678 0.1014 9.180e-07  0.4898 0.85259 0.000019  
t(G-L) 0.0956 0.96827 0.0635  0.3439 0.2050 0.2222  0.0751 0.1091 9.363e-06  0.4938 0.85353 0.000089  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.9751    0.3424    0.1608    0.9251   
Mammen  0.9735    0.3688    0.1720    0.8838   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.9697    0.3446    0.1550    0.9339   
Mammen  0.9779    0.3158    0.0710    0.7775   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1349  0.2252  0.3759  0.2505  0.0328  n.a.  0.4576  n.a.  
Mammen 0.1387  0.2246  0.3873  0.2675  0.0410  n.a.  0.4716  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1378  0.2244  0.3874  0.2468  0.0336  n.a.  0.4556  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0484  0.1608  0.3010  0.1798  0.0166  n.a.  0.4788  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.1000        0.1565    0.1105  
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.9085    0.2004    0.0651    0.8697   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.1240    0.2802    0.0063    0.3205  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000   0.000 
Effective F statistic  88.86    88.86    88.86    88.86   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0237    0.0058    0.0000    0.0039  
Number of observations 11,661 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of males: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working 
as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the 
aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The 
number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
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bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for any market work, unpaid family work and self-
employment. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-16 The impact of remittances on adult labor (females aged 20 to 24) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.0476 
(0.0986) 
[0.1281] 
0.3144 
(0.5314) 
[0.9578] 
-0.8629 
(0.6470) 
[0.8504] 
-1.5046*** 
(0.3765) 
-0.2181 
(0.1183) 
[0.1108] 
-1.2025* 
(0.4445) 
[0.6115] 
-1.2690** 
(0.4598) 
[0.5647] 
-1.6032*** 
(0.2388) 
0.1427  
(0.1336) 
[0.2245] 
1.4825** 
(0.4753) 
[0.5972] 
0.2631 
(0.7385) 
[0.8127] 
0.0502 
(0.2583) 
0.0426 
(0.2602) 
[0.2722] 
0.0345 
(0.1245) 
[0.1582] 
-1.0619*** 
(0.2771) 
[0.3543] 
-0.8229*** 
(0.2906) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.7097  0.3102 0.0001 0.0491  0.0246 0.0000 0.5250  0.7461 0.8457 0.8753  0.0027 0.0046 
t(G-1) 0.7128 0.7454 0.3199  0.0602 0.0604 0.0337  0.5307 0.0201 0.7487  0.8766 0.82900 0.0060  
t(G-2) 0.7129 0.7455 0.3203  0.0607 0.0609 0.0341  0.5309 0.0204 0.7488  0.8767 0.82907 0.0062  
t(G-L) 0.7148 0.7471 0.3263  0.0678 0.0680 0.0401  0.5345 0.0253 0.7505  0.8774 0.83017 0.0090  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.8490    0.1751    0.1042    0.9099   
Mammen  0.8200    0.1614    0.1194    0.8819   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.8547    0.1282    0.1592    0.9051   
Mammen  0.6553    0.0400    0.1120    0.7751   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.7120  0.2488  0.0614  0.0032  0.7242  0.7394  0.8816  0.1445  
Mammen 0.7302  0.2501  0.0719  0.0186  0.6897  0.7579  0.9049  0.1818  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.7169  0.2428  0.0618  0.0030  0.7349  0.7439  0.8659  0.1460  
Mammen 0.7617  0.1970  0.0294  0.0002  0.5071  0.7017  0.8313  0.0460  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t       0.1345        0.0760  
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.7459    0.0074    0.0570    0.8425   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.3631    0.1401    0.8944    0.0243  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  10.18    10.18    10.18    10.18   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.7648    0.0422    0.1562    0.8359   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0020    0.0005    0.0000  
Number of observations 15,630 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of females: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or 
working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in 
any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. 
The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
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models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for wage work and self-employment. Statistically 
significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-17 The impact of remittances on adult labor (males of ages 20-24 years old who currently live with their parents) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.2968* 
(0.1235) 
[0.1718] 
-0.2592 
(1.007) 
[0.8595] 
-1.1219 
(0.8420) 
[1.0197] 
-1.2656*** 
(0.4039) 
-0.1468 
(0.1248) 
[0.1599] 
-1.0699 
(1.0152) 
[1.0539] 
-0.5116 
(0.9102) 
[0.9977] 
-0.7744 
(0.5588) 
-0.2411 
(0.1562) 
[0.1539] 
1.1172 
(0.7680) 
[0.8115] 
-2.0189*** 
(0.6814) 
[0.5248] 
-2.0192** 
(1.0521) 
-0.2193 
(0.2201) 
[0.2165] 
-0.3065 
(0.4370) 
[0.5087] 
-1.7260*** 
(0.8420) 
[0.5081] 
-0.7928** 
(0.3636) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.0840  0.2712 0.0017 0.3588  0.6081 0.166 0.1172  0.0001 0.0550 0.3111  0.0007 0.0292 
t(G-1) 0.0963 0.7654 0.2817  0.3675 0.3197 0.6126  0.1298 0.1808 0.0007  0.3208 0.5523 0.0022  
t(G-2) 0.0968 0.7655 0.2821  0.3679 0.3201 0.6127  0.1303 0.1813 0.0008  0.3212 0.5524 0.0023  
t(G-L) 0.1045 0.7670 0.2885  0.3733 0.3261 0.6155  0.1380 0.1888 0.0015  0.3271 0.5558 0.0039  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.8235    0.4621    0.2128    0.7102   
Mammen  0.8196    0.5079    0.2192    0.6987   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.8257    0.4718    0.2118    0.7385   
Mammen  0.8371    0.4522    0.1132    0.6113   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1483  0.3101  0.3950  0.6096  0.0799  n.a.  0.2530  n.a.  
Mammen 0.1410  0.3283  0.4010  0.6218  0.0902  n.a.  0.2614  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1488  0.3100  0.4050  0.5997  0.0790  n.a.  0.2530  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0654  0.3046  0.3500  0.6417  0.0634  n.a.  0.2732  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t           0.1490    0.6533  
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.8593    0.3304    0.1218    0.5970   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.4157    0.7039    0.3661    0.3722  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.015   0.000 0.048 
Effective F statistic  29.61    29.61    29.61    29.61   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0124    0.0098    0.0000    0.0743  
Number of observations 9,875 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the marital status of the individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member 
of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural 
gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children 
aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 
years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of 
males: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; 
working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional 
migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous 
regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number 
of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, 
unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Small sample modifications have been applied to account 
for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in 
IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard 
normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-
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values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 9 and 1,064 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for unpaid family work and self-employment, respectively. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 
5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-18 The impact of remittances on adult labor (females of ages 20-24 years old who currently live with their parents) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances 0.0271 
(0.1262) 
[0.1485] 
-0.4388 
(0.8871) 
[2.0862] 
-0.6611 
(0.7307) 
[0.8963] 
0.8011* 
(0.4780) 
-0.1201 
(0.1412) 
[0.1300] 
-0.9916 
(0.7862) 
[1.0745] 
-1.0609 
(0.7836) 
[0.8138] 
-0.1316 
(0.3376) 
0.2663 
(0.1732) 
[0.2847] 
0.3890 
(0.5626) 
[1.2288] 
-0.0957 
(1.0988) 
[1.4859] 
0.1091 
(0.2703) 
n.a. 0.1637** 
(0.1960) 
[0.0689] 
n.a. -3.9593 
(20.262) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.8548  0.4607 0.0938 0.3554  0.1924 0.6966 0.3496  0.94861 0.6863 n.a.  n.a. 0.8451 
t(G-1) 0.8563 0.8350 0.4676  0.3642 0.3649 0.2042  0.3585 0.7542 0.94912  n.a. 0.0255 n.a.  
t(G-2) 0.8564 0.8351 0.4679  0.3645 0.3652 0.2047  0.3589 0.7543 0.94914  n.a. 0.0258 n.a.  
t(G-L) 0.8572 0.8362 0.4721  0.3700 0.3706 0.2120  0.3644 0.7559 0.94946  n.a. 0.0312 n.a.  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.8685    0.5003    0.8162    0.0544   
Mammen  0.8586    0.4568    0.8042    0.0511   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.8587    0.4903    0.8381    0.0956   
Mammen  0.8609    0.3710    0.7519    0.0810   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.8638  0.5026  0.3520  0.2475  0.6056  0.9636  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.8765  0.5190  0.3620  0.2800  0.5998  0.9604  n.a.  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.8777  0.5013  0.3522  0.2530  0.6203  0.9595  n.a.  n.a.  
Mammen 0.8111  0.4932  0.3346  0.1828  0.4118  0.8837  n.a.  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t                 
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.8204    0.2695    0.8021    0.0325   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.4371    0.3087    0.7915    n.a.  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.001 0.000   0.001 0.005   0.004 0.002   n.a. 0.026 
Effective F statistic  5.873    5.873    5.873    5.873   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.8228    0.2782    0.7734    0.1087   
p-value - score test of normality   0.8364    0.3905    0.1645    n.a.  
Number of observations 7,771 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the marital status of the individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member 
of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural 
gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children 
aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 
years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of 
females: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a 
wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is 
regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of 
exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by 
region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree 
by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Small sample modifications have been applied 
to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of 
√
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses 
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standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. Statistically 
significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-19 The impact of remittances on adult labor (males aged 25 to 49) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.4714*** 
(0.0603) 
[0.0718] 
-0.2930 
(0.5704) 
[0.7189] 
1.3949*** 
(0.2044) 
[0.2337] 
-1.5072*** 
(0.1516) 
-0.2484*** 
(0.0546) 
[0.0708] 
-4.9887*** 
(1.2575) 
[1.0126] 
-1.6485*** 
(0.2470) 
[0.2960] 
-1.1425*** 
(0.4135) 
0.1170 
(0.1268) 
[0.1113] 
1.6040*** 
(0.4091) 
[0.3813] 
1.3656*** 
(0.4452) 
[0.4621] 
0.4294** 
(0.1768) 
-0.0744 
(0.0626) 
[0.0551] 
3.0916*** 
(0.9529) 
[0.6470] 
1.1651*** 
(0.3378) 
[0.2888] 
0.2085* 
(0.1203) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 5.213e-11  2.412e-09 0.0000 0.0005  0.000000 0.0057 0.2932  0.0031 0.0152 0.1765  0.0001 0.0831 
t(G-1) 7.068e-07 0.6871 3.133e-06  0.0017 0.00004 0.000008  0.3032 0.0002 0.0067  0.1885 0.00006 0.0004  
t(G-2) 8.645e-07 0.6872 3.693e-06  0.0018 0.00005 0.000009  0.3037 0.0003 0.0069  0.1890 0.00007 0.0005  
t(G-L) 8.966e-06 0.6893 2.581e-05  0.0031 0.00018 0.000053  0.3098 0.0007 0.0098  0.1965 0.00024 0.0010  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.8158    0.0515    0.0651    0.0160   
Mammen  0.7797    0.0092    0.0273    0.0145   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.8155    0.1018    0.1258    0.0320   
Mammen  0.6661    0.0170    0.0254    0.0286   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0001  n.a.  0.0059  0.0218  0.3616  0.2115  0.1809  0.0477  
Mammen 0.0028  n.a.  0.0126  0.0305  0.3733  0.2232  0.1935  0.0670  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0000  n.a.  0.0052  0.0214  0.3540  0.2118  0.1764  0.0478  
Mammen 0.0000  n.a.  0.0002  0.0024  0.3006  0.1414  0.1174  0.0116  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.0160    0.0040    0.1300    0.0050  
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.7907    0.0000    0.0001    0.0086   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.0009    0.0001    0.0137    0.0002  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  15.28    15.28    15.28    15.28   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.6868    0.0437    0.0571    0.0444   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0237    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 63,991 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of males: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working 
as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the 
aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The 
number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
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models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for any market work, wage work, unpaid family 
work and self-employment. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-20 The impact of remittances on adult labor (females aged 25 to 49) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.1084 
(0.0478) 
[0.0679] 
1.0870 
(0.4426) 
[2.2247] 
-1.0089*** 
(0.2253) 
[0.3100] 
-0.3253*** 
(0.1236) 
-0.1853 
(0.0594) 
[0.1158] 
-1.6620** 
(0.3508) 
[0.7600] 
-1.6159*** 
(0.1182) 
[0.1379] 
-0.7194*** 
(0.2474) 
0.0622 
(0.0712) 
[0.0940] 
2.5050** 
(0.4748) 
[0.9329] 
0.9873** 
(0.3910) 
[0.4768] 
0.0274 
(0.1024) 
-0.0648 
(0.0696) 
[0.0684] 
0.2440 
(0.2111) 
[0.9442] 
0.3293 
(0.3702) 
[0.4249] 
0.9608*** 
(0.2957) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.1106  0.0011 0.0085 0.1098  0.0000 0.0036 0.5081  0.0384 0.7891 0.3433  0.4384 0.0012 
t(G-1) 0.1231 0.6293 0.0032  0.1223 0.0383 1.198e-11  0.5141 0.0126 0.0488  0.3523 0.7981 0.4456  
t(G-2) 0.1236 0.6295 0.0033  0.1228 0.0387 2.048e-11  0.5144 0.0129 0.0493  0.3527 0.7982 0.4459  
t(G-L) 0.1314 0.6321 0.0053  0.1306 0.0450 5.992e-09  0.5181 0.0169 0.0560  0.3583 0.7995 0.4503  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.9275    0.0853    0.2142    0.8429   
Mammen  0.8463    0.0902    0.1809    0.8201   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.9287    0.1120    0.2960    0.8495   
Mammen  0.5391    0.0712    0.1822    0.7339   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.1213  0.0443  0.0959  0.0004  0.5653  0.3295  0.3496  0.5089  
Mammen 0.1276  0.0484  0.0777  0.0093  0.5648  0.3677  0.3515  0.5146  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.1170  0.0438  0.0906  0.0006  0.5713  0.3414  0.3494  0.5021  
Mammen 0.1038  0.0094  0.0778  0.0000  0.4798  0.2296  0.3490  0.5019  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.0140    0.0025    0.1300      
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.6379    0.0179    0.0373    0.7989   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.0094    0.0000    0.0506    0.3197  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  15.92    15.92    15.92    15.92   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.6697    0.0057    0.1780    0.8027   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 68,862 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of females: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or 
working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in 
any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. 
The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
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models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for any market work, wage work, and unpaid 
family work. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-21 The impact of remittances on adult labor (males aged 50 to 64) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.4913*** 
(0.0731) 
[0.0797] 
-1.3484 
(0.7779) 
[1.7049] 
1.2388*** 
(0.2223) 
[0.3085] 
1.1356*** 
(0.0936) 
-0.2237*** 
(0.0899) 
[0.0676] 
-2.9835** 
(0.8832) 
[1.1259] 
-0.6899 
(0.8475) 
[1.2554] 
-0.2706 
(10.308) 
-0.3410 
(0.3045) 
[0.2763] 
0.1552 
(0.1234) 
[0.1066] 
-1.6830* 
(0.6278) 
[0.9611] 
-0.1719 
(0.2578) 
-0.4005*** 
(0.0813) 
[0.1091] 
1.4798 
(0.7492) 
[1.1612] 
1.1802*** 
(0.2834) 
[0.4361] 
0.1559 
(0.1873) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 7.385e-10  0.0001 0.0000 0.0009  0.5826 0.9791 0.2172  0.0799 0.5050 0.0002  0.0068 0.4052 
t(G-1) 1.942e-06 0.4364 0.0004  0.0028 0.0137 0.5875  0.2287 0.1578 0.0922  0.0011 0.2142 0.0120  
t(G-2) 2.316e-06 0.4367 0.0005  0.0029 0.0140 0.5877  0.2291 0.1583 0.0927  0.0012 0.2147 0.0123  
t(G-L) 1.833e-05 0.4413 0.0011  0.0047 0.0181 0.5907  0.2362 0.1659 0.1003  0.0022 0.2219 0.0162  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.7001    0.1986    0.2998    0.5024   
Mammen  0.6508    0.2398    0.3180    0.4628   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.6579    0.2422    0.3534    0.5869   
Mammen  0.4892    0.0166    0.3184    0.4238   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0001  n.a.  0.0009  0.6682  0.1011  n.a.  0.0008  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0028  n.a.  0.0081  0.7043  0.0782  n.a.  0.0095  n.a.  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0002  n.a.  0.0010  0.6667  0.1014  n.a.  0.0010  n.a.  
Mammen 0.0000  n.a.  0.0000  0.6137  0.0798  n.a.  0.0002  n.a.  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.1170        0.7328    0.0925  
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.3981    0.0001    0.1642    0.3009   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.0000    0.7205    0.5632    0.0022  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.001 0.560   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  8.87    8.87    8.87    8.87   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.3617    0.0737    0.3015    0.3752   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0052    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 24,185 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of males: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or working 
as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of his own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in any of the 
aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The 
number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
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models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit models for any market work and self-employment; for 
nonwage labor the corresponding figure is 928. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Table 1-22 The impact of remittances on adult labor (females aged 50 to 64) 
 Dependent variables 
 Any market work Wage work Unpaid family work Self-employment 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.1005 
(0.0752) 
[0.0884] 
0.0248 
(0.3340) 
[2.0461] 
-0.4343 
(0.3827) 
[0.7056] 
0.0139 
(0.1328) 
0.0696 
(0.1071) 
[0.1486] 
-0.3713** 
(0.1305) 
[0.1444] 
-1.4672*** 
(0.1861) 
[0.2220] 
-1.4800** 
(0.7484) 
-0.2242** 
(0.0959) 
[0.1056] 
0.3497 
(0.2912) 
[1.3486] 
-0.4290 
(0.8562) 
[1.6202] 
0.3679 
(0.4990) 
0.0446 
(0.1057) 
[0.1074] 
0.0464 
(0.1667) 
[0.6908] 
1.0437 
(0.6536) 
[0.6591] 
0.0806 
(0.1571) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.2554  0.5382 0.9163 0.6394  3.876e-11 0.0480 0.0338  0.7912 0.4609 0.6775  0.1132 0.6081 
t(G-1) 0.2661 0.99040 0.5437  0.6434 0.0165 6.343e-07  0.0438 0.7974 0.7933  0.6810 0.94696 0.1258  
t(G-2) 0.2666 0.99041 0.5439  0.6435 0.0167 7.780e-07  0.0442 0.7975 0.7934  0.6811 0.94699 0.1263  
t(G-L) 0.2732 0.99047 0.5474  0.6460 0.0213 8.310e-06  0.0508 0.7988 0.7947  0.6833 0.94732 0.1341  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.9959    0.0835    0.9581    0.9646   
Mammen  0.9941    0.0754    0.8995    0.9602   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.9979    0.1380    0.9601    0.9737   
Mammen  0.7133    0.0884    0.5795    0.8459   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.2669  0.6564  0.6965  n.a.  0.0272  n.a.  0.6926  0.5210  
Mammen 0.2771  0.6484  0.7022  n.a.  0.0305  n.a.  0.6993  0.5365  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.2612  0.6585  0.6981  n.a.  0.0268  n.a.  0.7001  0.5215  
Mammen 0.2330  0.7693  0.6039  n.a.  0.0102  n.a.  0.6761  0.4366  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t       0.0030          
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.9804    0.0102    0.7834    0.9535   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.6380    0.0150    0.8993    0.1419  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.006     0.000 0.000   0.000 0.003 
Effective F statistic  14.16    14.16    14.16    14.16   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.9903    0.0565    0.8097    0.9469   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0037    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 24,116 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to individual, household and region level covariates: last finished schooling of the individual, a dummy for the individual being the household head, a dummy for the marital status of the 
individual, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females (including the individual in 
consideration), dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length 
and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above 
high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables 
are dummies capturing labor force participation decisions of females: working for wage, working as unpaid family worker, being self-employed, and participating in any market work; and they stand for: having a regular job in return of a salary or 
working as a seasonal or temporary worker in exchange of a wage; working in a household enterprise without getting paid; doing a job of her own either by employing someone for a wage or employing unpaid family workers; and being employed in 
any of the aforementioned market work. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. 
The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by 
region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding 
share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. 
Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV 
bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS 
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models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster 
bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in IV bivariate probit model for wage work. Statistically significant: *** 1% 
level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-23 The impact of remittances on household well-being – part 1 
 Dependent variables 
 40 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
60 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
70 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
 Probit 
 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(2) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(6) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(10) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
 
(12) 
Probit 
 
 
(13) 
IV 2SLS 
 
 
(14) 
IV 
bivariate 
probit 
(15) 
SNP 
 
 
(16) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates                 
Remittances -0.2188*** 
(0.0554) 
[0.0651] 
-4.5523*** 
(0.5467) 
[1.1770] 
-1.3584*** 
(0.2120) 
[0.3154] 
-0.2133 
(0.2408) 
-0.2708*** 
(0.0490) 
[0.0571] 
-3.5131** 
(0.4652) 
[1.3045] 
-0.0285 
(0.3825) 
[0.6687] 
-0.2197 
(0.1578) 
-0.2116*** 
(0.0440) 
[0.0485] 
-1.7288 
(0.3451) 
[1.3942] 
0.0452 
(0.3171) 
[0.4908] 
-0.3277* 
(0.1729) 
-0.1991*** 
(0.0415) 
[0.0476] 
-0.3229 
(0.3024) 
[1.6080] 
0.2875 
(0.1893) 
[0.2904] 
0.1590 
(0.7681) 
Panel B: p-values based on 
different rejection methods  
                
N(0,1) 0.0008  0.00001 0.3758 0.00000  0.9659 0.164 0.0000  0.92648 0.0581 0.00002  0.3222 0.207 
t(G-1) 0.0024 0.0006 0.00022  0.00007 0.0124 0.9662  0.0001 0.2265 0.92721  0.00031 0.8424 0.3316  
t(G-2) 0.0025 0.0007 0.00024  0.00008 0.0127 0.9663  0.0002 0.2269 0.92724  0.00033 0.8425 0.3320  
t(G-L) 0.0042 0.0015 0.00062  0.00026 0.0166 0.9664  0.0005 0.2340 0.92770  0.00080 0.8435 0.3378  
WRE bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.0749    0.1906    0.6487    0.9775   
Mammen  0.0699    0.1866    0.5833    0.9348   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.1360    0.2496    0.6559    0.9757   
Mammen  0.0384    0.1584    0.4282    0.5759   
Restricted score bootstrap:                 
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0076  0.2020  0.0005  0.9793  0.0025  0.9469  0.0015  0.5090  
Mammen 0.0249  0.2237  0.0059  0.9788  0.0097  0.9503  0.0077  0.4954  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0068  0.1996  0.0002  0.9837  0.0018  0.9397  0.0012  0.5121  
Mammen 0.0002  0.0902  0.0000  0.7541  0.0000  0.8783  0.0000  0.5313  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.1725              
Panel C: test statistics                 
p-values of endogeneity tests:                 
Woolridge’s score test  0.0025    0.0321    0.2882    0.8690   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.0111    0.7121    0.5937    0.1000  
Instrument relevance:                 
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  16.00    16.00    16.00    16.00   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.0847    0.1506    0.3668    0.8489   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 98,557 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to household and region level covariates: a dummy for having a married household head, dummies for the age of the household head, the highest schooling level attained by a member of the 
household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional 
development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household 
income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-
64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. The dependent variables are dummies capturing household well-being taking values 1 if the household is located below 40%, 50%, 60% or 
70% of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly household disposable income distribution, and taking values 0 otherwise. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust 
standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index 
in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, 
share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in 
agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector by region. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications 
include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. 
Stata reports p-values based on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP models. 
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Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap 
replications in column 3. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-24 The impact of remittances on household well-being – part 2 
 Dependent variables 
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly 
household expenditure 
Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 2.15$ Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 4.30$ 
 Probit 
 
(1) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(2) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(3) 
SNP 
 
(4) 
Probit 
 
(5) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(6) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(7) 
SNP 
 
(8) 
Probit 
 
(9) 
IV 2SLS 
 
(10) 
IV bivariate 
probit 
(11) 
SNP 
 
(12) 
Panel A: coefficient estimates             
Remittances -0.1986*** 
(0.0505) 
[0.0458] 
-2.4261** 
(0.3791) 
[1.0037] 
0.3693* 
(0.1674) 
[0.1932] 
0.4249 
(0.3511) 
-0.2223 
(0.2442) 
[0.2385] 
-0.1624** 
(0.0562) 
[0.0621] 
-1.2145*** 
(0.4000) 
[0.2841] 
-0.4871 
(0.5686) 
 
-0.2250*** 
(0.0968) 
[0.0713] 
-1.3889*** 
(0.2279) 
[0.3595] 
-0.1338 
(0.2722) 
[0.3783] 
-0.3239 
(0.4065) 
Panel B: p-values based on different 
rejection methods  
            
N(0,1) 0.00001  0.0560 0.226 0.3511  0.00001 0.3916 0.0016  0.7235 0.4256 
t(G-1) 0.00020 0.0232 0.0675  0.3600 0.0149 0.00024  0.0041 0.00070 0.7265  
t(G-2) 0.00022 0.0236 0.0680  0.3604 0.0152 0.00026  0.0043 0.00074 0.7266  
t(G-L) 0.00059 0.0288 0.0752  0.3658 0.0195 0.00066  0.0065 0.00153 0.7284  
WRE bootstrap:             
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher  0.2855    0.0788    0.0481   
Mammen  0.2536    0.0550    0.0378   
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher  0.3132    0.1050    0.0736   
Mammen  0.1976    0.0434    0.0206   
Restricted score bootstrap:             
Symmetric 
test 
Rademacher 0.0016  0.1849  0.2689  0.1404  0.0008  0.7272  
Mammen 0.0099  0.1714  0.2533  0.2408  0.0054  0.7380  
Equal-tailed 
test 
Rademacher 0.0010  0.1858  0.2682  0.1400  0.0006  0.7305  
Mammen 0.0000  0.1674  0.3008  0.0388  0.0000  0.6709  
Pairs cluster bootstrap-t   0.0275    0.0490      
Panel C: test statistics             
p-values of endogeneity tests:             
Woolridge’s score test  0.0326    0.0016    0.0001   
Wald test of ρ=0   0.0045    0.0286    0.8088  
Instrument relevance:             
p-value of Wald test   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Effective F statistic  16.00    16.00    16.00   
p-value of Anderson-Rubin test  0.1584    0.0433    0.0496   
p-value - score test of normality   0.0000    0.0000    0.0000  
Number of observations 98,557 
Notes: All models also include year fixed effects in addition to household and region level covariates: a dummy for having a married household head, dummies for the age of the household head, the highest schooling 
level attained by a member of the household, number of 0-5 years old children, number of 6-19 years old male and female children, number of 20-64 years old adult males and females, dummies for ownership of piped 
water and natural gas systems, dummy for rural residence, regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads 
by region, number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for 
men with above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in 
private sector by region. The dependent variables are dummies capturing household well-being taking values 1 if the household is located below 50% of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly household 
expenditure distribution, and daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels are less than 2.15$ and 4.30$, and taking values 0 otherwise. The instrument is regional migration rate in 1985. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Cluster robust standard errors are in brackets. Wald tests are based on cluster robust standard errors. The number of clusters (G) is 26. L is the number of exogenous regressors that are invariant 
within clusters and for all models includes: regional development index in 1973, length of road per 1 km2 in 1980 by region, share of asphalt roads in 1985 by region, interaction of length and share of roads by region, 
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number of schools per 1,000 children aged 6 to 16 in 1985 by region, gini of household income by region, share of men between 25 and 64 years old with high school degree and the corresponding share for men with 
above high school degree by region, unemployment rate for males 15 years old or older by region, share of men aged 15-64 working in agricultural sector by region, and share of men aged 15-64 working in private sector 
by region. Small sample modifications have been applied to account for the downward bias in standard errors due to having few clusters. Small sample modifications include inflating cluster robust standard error estimates 
by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 in probit and IV bivariate probit regressions; and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 in IV 2SLS regressions where N is the number of observations and k is the number of regressors. Stata reports p-values based 
on t(G-1) distribution with “ivregress” command for IV 2SLS models with small sample modifications. Stata uses standard normal distribution as basis for p-value calculations in probit, IV bivariate probit and SNP 
models. Wild restricted efficient residual and restricted score bootstraps use 9,999; pairs cluster bootstrap-t uses 1,999 bootstrap replications. In calculating p-values by pairs cluster bootstrap-t, one or more parameters 
could not be estimated in 5 bootstrap replications in columns 3 and 7. Statistically significant: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Table 1-25 Treatment effects of receiving remittances on outcomes 
  Treatment Effects 
  
LATE ATE (AME) 
  
 
Outcomes: 
# of 
observati
ons 
IV 2SLS Probit IV bivariate 
probit 
SNP 
Attendance of 6-14-years-old boys 
(Table 1-9) 
25,426 0.9714 
(0.6608) 
0.0259 
(0.0159) 
0.0572 
(0.0579) 
0.0238*** 
(0.0085) 
Attendance of 6-14-years-old girls 
(Table 1-9) 
24,164 2.5102*** 
(0.4970) 
0.0263 
(0.0167) 
0.1106*** 
(0.0280) 
0.0322* 
(0.0167) 
Illiteracy of 6-14-years-old boys 
(Table 1-10) 
25,426 -1.1168* 
(0.5697) 
-0.0246* 
(0.0133) 
-0.0572** 
(0.0288) 
-0.0212** 
(0.0105) 
Illiteracy of 6-14-years-old girls 
(Table 1-10) 
24,164 -1.7332*** 
(0.3061) 
-0.0159 
(0.0150) 
-0.0789*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.0656*** 
(0.0071) 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old boys  
(regressions controlling for labor market 
characteristics- Table 1-11) 
14,677 -5.4538*** 
(1.002) 
0.1490 
(0.1005) 
-0.0966 
(0.3003) 
0.0829* 
(0.0490) 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old girls 
(regressions controlling for labor market 
characteristics- Table 1-11) 
14,478 -6.0528* 
(3.1199) 
0.0299 
(0.0276) 
-0.2920** 
(0.1204) 
-0.1510*** 
(0.0501) 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old girls 
(regressions omitting labor market controls- 
Table 1-11) 
14,478 -1.7054 
(1.1175) 
0.0307 
(0.0274) 
-0.2841** 
(0.1267) 
-0.2098*** 
(0.0626) 
Child labor- boys aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-12)      
 Any market work 14,677 4.6267*** 
(1.3553) 
-0.0603 
(0.0368) 
-0.0004 
(0.1939) 
0.0692 
(0.0504) 
 Wage work 14,677 2.2054*** 
(0.7533) 
-0.0011 
(0.0337) 
-0.0562 
(0.1203) 
0.0013 
(0.1066) 
 Unpaid family work 14,677 2.6554** 
(0.9752) 
-0.0648*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0743 
(0.1148) 
-0.0701*** 
(0.0150) 
 Self-employment 14,677 -0.2340 
(0.1288) 
-0.0020 
(0.0045) 
0.3334 
(0.4629) 
0.0134 
(0.0105) 
Child labor- girls aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-13)      
 Any market work 14,478 -3.6078 
(4.4829) 
-0.0748*** 
(0.0121) 
0.0592 
(0.3091) 
0.1985*** 
(0.0304) 
 Wage work 14,478 -3.1119 
(1.9208) 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.0439 
(0.0636) 
-0.0688*** 
(0.0098) 
 Unpaid family work 14,478 -0.2190 
(2.7854) 
-0.0134 
(0.0139) 
0.0669 
(0.3242) 
0.0432 
(0.2463) 
 Self-employment 14,478 -0.2769 
(0.1776) 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Child labor- girls aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-14) 
(regressions omitting labor market controls) 
     
 Any market work 14,478 -5.8226 
(3.2732) 
-0.0782*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.1663*** 
(0.0245) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0177) 
 Wage work 14,478 -4.0809*** 
(1.0141) 
-0.0593*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0876*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0707*** 
(0.0046) 
 Unpaid family work 14,478 -1.5265 
(2.5258) 
-0.0148 
(0.0151) 
-0.0654** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0167*** 
(0.0065) 
 Self-employment 14,478 -0.2151*** 
(0.0655) 
n.a. n.a. -0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
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Table 1-25 (continued) 
Adult labor- males aged 20 to 24 (Table 1-15)      
 Any market work 11,661 -0.0253 
(0.6266) 
-0.0953* 
(0.0544) 
-0.4586*** 
(0.1576) 
-0.3425*** 
(0.0509) 
 Wage work 11,661 -1.0612 
(0.8010) 
-0.0484 
(0.0487) 
-0.2968* 
(0.1589) 
-0.2329*** 
(0.0468) 
 Unpaid family work 11,661 1.1239 
(0.6598) 
-0.0441** 
(0.0199) 
-0.1423*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0523 
(0.0355) 
 Self-employment 11,661 -0.0880 
(0.4687) 
-0.0107 
(0.0140) 
-0.0611*** 
(0.0083) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.0052) 
Adult labor- females aged 20 to 24 (Table 1-16)      
 Any market work 15,630 0.3144 
(0.9578) 
-0.0140 
(0.0373) 
-0.1946 
(0.1272) 
-0.1780*** 
(0.0319) 
 Wage work 15,630 -1.2025* 
(0.6115) 
-0.0420** 
(0.0192) 
-0.1531*** 
(0.0287) 
-0.1330*** 
(0.0122) 
 Unpaid family work 15,630 1.4825** 
(0.5972) 
0.0195 
(0.0327) 
0.0377 
(0.1288) 
0.0050 
(0.0262) 
 Self-employment 15,630 0.0345 
(0.1582) 
0.0010 
(0.0069) 
-0.0106*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0068*** 
(0.0012) 
Adult labor- males aged 20-24 who live with 
their parents (Table 1-17) 
     
 Any market work 9,875 -0.2592 
(0.8595) 
-0.1053* 
(0.0615) 
-0.3732 
(0.2737) 
-0.2458*** 
(0.0684) 
 Wage work 9,875 -1.0699 
(1.0539) 
-0.0513 
(0.0547) 
-0.1664 
(0.2851) 
-0.1612** 
(0.0767) 
 Unpaid family work 9,875 1.1172 
(0.8115) 
-0.0415* 
(0.0233) 
-0.1556*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.1352*** 
(0.0221) 
 Self-employment 9,875 -0.3065 
(0.5087) 
-0.0159 
(0.0128) 
-0.0495*** 
(0.0094) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0066) 
Adult labor- females aged 20-24 who live with 
their parents (Table 1-18) 
     
 Any market work 7,771 -0.4388 
(2.0862) 
0.0095 
(0.0523) 
-0.1983 
(0.2149) 
0.1534 
(0.1052) 
 Wage work 7,771 -0.9916 
(1.0745) 
-0.0332 
(0.0346) 
-0.2067** 
(0.0872) 
-0.0205 
(0.0500) 
 Unpaid family work 7,771 0.3890 
(1.2288) 
0.0388 
(0.0462) 
-0.0118 
(0.1766) 
0.0107 
(0.0274) 
 Self-employment 7,771 0.1637** 
(0.0689) 
n.a. n.a. -0.0059*** 
(0.0021) 
Adult labor- males aged 25 to 49 (Table 1-19)      
 Any market work 63,991 -0.2930 
(0.7189) 
-0.1024*** 
(0.0192) 
0.1070*** 
(0.0055) 
-0.2320*** 
(0.0218) 
 Wage work 63,991 -4.9887*** 
(1.0126) 
-0.0896*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.5042*** 
(0.0496) 
-0.2718*** 
(0.0681) 
 Unpaid family work 63,991 1.6040*** 
(0.3813) 
0.0045 
(0.0045) 
0.0978* 
(0.0551) 
0.0216** 
(0.0105) 
 Self-employment 63,991 3.0916*** 
(0.6470) 
-0.0216 
(0.0155) 
0.4043*** 
(0.0965) 
0.0451* 
(0.0270) 
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Table 1-25 (continued) 
Adult labor- females aged 25 to 49 (Table 1-20)      
 Any market work 68,862 1.0870 
(2.2247) 
-0.0313* 
(0.0190) 
-0.2196*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.0622*** 
(0.0203) 
 Wage work 68,862 -1.6620** 
(0.7600) 
-0.0309* 
(0.0174) 
-0.1410*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0855*** 
(0.0134) 
 Unpaid family work 68,862 2.5050** 
(0.9329) 
0.0086 
(0.0135) 
0.1901 
(0.1175) 
0.0033 
(0.0126) 
 Self-employment 68,862 0.2440 
(0.9442) 
-0.0055 
(0.0055) 
0.0376 
(0.0596) 
0.1607* 
(0.0891) 
Adult labor- males aged 50 to 64 (Table 1-21)      
 Any market work 24,185 -1.3484 
(1.7049) 
-0.1770*** 
(0.0277) 
0.3413*** 
(0.0506) 
0.2598*** 
(0.0203) 
 Wage work 24,185 -2.9835** 
(1.1259) 
-0.0574*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.1441 
(0.1770) 
-0.0311 
(1.1559) 
 Unpaid family work 24,185 0.1552 
(0.1066) 
-0.0043* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0105** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0021 
(0.0028) 
 Self-employment 24,185 1.4798 
(1.1612) 
-0.1145*** 
(0.0282) 
0.3889*** 
(0.1282) 
0.0310 
(0.0386) 
Adult labor- females aged 50 to 64 (Table 1-22)      
 Any market work 24,116 0.0248 
(2.0461) 
-0.0243 
(0.0206) 
-0.0941 
(0.1298) 
0.0022 
(0.0212) 
 Wage work 24,116 -0.3713** 
(0.1444) 
0.0054 
(0.0123) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0331*** 
(0.0049) 
 Unpaid family work 24,116 0.3497 
(1.3486) 
-0.0344** 
(0.0150) 
-0.0611 
(0.1951) 
0.0715 
(0.1024) 
 Self-employment 24,116 0.0464 
(0.6908) 
0.0036 
(0.0091) 
0.1698 
(0.1712) 
0.0061 
(0.0129) 
Household well-being- part1 (Table 1-23)      
 40 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
98,557 -4.5523*** 
(1.1770) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0999*** 
(0.0116) 
-0.0230 
(0.0233) 
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
98,557 -3.5131** 
(1.3045) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0050 
(0.1169) 
-0.0348 
(0.0231) 
 60 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
98,557 -1.7288 
(1.3942) 
-0.0431*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0098 
(0.1085) 
-0.0570** 
(0.0275) 
 70 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
yearly household disposable income 
98,557 -0.3229 
(1.6080) 
-0.0471*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0742 
(0.0781) 
0.0352 
(0.0286) 
Household well-being- part2 (Table 1-24)      
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent 
monthly household expenditure 
98,557 -2.4261** 
(1.0037) 
-0.0306*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0693* 
(0.0405) 
0.0744 
(0.0632) 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels 
of 2.15$ 
98,557 -0.1624** 
(0.0621) 
-0.0011 
(0.0009) 
-0.0028*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0016 
(0.0012) 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels 
of 4.30$ 
98,557 -1.3889*** 
(0.3595) 
-0.0098*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0061 
(0.0160) 
-0.0104 
(0.0107) 
Notes: IV 2SLS recovers estimates of LATE of remittances while the remaining nonlinear models recover estimates of ATE 
(AME) of remittances. Stata’s “margins” command is implemented to estimate the average change in the probability of success 
with respect to a change in the remittance variable from 0 to 1. The estimates from nonlinear models are also known as average 
marginal effects of remittances. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors of treatment effect estimates for nonlinear 
models are calculated through delta method which uses the robust/clustered variance estimates of the original model parameters. 
For IV 2SLS, clustered robust standard errors are reported. p-value calculations are based on t(G-1) distribution for IV 2SLS 
and standard normal distribution for nonlinear models. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. n.a. stands for not applicable. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Reduced form regressions for non-receiving samples   
  
 
Wald test of being in a historically high 
migration region on outcomes (p-value) 
 # of observations OLS Probit 
Outcomes:    
Attendance of 6-14-years-old boys (Table 1-9) 25,113 0.679 0.664 
Attendance of 6-14-years-old girls (Table 1-9) 23,879 0.208 0.126 
Illiteracy of 6-14-years-old boys (Table 1-10) 25,113 0.626 0.739 
Illiteracy of 6-14-years-old girls (Table 1-10) 23,879 0.605 0.546 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old boys  
(regressions controlling for labor market characteristics- Table 
1-11) 
14,481 0.160 0.153 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old girls 
(regressions controlling for labor market characteristics- Table 
1-11) 
14,286 0.259 0.197 
Attendance of 15-19-years-old girls 
(regressions omitting labor market controls- Table 1-11) 
14,286 0.042 0.038 
Child labor- boys aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-12)    
 Any market work 14,481 0.959 0.828 
 Wage work 14,481 0.162 0.200 
 Unpaid family work 14,481 0.433 0.369 
 Self-employment 14,481 0.042 0.091 
Child labor- girls aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-13)    
 Any market work 14,286 0.000 0.000 
 Wage work 14,286 0.076 0.242 
 Unpaid family work 14,286 0.000 0.000 
 Self-employment 14,286 0.198 0.108 
Child labor- girls aged 15 to 19 (Table 1-14) 
(regressions omitting labor market controls) 
   
 Any market work 14,286 0.000 0.000 
 Wage work 14,286 0.000 0.001 
 Unpaid family work 14,286 0.001 0.000 
 Self-employment 14,286 0.188 0.101 
Adult labor- males aged 20 to 24 (Table 1-15)    
 Any market work 11,518 0.404 0.440 
 Wage work 11,518 0.515 0.551 
 Unpaid family work 11,518 0.071 0.018 
 Self-employment 11,518 0.464 0.446 
Adult labor- females aged 20 to 24 (Table 1-16)    
 Any market work 15,428 0.123 0.160 
 Wage work 15,428 0.876 0.849 
 Unpaid family work 15,428 0.168 0.168 
 Self-employment 15,428 0.472 0.482 
Adult labor- males aged 20-24 who live with their parents 
(Table 1-17) 
   
 Any market work 9,758 0.151 0.159 
 Wage work 9,758 0.823 0.871 
 Unpaid family work 9,758 0.108 0.029 
 Self-employment 9,758 0.222 0.304 
135 
 
Table A1 (continued) 
Adult labor- females aged 20-24 who live with their parents 
(Table 1-18) 
   
 Any market work 7,660 0.565 0.528 
 Wage work 7,660 0.229 0.263 
 Unpaid family work 7,660 0.108 0.140 
 Self-employment 7,660 0.480 0.570 
Adult labor- males aged 25 to 49 (Table 1-19)    
 Any market work 63,438 0.168 0.250 
 Wage work 63,438 0.826 0.883 
 Unpaid family work 63,438 0.408 0.563 
 Self-employment 63,438 0.961 0.848 
Adult labor- females aged 25 to 49 (Table 1-20)    
 Any market work 67,929 0.267 0.250 
 Wage work 67,929 0.036 0.012 
 Unpaid family work 67,929 0.224 0.169 
 Self-employment 67,929 0.352 0.241 
Adult labor- males aged 50 to 64 (Table 1-21)    
 Any market work 23,867 0.001 0.002 
 Wage work 23,867 0.203 0.241 
 Unpaid family work 23,867 0.993 0.693 
 Self-employment 23,867 0.023 0.015 
Adult labor- females aged 50 to 64 (Table 1-22)    
 Any market work 23,649 0.162 0.145 
 Wage work 23,649 0.629 0.662 
 Unpaid family work 23,649 0.062 0.044 
 Self-employment 23,649 0.635 0.575 
Household well-being- part1 (Table 1-23)    
 40 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
97,029 0.174 0.050 
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
97,029 0.184 0.121 
 60 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
97,029 0.155 0.170 
 70 % of the median of the per adult equivalent yearly 
household disposable income 
97,029 0.231 0.268 
Household well-being- part2 (Table 1-24)    
 50 % of the median of the per adult equivalent monthly 
household expenditure 
97,029 0.110 0.059 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 2.15$ 97,029 0.487 n.a. 
 Daily per adult equivalent expenditure levels of 4.30$ 97,029 0.433 0.075 
Notes: The results in this Table are outcomes of an indirect test for the exogeneity of the instrument. We split regions into two 
with respect to the cutoff - the median of the historical migration rate distribution. Then we estimate reduced form equations 
of outcomes on a dummy taking value 1 if the observation belongs to a historically high migration region —region that is above 
the median migration rate in 1985—for non-receiving samples. The reduced form equations include all the control variables 
from the corresponding structural equations omitting the dummy for receiving remittances. Wald tests take into account the 
clustered structure of the observations in OLS and probit models. p-value for Wald test of being in a historically high migration 
region is presented. p-value calculations employ small sample corrections: (i) inflate standard errors by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
 for 
probit models and by a factor of √
𝐺
𝐺−1
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 for OLS models, and (ii) use t(G-1) critical values instead of standard normal critical 
values for OLS models. n.a. stands for not applicable.
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2 THE IMPACT OF MIGRANT NETWORKS ON IMMIGRANTS’ LOCATION 
CHOICES 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Migrant networks, which are formed by the former migrants from a household or a 
community, lowers the costs and increases the net benefits of migration for potential migrants 
by means of providing information to the potential migrant about housing and labor markets at 
destination, providing direct assistance in terms of facilitating and funding the travel, and 
providing food, shelter and job referrals upon migrant’s arrival,. For the reasons cited the 
positive network externalities are assumed to affect a household’s decision to send migrants. 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) in the case of migration from rural Mexico to US, find that 
larger shares of migrants in a community is associated with an increase in the probability of a 
compatriot to migrate. This positive impact is more pronounced for the individuals in the lower 
end of the wealth distribution if migration networks are substantially large.  
A perfect example in the Turkish context for the impact of migrant networks on 
migration propensities for the residents is from a county of Giresun known as Yağlıdere, located 
in Eastern Black Sea region. With the population exchange agreement signed between Turkey 
and Greece on 30.01.1923, residents of some parts of Eastern Black Sea region had to relocate 
to Greece. Parents of one of the families lost their lives while migrating from Yağlıdere to 
Greece, and their orphan named Lefter was raised by a family residing in Yağlıdere. Lefter, 
soon decided to look for his relatives and migrated first to Greece and from there to US. Long 
years later, he came back to Yağlıdere to visit the family that raised him; however, his foster 
mother was deceased already. Lefter noticed the poverty in the county and decided not to leave 
alone from his town. He took one person with him to the US in 1969 and the migration stream 
from Yağlıdere to US began with this one specific incidence. Until 1985, the migration stream 
from Yağlıdere continued with 2 to 3 persons per year. After 1985, there was a boom in the 
annual counts of migrants to the US from Yağlıdere. Nowadays, the population of Yağlıdere is 
around 16,000 and the immigrants in US who are born in Yağlıdere is more than 20,000 76 
(“ABD’nin Vize Engelini”, 2017, para. 1-7).     
                                                          
76 I thank Aziz Şerif Şimşir for bringing up this example to my attention.  
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Some studies focus on the externalities that migration networks present with respect to 
the employment outcomes of recent immigrants. Yamauchi and Tanabe (2008), concentrating 
on the Bangkok labor market, show that migration network has a negative impact on the 
employment probability of new immigrants while the impact of previous migrants’ efficiency 
is in the opposite direction. In Yamauchi and Tanabe (2008) the migration network is measured 
as the relative share of the previous migrants from a particular province in the population of 
immigrants in Bangkok while the efficiency of previous migrants is a variable which captures 
the estimated employment probabilities of previous migrants by their origin provinces. The 
previous migrants and the recent migrants are substitutes in Bangkok labor market and as the 
network gets larger, new immigrants may need to compete with the previous migrants for the 
available jobs. The negative substitution effect is dominated by the positive scale effect as the 
efficiency of previous migrants is improved. Munshi (2003) investigates the network impacts 
on Mexican immigrants’ employment prospects in the US conditional on the arrival of Mexican 
immigrants. Making use of data from Mexican Migration Project, he was able to utilize the 
variation in network variable over time which is defined as the proportion of migrants in a 
community who are in the US for any given year. He finds that migration network has positive 
effects on the employment probability and on the likelihood of having a nonagricultural job for 
a recent immigrant. He also points out that the established migrants who have arrived in the US 
four or more years earlier than the recent immigrants provide most of the job referrals and the 
support. 
If migrant networks provide information and direct assistance to potential migrants, then 
it is reasonable to expect that the positive network externalities arise in destination locations 
where the migrant network is highly concentrated as network members are likely to provide 
more accurate information about locations they have settled in relative to other migration 
destinations (Davis et al., 2002). Establishing the role of migrant networks in enhancing 
migration from a source location is, however, compliacted due to potential confoundres. Most 
of the studies on economic impacts of migration rely on cross-sectional data which provides 
limited capability to control for the historical development of migration networks. The strong 
positive associations between migration networks and migration decisions of current 
households may actually be driven by factors that induced migration from a source location in 
the past and continue to influence migration from the same location in the present. Considering 
that households which reside in the same source location have much in common, and not all 
attributes of the migration decisions are observable by the econometrician, it is possible that 
some of the unobserved attributes correlate the past and current migration streams from a source 
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location. While researchers mostly control for individual, household and source location 
specific characteristics to account for this possibility (see McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011; 
Binzel and Assaad, 2011), there is still room for a spurious positive relation between migrant 
networks and migration decisions. If it can be shown that location choices of former and latter 
migrants are related after accounting for differences in locational attributes across alternative 
locations then it supports the view that migrant networks, through providing information and 
assistance to potential migrants, affect the migration decisions of households.  
Munshi (2003) states that while 28% of Mexican migrants from Michoacan settle in San 
Francisco, this share never exceeds 8% for the rest of the states in Mexico. In addition, 27% of 
Mexican migrants from Jalisco live in san Diego, yet this share is around 1% for migrants from 
San Luis Potosi. Bauer et al. (2007) adds to the descriptive statistics by showing that 58% of 
migrants from Guanajuato, the Mexican state with the highest emigration rate to the US, go to 
California and another 23% to Texas. In the Turkish context, Istanbul is the largest city in terms 
of both in- and out-migration in all census years between 1980 and 2000, where migration is 
defined as the change in the province of residence in the last 5 years (Kocaman, 2008). The 
cities with the lowest net migration counts—the difference between the numbers of immigrants 
to and emigrants from a province—between 1995 and 2000 are Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, 
Erzurum, and Zonguldak, and the relative shares of their emigrants in Istanbul are respectively 
34%, 9.9%, 17.7%, 23,9%, and 37.8% (Kocaman, 2008). The share of emigrants from Samsun 
during 1975-1980 period who choose to settle in Istanbul is 32.7%, and it constitutes the highest 
share of respective emigrant flows across all provinces in Turkey between 1975-1980 
(Tandoğan, 1990). 20 years later, Istanbul is still the most favorable destination for the 
emigrants from Samsun. Sivas was among top 3 provinces with respect to the lowest net 
migration counts between 1975-1980, 1980-1985, and 1985-1990; and Sivas born migrants in 
Istanbul constitute around 4% of the population of Istanbul in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 
2000. Sivas was also the leading province in Turkey with respect to the foreign-born population 
shares of Istanbul in these years (Kocaman, 2008; Murat et al. 1997; Başel, 2003). These 
observational evidence suggest that both past and current migrants are not uniformly distributed 
across destination locations.  
The existing explanation for the clustering of immigrants in certain locations is the 
beneficial network externalities (see Gottlieb, 1987; Grossman, 1989; Marks, 1989; Chiswick 
and Miller, 1996; Zahniser, 1999; Munshi, 2003). Bartel (1989) shows that international 
migrants to the US from 1964 to 1980 choose to locate in standard metropolitan statistical areas 
(SMSAs) with high concentrations of their ethnic groups; though, more educated immigrants 
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rely less on the ethnic enclaves and are more dispersed across the country compared to less 
educated immigrants. By modeling the preferences of immigrants over alternative SMSAs 
using conditional logit, she showed that labor market characteristics of destination such as 
average wage levels and unemployment rates are important determinants of location choice; 
although, unemployment rates are only statistically significant for immigrants of Hispanic 
origin. Foreign-born men are more likely to reside in SMSAs with higher average wages and 
higher average monthly general assistance payments, and for men of Hispanic origin higher 
unemployment rates are a deterrent. The most important determinant of the location choice is 
the share of the ethnic group in the US that resides in a SMSA. Distance has a negative and 
significant impact on the location decision of immigrants. Distance by proxying the travel, 
psychic and information gathering costs of a destination predicts that immigrants tend to live 
in SMSAs that are closer to their origin country. This issue has attracted lots of attention after 
the seminal work of Bartel (1989). Dunlevy (1991) studied the settlement patterns of Latin and 
Caribbean born immigrants from 11 different nations to the US who received legal permanent 
residence status in 1987. He found that migrant stocks for each nationality play an important 
role in the immigrants’ destination location decisions. Zavodny (1999) investigates the 
locational choices of international migrants to US who are new recipients of legal permanent 
status and are new refugees between 1989 and 1994. He found a positive relationship between 
the flow of immigrants to states and the foreign-born share of state population for all new legal 
permanent residents and new refugees. Employment based legal permanent residents seem to 
be more sensitive to economic conditions of the locations: they prefer to live in states with 
higher manufacturing wage levels and lower unemployment. The difference between states 
with respect to welfare generosity seems to affect only refugees’ locational choices; as 
expected, they choose to settle in states where they can enjoy higher welfare benefits. Davis et 
al. (2002), by making use of a data set where they observe immigrants from rural Mexico 
locating either in different states in US or in different states in Mexico, try to estimate the 
determinants of their location choices separately. They found that both for international and 
internal migrants, the share of total migrants from an ejido—a classification of agricultural land 
that is operated by small or medium sized producers in Mexico—in a given location has a 
positive and significant impact on the location choice of a migrant. Family level migrant 
networks also influence the settlement patterns of both international and internal migrants in 
the same way as ejido level networks do. Davis et al. (2002) found that family level and ejido 
level migrant networks are substitutes; that is, as the size of the ejido level network increases 
in a location, an additional migrant from the family settled in the same location is less influential 
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on the location choice of a migrant. This implies that as the ejido level network size increases, 
the private information available for a family becomes more and more common knowledge 
within the ejido.  
Bauer et al. (2007) examines the destination choices of Mexican migrants to US among 
43 distinct locations. They allow for the migrant stock variables to have a nonlinear relationship 
with the probability of a migrant residing in a given location. Besides, they let migrants to 
follow the herd; that is, they allow for migrants to discount the information they receive from 
the migrant stocks and move to the locations that recent immigrants had gone with the 
presumption that the information that recent immigrants have is more valuable than the 
information that the migrant stocks provides. They include two migrant stock variables and one 
flow variable. The first stock variable is the fraction of the population of a US location that is 
constituted by Mexicans. The other stock variable measures the migration experience of a 
Mexican village in a US location relative to its migration experience in the whole US. The first 
stock measure captures the extent of ethnic goods available in a given US location while the 
second stock variable captures the extent of information available for a potential migrant in a 
Mexican village about a US location. The flow measure is calculated as the change in the village 
migration experience in a US location during the year preceding a potential migrant’s location 
choice decision. They found that both stock variables have inverted U shape impacts on the 
probability of choosing a US location. As the size of the migrant stocks increase in a location, 
the positive network externalities improve prospective migrants’ chances to move to that 
location with a decreasing rate. At a certain point, an additional increase in the stock causes 
negative network externalities to dominate; as the number of similar immigrants increase in a 
location, competition for available jobs would be inevitable considering that immigrants from 
the same source are substitutes of each other. After the turning point is reached, adding to the 
stock of migrants in a location decreases the propensities of migrants to migrate to that location. 
The flow impact, though, is positive on the location choice of a migrant. Immigrants are inclined 
to move to locations which attract relatively higher recent flows. Bauer et al. (2005) considers 
Mexican immigrants’ location choices in US as a function of their English language proficiency 
and concludes that immigrants with low language abilities choose to migrate to locations with 
high Mexican shares of their respective populations. Their finding for the impact of the migrant 
stock on location choice is similar to their result in Bauer et al. (2007) where they find that the 
stock of migrants in a US location has an inverse U-shaped effect on a migrant’s probability to 
choose that location.  
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Jaeger (2000) examines the intended location choices of male immigrants aged 21-54 
when they entered the US during the fiscal year 1991 (October 1990-September 1991). He 
allows the demographic and economic factors of the location to have varying influences on 
locational propensities of male immigrants based on their admission category (visa status). He 
found that immigrants in all admission categories are highly responsive to the share of the 
population of US metropolitan area from immigrant’s region of birth. Surprisingly, this effect 
is largest for the employment based immigrants. Local labor market characteristics such as 
expected wages and unemployment rates are more influential on employment based 
immigrant’s chances to migrate to a metropolitan area. Despite the ties that family reunification 
based immigrants have with the stock of migrants in US, diversity immigrants constitute a 
random sample from the population of foreign-born individuals, conditional on applying to the 
lottery. Unemployment rate of a location has a negative and significant effect on the probability 
that the diversity based immigrant migrate to that location; however, the size of the effect is 
half of the corresponding figure for employment based immigrants. The impact of region of 
birth share in the population of a location on the probability of a diversity immigrant migrating 
to that location is on par with the corresponding impact on employment based immigrants. 
Jaeger in his 2007 study expands the estimation sample in his earlier work and looks at the 
intended settlement choices of newly arrived 25-to-60-years-old immigrants who entered US 
legally between 1971 and 2000. The methodological approach in his latter study differs from 
his former one basically in two ways: in the latter one, he allows for the network variables to 
have nonlinear impacts on location propensities of immigrants, and he accounts for the time 
constant heterogeneity in state characteristics by including state level fixed effects. His findings 
are similar to what he has found before. Region of birth concentration in the state population, 
which is measured as the share of the state population that comes from the immigrant’s region 
of birth, is still found to be the most important network variable that affects an immigrant’s 
(irrespective of his visa status) location choice. Labor market characteristics play an important 
role in migrants’ destination choice where employment based immigrants form the most 
sensitive group to variations in wage levels and unemployment rates across alternative 
locations.  
In addition to the studies on location choices of immigrants to US there are a number of 
other studies that focus on other host countries. Aslund (2005) investigates the location choices 
of immigrants to Sweden and their secondary migration destinations within the country. He 
found that the number of individuals from the immigrant’s country of birth is a significant pull 
factor for both initial and subsequent location choice. Aslund (2005) found a smaller impact of 
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overall immigrant density compared to an immigrant’s country of birth concentration in a 
location. In addition, locations with high wages and low unemployment rates attract 
immigrants. There is little evidence in the study that immigrants are sensitive to variations in 
welfare generosity across locations. Damm (2009) focuses on secondary migration movements 
of immigrants within Denmark and tries to estimate the regional factors that push immigrants 
out of their initial locations. She showed that a small ethnic enclave, lack of housing and lack 
of institutions for qualifying education are the most important push factors. Immigrants respond 
to high levels of unemployment by moving out of the location as well. Findings of Aslund 
(2005) and Damm (2009) on European countries agree with US findings with respect to the 
responses of immigrants to concentrations of earlier settled immigrants of same origin and 
economic conditions of a location.  
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) investigate the determinants of destination choice of 
internal migrants in the developing country context of Nepal. They contribute to the literature 
by studying internal migrants’ preferences over locations which does not attract as much 
attention as international migrants’ choices of migration destinations, and by providing 
evidence on determinants of migrants’ location choice from a developing country. They find 
that migrants value high concentrations of individuals with similar ethnic and linguistic 
backgrounds in a location. Distance to place of origin is negatively correlated with the 
propensity to choose a location. Better access to amenities prove to be a pull factor for 
immigrants. Findings of Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) compare to previous studies on migrants’ 
location choices, and suggest that the impacts of destination attributes on the choice do not 
differ significantly between internal and international migration, as well in developed and 
developing country contexts.  
Clustering of immigrants in a few locations is most likely to result in concentration of 
the economic and fiscal impacts of migration in these areas (Damm, 2009). Quantifying the 
effects of location characteristics on migration destination choice may help local administrators 
and policy makers to predict future waves of migration to locations and take precautions to 
provide the forthcoming immigrants with necessary services and infrastructure facilities. The 
legislators may benefit from the valuable information in preparing legislations which help in 
distributing new waves of migrants across the whole country, especially if sizable extent of 
clustering is shown to be detrimental for natives’ as well as immigrants’ welfare.   
This study contributes to the scarce literature of determinants of internal migrants’ 
destination choices by examining the locational factors that influence internal migrants’ 
preferences over alternative provinces within the developing country context of Turkey by 
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using data from two rounds of population censuses: 1990 and 2000. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study conducted on this topic in Turkey. The study aims to provide 
evidence that helps to paint a clearer picture on internal migrants’ responses to location 
attributes when deciding where to live. 
2.2 Methodology 
We try to estimate the impact of pull factors of locations on internal migrants’ location 
propensities based on a discrete choice model. We closely follow the methodology applied in 
Jaeger (2007), and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013). We model the utility that an internal migrant 
𝑖 from source province 𝑜 gets from choosing province 𝑗 as follows: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝑍𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     ,     𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 (1) 
where the stochastic utility function is linear in parameters and there are 𝐽 possible destinations 
in a migrant’s choice set. The coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are fixed across choices and across 
individuals. 𝐿𝑜𝑗 is a vector of destination characteristics that varies by the source (origin) 
province of migrant, and 𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑗 is a vector of interactions between destination province and 
individual characteristics that also varies by the source province of the migrant. 𝑍𝑗 controls for 
unobserved differences between provinces and the coefficients on province fixed effects 𝛾𝑗 
varies over alternatives 𝑗. The reason for having the subscript 𝑜 in the right-hand side terms is 
that the location attributes of a destination differ across origin provinces. For example, migrants 
evaluate the distance between the source and the destination while deciding on the location 
choice as higher distance is associated with higher transportation and psychic costs. Consider 
two potential migrants, one from source Ankara and one from Hakkari. If we assume that 
distance deters migration, then the coefficient on distance has negative sign, and the utility that 
the migrant from Ankara gets from migrating to Istanbul will be higher compared to the utility 
that the migrant from Hakkari gets in Istanbul, holding everything else constant. Since the 
distance to a destination differs across origins, the utility of the destination varies by the origin 
province of migrants. In other words, the attribute of a destination will be viewed differently 
by migrants from different source provinces. Our preferred specification involves evaluation of 
utilities in alternative destinations relative to the origin province by the potential migrant. That 
is, migrants compare location attributes of possible destinations with those characteristics in 
their origin provinces, and decide on the location choice based on this comparison. The 
implementation of this approach will be explained in detail but briefly we subtract the measure 
of the location attribute in origin from the location attribute in destination. The decision makers 
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are utility maximizers; in other words, they compare the utilities they get from each alternative 
and choose the one with the highest utility77. If 𝜀𝑖𝑗 follows type I extreme value distribution, 
and is independent and identically distributed over alternatives 𝑗, then the model parameters 
can be estimated by using McFadden’s (1984) conditional logit model. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑗 be a random 
variable that takes the value 1 if individual 𝑖 chooses province 𝑗, and takes value 0 otherwise. 
Then the probability of migrant 𝑖 from origin 𝑜 choosing province 𝑗 is shown to be:  
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) =
exp (𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑗)
∑ exp (𝛼𝐿𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑜𝑘)
𝐽
𝑘=1
 (2) 
Equation (2) gives the likelihood function for an individual 𝑖 being observed in province 𝑗. After 
taking the logarithmic transformation of equation (2) and summing across all individuals 𝑖 =
1, 2, … , 𝑁, we can estimate model parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 by maximum likelihood estimation 
strategy. The marginal effect of a change in a location’s characteristic 𝑧𝑗—we intentionally drop 
the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑜—on the probability of a migrant choosing that location over others is 
calculated by taking the derivative of equation (2) with respect to 𝑧𝑗: 
 𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1)
𝜕𝑧𝑗
= [𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1)(1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1)]𝛼𝑧 (3) 
where 𝛼𝑧 corresponds to the coefficient of location characteristic 𝑧 in equation (1). Equation 
(3) implies that the marginal effect of a covariate varies with location 𝑗. If there is more 
uncertainty regarding the destination choice; that is, the choice probability 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) is close 
to 0.5, then a small change in the location’s attribute induces more migrants to choose that 
province over others and the marginal effect is largest. However, if there is less uncertainty 
with regard to choosing a location—the choice probability 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) is close to either 0 or 
1—, then a small change in the location’s attribute does not contribute to a significant change 
in the share of immigrants choosing province 𝑗 over others which interprets as a small marginal 
effect. In our case, the share of migrants in each location is different which implies that location 
probabilities 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) are different. As a result, the marginal effect of a change in a location 
attribute depends on the location. Therefore, we follow Jaeger (2007) in defining average 
marginal effect of a change in covariate 𝑧𝑗 on 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) as  
 𝜕?̂?(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1)
𝜕𝑧𝑗
= [
1
𝐽
(1 −
1
𝐽
)]?̂?𝑧 (4) 
                                                          
77 Decision maker 𝑖 chooses destination 𝑗 if and only if 𝑈𝑖𝑗 > 𝑈𝑖𝑘  ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗. 
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1
𝐽
 is the average probability of location assuming that immigrants are equally likely to live in 
any given province. In our study, we model the preferences of internal migrants over alternative 
destinations conditional on migrating as Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) suggests. This implies 
that each migrant is observed in only one location, and this location is different than his province 
of origin78. The sample contains 67 provinces which covers the whole country. Thus, each 
migrant has a choice set with 66 destination alternatives and migrants from different source 
provinces have different choice sets. By multiplying the conditional logit estimates with 
[
1
𝐽
(1 −
1
𝐽
)] =
1
66
(1 −
1
66
) ≅ 0.0149, we will be able to interpret the resulting product as the 
average effect of a change in a province’s attribute on the probability of a migrant deciding to 
live in that province. We do not include non-migrants in our sample because mainly non-
migrants and migrants differ in both their observed and unobserved characteristics, and the 
heterogeneity in individual traits, unless properly controlled, may bias the estimates of 
determinants of location choice. Although the heterogeneity caused by observable attributes 
can be controlled for in a conditional logit framework, unobserved differences between the two 
groups may create serious problems. For example, it is possible to think of a scenario where 
unobserved characteristics of non-migrants—like having relatives they cannot leave behind or 
having businesses they have in place of origin that they cannot afford to shut down—keep them 
in their place of origin. This suggests that the cost of migration is too high for non-migrants. If 
we include non-migrants in the analysis, then the variable which accounts for the migration 
costs in the location choice equation captures the impact of non-migrants’ unobserved “stay” 
factors. Including individual-specific province-of-origin fixed effects79 accounts for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in migration costs; however, individual-specific province-of-origin 
fixed effects would entirely account for non-migrants’ decisions to stay at origin and including 
non-migrants and origin provinces as alternatives to the analysis of location choice, then, would 
provide no additional information (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2009). In short, there may be many 
factors that determine the decision to migrate and to not conflate those with the determinants 
of migration destination choice, plus to minimize the bias that results from self-selection into 
migration, we drop non-migrants from the sample. On the other hand, some researchers argue 
that excluding non-migrants and hence source locations as alternatives may result in sample 
                                                          
78 To clarify, province of origin refers to the location of the internal migrant 5 years prior to the survey date. Place of birth or 
province of birth corresponds to the immigrant’s birth location. 
79 This variable takes value one if the destination is the province of the individual five years prior to the survey date and takes 
value zero otherwise. This variable compares to the “non-migration dummy” variable implemented in Davies et al. (2001). 
Non-migration dummy of Davies et al. (2001) differs from place-of-origin fixed effect by assigning value zero to migrants.  
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selection issues (see Davies et al., 2001; Sorensen et al., 2007) since the composition of the 
migrant subsample may be different from that of non-migrants, e.g. non-migrants under the 
possibility of migrating may respond differently to location attributes than the observed 
migrants in the sample react. To check for the sensitivity of our conditional logit estimates from 
the migrant sample, we estimate equation (2) for a combined sample of migrants and stayers in 
which origin provinces are treated as potential destination choices. We do not have information 
on international migrants; so, we study the determinants of location choices of internal migrants 
only.    
 It is impossible to observe the utility levels that immigrants would get in different 
locations. Thus, we need to think of the factors that determine an immigrant’s utility from living 
in a location. Previous research (Bartel, 1989; Davies et al., 2001; Jaeger, 2000; Jaeger, 2007; 
Bauer et al., 2007) shows that immigrants respond to variations in economic conditions of 
locations. To capture differences in labor market conditions researchers generally include in 
their specifications average wage levels (or per capita income) and unemployment rates of 
locations (see Davies et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2005; Jaeger, 2007). Turkish census data does 
not provide information on individuals’ incomes, instead reports their occupation in the week 
before the survey and their last finished schooling level. Omitting average wage levels of 
locations would most likely result in endogeneity bias; as, the difference in income levels 
between locations is supposedly a key determinant that draws migrants together to a location 
both in the past and in the present. Bauer et al. (2007) and Bartel (1989) control for a location’s 
population size and unemployment rate to capture the level of economic activity, level of labor 
demand and job opportunities in a location. Bauer et al. (2007) argues that controlling for 
unemployment rates also account for unobserved autocorrelated shocks to local labor markets 
which may drive migrants to locations which former migrants of the same origin do or do not 
consider as best alternatives. In other words, by including unemployment rates one achieves to 
control for the impact of unobserved local labor market attributes on migrants’ location 
propensities. Another way to control for income differences between alternatives is to use a 
method as in Jaeger (2007) by estimating expected wage levels of immigrants in each 
alternative location. For that, firstly we need to have a random sample of the population in years 
1985 and 1995 where we observe individuals’ wages, their schooling attainment, and province 
of residence. Then for each skill level in each province we can get the average wage level. 
Lastly, for each internal migrant in each skill group who migrates in our sample between 1985-
1990 or 1995-2000, we assign the corresponding figures from 1985 or 1995 as his expected 
wage levels in different provinces. However, we do not know of a data set as distant in past as 
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1985 which contains information on wage, schooling, and settlement of individuals. Therefore, 
we follow Bauer et al. (2007) in using a location’s population size and unemployment rate as 
proxies for income level and economic conditions of a location. In an alternative specification, 
we replace population size with population density to control for the effect of a destination’s 
job opportunities and economic conditions on migrant’s utility.   
 As local labor market conditions are of interest for migrants who pursue better job 
opportunities and higher welfare by migrating, we restrict our sample to 28-54-years-old male 
internal migrants who are neither students nor retirees and are supposed to have a connection 
to the labor market80. Internal migration in our context is defined as the change in the province 
of residence in the past 5 years. The age restriction on the lower bound is, therefore, to ensure 
that migration is not due to pursuing schooling beyond high school level. In Turkey, schooling 
starts at age 6 and until one finishes university education 15 or 16 years elapse81. By age 23 
most of the high academic achievers are supposed to exit the schooling phase of their lives. The 
law on pensions in Turkey allowed males to retire as young as 43 years of age until 08.09.1999 
(Kızılot, 2012, para. 2). After that date, the retirement age is gradually increased. Since the 
census data comes from 1990 and 2000 for internal migrants, to make sure that migration due 
to retirement is not a concern the upper cap of the age restriction could be set at 42; then, 
however, the sample size would be reduced significantly. To capture migration destination 
preferences of prime-age males, we set the upper bound of the age restriction to be 54 and 
dropped the observations which state their reason for not working in the last week as being 
retired. Since the sample consists of males aged 28-54, provincial unemployment rates are 
calculated for 28-54-years-old males including both natives and immigrants. Agricultural sector 
in Turkey is large in the sense that the share of agricultural sector in total employment is 34% 
in 1985 and 29% in 1990. Hence, the average unemployment rates may not be good predictors 
of job availability in destinations. To counteract this problem, we test with two alternative 
measures of job opportunities in a destination: nonagricultural employment rate which is the 
share of total employment in a destination that is from nonagricultural sector, and 
                                                          
80 We exclude military personnel from the estimation sample—to the extent that it is possible—since their location choice may 
be exogenous to economic and demographic conditions of locations and may be completely determined by the will of Turkish 
armed forces. Civil servants constitute another group that may not freely choose among the alternative destinations. Their 
location choices may be restricted to a subsample of the alternatives, and the desire of the corporation they work for may be an 
important determinant of their choice. Hence, estimation sample excludes civil servants as well.  
81 Assuming that the individual does not repeat grades and attain university as soon as he graduates from high school. Total 
length of schooling until the end of university depends on whether an individual attended a regular/vocational/religious 
vocational high school or Anatolian/science high school. The latter group includes an additional one year of preparatory grade.  
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nonagricultural unemployment rate which is the unemployment rate (in a destination) in the 
nonagricultural sector.  
 The identification strategy requires us to observe the location characteristics before 
migrants actually decide on migration destination to abstract from simultaneity issues. Large 
inflows of immigrants to a location may affect province level characteristics like unemployment 
rate and ease of access to amenities. If the researcher observes the location attributes after the 
migration flows have occurred, he mistakenly might conclude to a wrong direction of causation. 
The internal migrants in our sample are those who changed their province of residence between 
1985-1990 or 1995-2000. Hence, the location characteristics are dated 1985 for the earlier flows 
and 1990 for the later flows. We gather information on location characteristics from 1985 
census for internal migrants observed in 1990 census and had changed their province of 
residence between 1985 and 1990. Similarly, location attributes are derived from 1990 census 
for internal migrants observed in 2000 census and had left their province of origin between 
1995 and 2000. We take 1990 locational characteristics as approximations to their 1995 
counterparts; although, some attributes might have changed during the five-year period between 
1990 and 1995. This is the best we can achieve as there is no reliable data set that presents 
demographic, social and economic characteristics of provinces in 1995. Summing up, to 
account for heterogeneity in local labor markets, we include provincial population size and 
provincial unemployment rate for 28-to-54-years-old males (including natives and immigrants) 
at two points in time; 1985 and 1990.  
 Studies on location choices of internal and international migrants reveal that ties of 
kinship, acquaintanceship, and birth places link former and latter migrants, and influence the 
destination choices of potential migrants through providing them information about destination 
labor and housing markets (see Bartel, 1989; Dunlevy, 1991; Zavodny, 1999; Davis et al., 2002; 
Winters et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2007; Jaeger, 2000; Jaeger, 2007, 
Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013). How these migrant ties (or migrant networks) are defined and 
measured varies across studies. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) prefer to capture the impact of 
migrant networks on location propensities by the fraction of a destination district’s population 
who shares the same ethno-caste, religious and linguistic characteristics with the internal 
migrant in consideration. Jaeger (2007) introduces three variables to quantify the impact of 
immigrant concentrations: the share of the state population that comes from the immigrant’s 
region of birth; the share of the immigrant’s region of birth population in US that lives in the 
state; and the share of the state’s population that was foreign-born. Bartel (1989) prefers to 
include the share of the immigrants with the same ethnicity in US that lives in a SMSA to 
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control for supposedly migration cost reducing impact of migrant networks. The migrant stock 
variables used in Bauer et al. (2007) are similar to those in Jaeger (2007) and are explained in 
detail previously. What these studies have in common is that the ties which matter most for a 
potential migrant are those that are formed by sharing the same region/country/district/village 
of birth, or in short, place of birth. This observation leads us to define migrant networks with 
regard to ties of birth provinces. We include three migrant network variables into our 
specification following Jaeger (2007). The first one is the share of the immigrant’s birth 
province group in the population of the destination province; the second variable is the share of 
the immigrant’s birth province population in Turkey that lives in the destination province; and 
the last one is the share of the foreign-born individuals in destination province population. The 
first stock variable accounts for the relative size of the network and captures the extent of ethnic 
goods available to the immigrant in a destination location (Baur et al., 2007; Jaeger, 2007). The 
ethnic goods component of the network includes besides availability of ethnic foods and music, 
the availability of people who speak the same language with the immigrant. In Turkish context 
it is possible to think that linguistic considerations may not affect migrants’ location choices; 
however, migrants from east and south-east parts of Turkey are known to have difficulties in 
speaking the official language. Thus, the first stock variable to some extent also measures the 
size of the linguistic enclave in a destination (Jaeger, 2007). The second stock variable measures 
the amount of information available to the immigrant about a destination relative to other 
destinations. Since the denominator is the same for all provinces82, this variable accounts for 
the impact of absolute size of the immigrant’s birth province group in a destination. The second 
stock variable is supposed to capture the impact of the extent of information available to the 
potential migrant about housing and labor markets at a destination relative to other destinations. 
Immigrants may discount the extent of information that they have on labor markets at 
destination and the extent of assistance that they could get after arrival, and prefer to move to 
destinations that they know welcome immigrants of all origins. It may be the attitudes of natives 
against immigrants or the differential services offered to the immigrants and their families that 
attract migrants to these provinces. The last stock variable captures these effects. In a sense it 
controls for the herd behavior where the herd consists of immigrants of all origins (regardless 
of their birth provinces). The third stock variable may be collinear with the second stock 
measure because immigrant attracting cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir might also account 
                                                          
82 The second stock variable is measured by dividing the total count of immigrant’s birth province group in a destination 
province to the total count of immigrant’s birth province group in Turkey.  
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for the largest shares of the population of immigrants in immigrant sending cities (Kocaman, 
2008). Therefore, in the multivariate analysis we check for the sensitivity of the results by 
excluding the third stock variable from the regressions. Bauer et al. (2007) and Jaeger (2007) 
show that the relationship between location propensities and migration networks is non-linear, 
more specifically of inverted U shape; hence, for all three migrant stock variables we include 
both a linear and a quadratic term to allow for this possibility.   
 It may be the case that instead of acquiring information about housing and labor markets 
at destination and getting help in terms of food, shelter and job referrals upon arrival through 
former migrants that are linked to potential migrants via birth province and kinship; 
acquaintances, neighbors, and colleagues in the origin province may assist potential migrants 
in their location choices. To allow for this possibility, we construct migrant network measures 
that are conceptually the same with the previous ones but the tie that links former and latter 
migrants is living in the same origin province before migrating. That is, the first stock variable 
is defined as the share of a destination population that is from migrants from the same origin 
province as the potential migrant—with the migrant from 1990 or 2000 census—that moved to 
the destination between 1980 and 1985, or between 1985 and 1990. The other network variables 
are constructed analogously and we test the sensitivity of the results to the way we define 
migrant networks by incorporating this new set of network variables that are based on ties of 
origin province.  
 Migration, either international or internal, incurs some substantial costs: travel costs, 
psychic costs of leaving beloved ones behind, information gathering costs and costs associated 
with accommodating to a new environment (Bartel, 1989; Jaeger, 2007). Internal migrants may 
be more sensitive to travel costs associated with visiting kin compared to international migrants 
as the former involves passing city borders and the latter involves passing country borders. To 
proxy for migration costs, we take the straight-line distance (in kilometers) between the centers 
of destination province and the immigrant’s province of origin. The marginal cost of moving 
one unit further for a migrant may decline as the distance between the destination and the origin 
province increases (Davies et al., 2001; Jaeger, 2007). We include a squared distance term to 
allow the relation between location propensities and distance to be non-linear.      
 Cragg and Kahn (1997) show that amenities are important determinants of location 
choice. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) find that better access to amenities measured in terms of 
higher housing premium, and shorter travel time to the nearest paved road and bank are 
important pull factors of districts in Nepal. Jaeger (2007) includes in the regressions quadratics 
in absolute differences in average temperatures and annual average precipitations between the 
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immigrant’s country of birth and the US state. He finds that the differences in amenities between 
states have almost zero effect on location propensities of immigrants in all admission categories 
(regardless of gender). We do not have information on amenities that provinces provide. 
However, by including province fixed effects (province specific constants) we may account for 
the impact of amenities, as province fixed effects, when we pool the data from 1990 and 2000 
censuses, control for time invariant attributes of a province like weather, total land area of the 
province, being on the coast, the amount of resource endowment, etc. Province fixed effect for 
a destination captures the average impact of factors not controlled for directly—including 
amenities—on the utility of the destination (Train, 2009). The source of the identification with 
fixed effects models differs depending on the data set at hand. If the multivariate analysis is 
based on a single cross-section and province fixed effects are included in the model 
specification, then the parameters of the model are identified through within province variation 
in observable covariates (Allison, 2009). In the case of pooled cross-sectional data where 
province-group dummies are included in the model, the identification comes from within 
province variation in observable covariates over time (Jaeger, 2007). To escape from dummy 
variable trap one of the location dummies should be dropped in either of the data sets discussed. 
Fixed effects methods help to control for omitted variable bias; hence, we prefer to include 
province specific constants to our model specification. Zavodny (1999), Kaushal (2005) and 
Aslund (2005) investigate the impact of welfare benefits on migrants’ location choices, and 
couldn’t find evidence on differences in welfare generosity among locations inducing 
systematic location choices. To the best of our knowledge, we do not have variation in welfare 
benefits among Turkish provinces, neither in the past nor in the present, because the central 
government considers the country as a unity when planning social welfare programs. Hence, 
welfare benefits are supposedly ineffective on locational choices of internal migrants and 
therefore we do not control for welfare benefits.  
We have mentioned earlier that source province characteristics also matter in location 
choice of migrants. Migrants from a source with high income level may view the income level 
of a destination differently than migrants from a source with low income level (Davies et al., 
2001). However, source province characteristics do not vary over alternative destinations; thus, 
we cannot directly include them as separate regressors in our specification. Davies et al. (2001) 
argues that there are three possible solutions to account for differences in origin province 
characteristics of migrants. Firstly, we may ignore the differences in source province 
characteristics and concentrate only on destination characteristics. However, this approach is 
restrictive as it implicitly assumes that a location attribute has the same contribution to the 
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utility of a destination for migrants from different sources; although, for migrants from a given 
source the location attribute may be favorable and for the migrants from another source the 
location attribute may be undesirable. Secondly, we may interact province dummies with source 
province characteristics. This will lead to a substantial increase in the number of parameters 
that needs to be estimated as there are 66 alternatives and numerous origin characteristics. The 
second approach would be infeasible to apply and most likely result in convergence problems. 
Thirdly, we may use relative measures of location attributes between the destination and origin 
province. Davies et al. (2001) via incorporating destination-to-origin ratios of location attributes 
allows the effect of location characteristics to vary over origin states. As the ratio exceeds one, 
the relative difference between destination and origin increases, and this leads to a higher 
influence of the location characteristic on locational propensity. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) 
use differences in location attributes between the destination and the origin to control for 
differences in source district characteristics among immigrants. This method corresponds to 
taking logarithmic transformation of destination-to-origin ratio of location characteristics such 
as population, housing price premium, average district income and consumption in their study. 
Both methods applied by Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013), and Davies et al. (2001) require 
symmetric responses to changes either in destination or origin source characteristics, and in this 
sense, these methods are also restrictive. However, applying the second approach is infeasible; 
thus, we adopt the third option and create variables that take the differences in location 
characteristics between destination and origin provinces.   
 The data limitations in this study may cause some problems. Firstly, for internal 
migrants we observe their province of origin and province of destination, and between the two 
observations there is 5 year lag. During this time period the migrant may have moved more than 
once and eventually decided to settle in the province that we observe at the end of the fifth year. 
If the migrant has the same set of information regarding the destination alternatives before his 
first move and decided not to migrate to his ultimate choice in the first place, then we may 
overestimate the impacts of province attributes which are correlated with the final move. Think 
of an extreme case where all the migrants move more than once during the 5 years prior to the 
survey date and all chose initially provinces with small concentrations of same birth place 
individuals, and all ultimately chosen destination provinces have high concentrations of 
compatriots. In this scenario, assuming that before the first move migrants know the spatial 
distribution of their birth place group over provinces, we overestimate the impact of migrant 
networks; actually, we predict a wrong direction for the impact of migrant stocks on location 
propensities. We don’t have any viable approach to counteract this possibility; hence, we simply 
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assume that migrants stay in their intended locations for a long period of time or at least for 5 
years. Secondly, we estimate our conditional logit model using the pooled census data from 
1990 and 2000, mainly to control for time constant province characteristics via incorporating 
province dummies. In this case, the model imposes a restriction as the parameters are not 
allowed to vary across time. Some location characteristics may have gained importance over a 
decade, and some others may have lost influence on location decisions of migrants. We can 
check whether the parameter estimates are stable over a decade in two ways: firstly, with pooled 
census data we can interact each location characteristic with two dummy variables; one for year 
1990 and one for year 200083. In this way, we end up with two sets of parameter estimates that 
allow the impact of location attributes to vary across time. Secondly, we can run separate 
regressions on each census data to see whether the results are consistent over a decade while 
relative economic and demographic conditions of locations may be changing from one census 
to the other. We prefer the second approach.  
 Thirdly, Turkey experienced an increase in the number of provinces over the period 
1985-2000. The number of provinces were 67, 73, and 81 in 1985, 1990 and 2000 censuses, 
respectively. The new provinces were counties of the existing provinces and became a province 
of their own84. The process of new city creation did not cause existing old provinces to change 
names or cease entirely. This process resulted in a change in the borders of the provinces. To 
track provinces over a period of 15 years, we have two options: i) define the labor markets as 
provinces in 2000 which results in the migrant to have a choice set of 80 alternatives; ii) define 
the labor markets as provinces in 1985 which presents migrants 66 alternatives among which 
they need to choose one. The first approach is problematic in two ways: first, it requires the 
migrants to perfectly foresee that a county which presents a small labor market today will 
become a province in the future and will have a boom in job opportunities due to the city 
formation process; secondly, for a migrant with a birth province among the last 14 created cities, 
we are unable to create migrant network variables due to the fact that we don’t have the birth 
county information for observations in 1985 and 1990 censuses85. The second approach is not 
                                                          
83 The dummy for year 1990 takes value one if the migrant had moved between 1985 and 1990 and takes value zero otherwise. 
The dummy for year 2000 is constructed analogously.  
84 Aksaray, Bayburt, Karaman, Kırıkkale became provinces in 1989 and were former counties of Niğde, Gümüşhane, Konya, 
and Ankara, respectively. Batman and Şırnak were separated from Siirt and became provinces in 1990. All these cities were 
created after the 1985 census and were first included as provinces in 1990 census. Bartın and Karabük were former counties of 
Zonguldak and became provinces in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Ardahan and Iğdır were separated from Kars in 1992. Yalova, 
Kilis, Osmaniye and Düzce were former counties of İstanbul, Gaziantep, Adana and Bolu, respectively. The latter set of 
provinces were first introduced as provinces in 2000 census.  
85 Plus, we do not have the county of residence information in 1985 census which would also be required to create migrant 
network variables in the last founded 14 cities.  
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free of problems, either. If we imagine the province that was created after 1985 as a county of 
its former city, and accordingly define the choice set for a migrant to have 66 alternative 
provinces, then the migrant enclave in a destination would constitute of the former migrants 
from the province that was split into two and the county that emerged as a new province out of 
the existing one. On one hand, the outflows of migrants from the newly created province may 
be directed to destinations that could not be predicted by the joint spatial distribution of the 
former migrants from the old and new province; however, the migrant networks created by the 
former migrants from the county—which eventually became a province—may be a good 
predictor of destination choices of migrants from the newly founded province, and we are 
unable to differentiate the migrant network of the new province from the migrant network of 
the old province. On the other hand, it might be the case that the city formation process induces 
high in-migration to a province that was formerly a county of an existing province since the 
process involves a significant increase in job openings (Bengin, 2016, para. 2). If the boom in 
the economy of the newly created province results in inflow of migrants which is uncorrelated 
with the existing migrant networks in the newly created province86, then one can simply 
misevaluate the observational evidence and conclude that migrant networks do not affect 
location choices of potential migrants. To capture the pull effect of job creations in a newly 
founded province within our estimation strategy one needs to include to the specification a 
dummy which takes value one if the destination province contains a county that eventually 
became a province, and takes value zero otherwise. Based on the above discussion, we prefer 
to define labor markets as provinces in 1985 with the migrant having the possibility to choose 
among 66 alternative provinces.  
The conditional logit model relies on independence from irrelevant alternatives 
assumption which requires that the ratio of choice probabilities between any two destinations 
is independent of other alternatives (Train, 2009). Since we let all the provinces in Turkey to 
be in the choice set, the possibility of existence of alternative provinces that are not in the choice 
set becomes irrelevant. Hence, independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption is 
trivially satisfied.  
 We discuss now some potential threats to the model specification. Firstly, values 
attached to the attributes of destination provinces may vary over immigrants. If immigrants’ 
                                                          
86 Actually, it is the migrant enclaves present in the old province which was split into two as we could not measure the size of 
the migrant networks in the newly emerging province that was formerly a county. If the old province was not a favorable 
destination location for immigrants which is suspected to be true for provinces located especially in the eastern and south-
eastern parts of the country, the large inflows of migrants to the newly created province out of the existing one would be 
uncorrelated with the migrant enclaves in the old province.  
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tastes over attributes of alternatives vary with respect to immigrants’ observed characteristics, 
then by interacting province attributes with the observable traits of immigrants, which are 
suspected to induce differences in utility levels between alternative provinces87, conditional 
logit becomes a suitable model to capture taste variations (Train, 2009). However, if tastes vary 
with respect to unobserved characteristics of immigrants, then the assumption of errors being 
independent and identically distributed over alternatives cannot be satisfied which leads to 
model misspecification (Train, 2009). In our context, immigrants with low language 
capabilities may have high costs to migrate to provinces where their migrant enclaves are not 
highly concentrated; hence, they may prefer provinces where a large number of earlier settled 
compatriots exist. If we had the opportunity to observe language abilities of immigrants, we 
simply would have interacted the migrant network variable with language capability of the 
immigrant. However, the census data does not contain information on language capabilities of 
individuals, therefore the interaction term will end up in the error term which causes errors for 
different alternatives to be correlated and have different variances88. For this specific scenario, 
the first stock variable by measuring the size of the linguistic enclave in a destination, accounts 
for differences in tastes of migrants based on unobserved language capabilities. To control for 
differences across migrants in the values and importance they attach to location attributes, we 
include individual fixed effects to equation (1)89. Individual fixed effects also control for any 
effect on utility of destinations due to source province characteristics since origin province 
                                                          
87 Since immigrant characteristics do not vary over alternative locations, there are two ways to incorporate traits of immigrants 
into conditional logit model: i) normalize the coefficient of the immigrant trait to zero for one alternative location and interpret 
the remaining coefficient estimates of immigrant’s characteristic as the impact of the immigrant trait on an alternative location 
relative to the location for which the impact is normalized to 0. ii) interact the location attribute with the immigrant 
characteristic; in this case, there is no need to normalize any of the coefficients of the trait variable to zero. Since location 
attributes vary over alternatives, the difference in utility levels varies with the immigrant trait (Train, 2009).  
88 Simplify the model in equation (1) and let the utilities depend only on migrant networks in a location and the distance of the 
location to the place of origin plus a stochastic error term that varies both over individuals and locations: 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. The subscript 𝑖 in the coefficient of migrant network variable is included to allow the value of migrant network 
to vary over immigrants. We assume that the variation in immigrant tastes over provinces is partly explained by the variation 
in immigrants’ language proficiencies. We can decompose the network effect into two: an average effect and an immigrant 
specific component—a deviation around the mean that differs across individuals—. Let 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖 where the latter term 
controls for the language capability of an immigrant. When we plug 𝛼𝑖 into the above equation we reach: 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. Since we do not observe language capabilities in census data, the interaction term ends up in the 
new error term 𝜀?̃?𝑗 = 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗. The new error terms for different alternatives are correlated and have different 
variances. To see that: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀?̃?𝑗 , 𝜀?̃?𝑘) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 , 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑘) +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑘) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑘) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑘) = 𝛾
2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖)𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑘. The covariance between 
new error terms is conditional on observable location attributes, and orijinal error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗 and 𝜀𝑖𝑘 are orthogonal to observable 
location characteristics. Since language capabilities vary over immigrants, the resulting term is not equal to zero. To see that 
errors do not have identical distributions: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀?̃?𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑗) =
𝛾2𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑗). This sum varies over alternatives as migrant networks vary over alternatives. Hence, errors 
are not identically distributed over alternatives.   
89 A crucial point is that for individual fixed effects to control for omitted variable bias due to heterogeneity in unobserved 
individual characteristics, the unobserved individual traits should be constant across alternative destinations.  
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characteristics can be thought of as traits of migrants that do not vary across alternatives 
(Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013).  
 Another critical issue is related with achieving correct inference. The method applied in 
this study creates patterns of positive and negative correlations in error terms across alternatives 
for a migrant. A migrant goes to only one location among the alternatives and this creates 
interdependence across observations for the immigrant. As an example, imagine that a migrant 
is equally likely to migrate to any province in the choice set and he chooses one of the 
alternatives randomly. Since there are 66 provinces in migrant’s choice set, probability of 
choosing one of them is 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑘 = 1) =
1
66
. Then for the alternative which is randomly chosen 
by the migrant, the error term is 𝜀𝑖𝑙 = 1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑙 = 1) = 1 −
1
66
=
65
66
 . For the other alternatives, 
the error terms take the value 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 0 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 0 −
1
66
= −
1
66
 . The unchosen 
alternatives, thus, have positively correlated residuals. The correlation between the residuals of 
chosen and unchosen alternatives is negative. The main problem stems from the presence of 
negative correlations in errors across location choices for an immigrant (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 
2009). Individual fixed effects capture some of the correlation in the error terms across different 
alternatives since including individual fixed effects accounts for systematic taste variation that 
depends on unobserved individual characteristics that do not vary over alternatives.  If the 
unobserved individual characteristics would have affected all the choices for a migrant in the 
same way, individual fixed effects would absorb the common shock and the remaining residuals 
would have zero within-cluster correlation (Cameron and Miller, 2015). However, having both 
positively and negatively correlated residuals renders individual fixed effects insufficient to 
absorb away the whole within-cluster error correlations. Hence, to correct for this 
interdependence across observations relative to a migrant, we need to cluster standard errors at 
individual level.  
 Including individual fixed effects and clustering standard errors at individual level may 
not ensure correct inference. Turkey has experienced an armed conflict (with the terrorist 
organization known as PKK) which resulted in deaths of thousands of ethnic Turks and Kurds 
which still continues to harm citizens of the country. The main aim of Kurdish terrorists is stated 
as the establishment of an independent ethnic state in the area which is located partly in South 
East Turkey, North of Iraq and Syria, and Western Iran (Öcal and Yıldırım, 2010). 1984 was 
the year that Turkish state had its first martyr to the terrorist attacks and the number of armed 
attacks by the terrorists increased dramatically in the second half of 1980s and in 1990s 
(“PKK’nin Kanlı Tarihi”, 2016, para. 12-15). The armed attacks are mainly concentrated in 
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eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey. The severity of the attacks caused thousands of 
individuals to leave their birth districts and move to western parts of the country during 1980s 
and 1990s (Yıldırım and Öcal, 2013). If the destination choices of migrants from the same 
origin province are correlated, then clustering standard errors at individual level would not be 
sufficient to achieve correct inference. Immigrants originating from the same province have 
much in common and some of these similarities are unknown to the researcher and may 
correlate migrants’ location choices. To correct for this possibility, we cluster standard errors 
at origin province level90. It is tempting to imagine that the factors that cause correlated location 
choices of migrants from the same origin province in 1980s are completely irrelevant to 
migrants’ location choices from the same origin province a decade later. Then, it would be 
possible to cluster standard errors at origin province*year level which results in 134 clusters. 
However, fear of terrorism is suspected to be a push factor that correlates location choices of 
migrants from the same origin province both in 1980s and 1990s. Hence, we separate the 
observations into 67 groups and cluster standard errors by origin province.  
Provinces that were targeted by terrorist attacks in the East and Southeast Turkey had 
experienced downgrade in economic conditions and the migrant enclaves in these provinces 
responded to terrorism as well. One may falsely conclude that migrant networks are positively 
associated with migrants’ location propensities based on observational data; though it may be 
the deterring impact of terrorism on migration that migrant enclave measure captures. To isolate 
the impact of terrorism from other location characteristics on immigrants’ locational choices, 
we include a dummy which takes value 1 if the province suffers from terrorist attacks and takes 
value 0 otherwise. To identify the impacts of terrorism and job creations due to formation of 
new cities, we need to use cross province variation in the dummy variables that control for the 
relevant effects. However, in a province fixed effects model with pooled census data 
identification comes from within province variation in covariates over time; hence, it is not 
possible to identify these impacts91. In single cross sectional analysis, we can either include 
province dummies to control for differences in unobserved destination characteristics—
includes whether a province is affected from terrorist attacks and whether a province is split 
                                                          
90 Clustering standard errors at origin province level encompasses clustering standard errors at individual level. 
91 If terrorism and new city formation have the same influence on location choices of immigrants in late 1980s and late 1990s, 
then location fixed effects would capture these impacts (Allison, 2009). Though, it is a strong assumption to believe in since 
the pull impact of city formation is most likely high in the short run when the city is newly founded and loses its strength as 
time passes (as available job positions are getting occupied). Almost half of the cities were created before 1990; hence, it is 
possible to observe a declining impact of city formation process on location propensities over time. On the other hand, since 
terrorism is brutal in South-eastern and Eastern Turkey during 1980s and 1990s, it is possible to imagine the deterring impact 
of terrorism to be constant over time. In that case, province fixed effects would account for the difference in location 
propensities due to safety issues.  
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into two that results in job creations—, or  include dummy variables which control for impacts 
of terrorism and job creations on location choices of migrants since the identification comes 
from both within-province and cross-province variation in covariates in single cross-section 
discrete choice models (Jaeger, 2007). Based on findings of Öcal and Yıldırım (2010), we 
include a dummy variable that takes value 1 for provinces Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Bitlis, 
Hakkari, Van, Tunceli and Artvin; and takes value zero otherwise92. In these provinces, the 
average number of fatalities in a year due to ethnic terrorism during the period 1987-2001 is 
more than 9.733, and according to this definition ethnic terrorism is most brutal in these cities 
compared to other cities in Turkey. We can estimate the impact of job creation due to new city 
formation process in province fixed effects model with pooled census data by allowing the 
impact to vary over time: new job opportunities in cities created between 1985 and 1990 have 
influence only on migrants’ location choices who move between 1985 and 1990; similarly, new 
job opportunities in cities created between 1990 and 2000 are influential only on the location 
propensities of migrants that move between 1995 and 2000. It is obvious that the location 
decisions of migrants that had moved between 1985 and 1990 are orthogonal to changes in 
labor market characteristics of cities that are going to be created 5 to 10 years later than their 
moves occurred. The pull impact of new jobs in cities that were created between 1985 and 1990 
are assumed to diminish for migrants that are going to move between 1995 and 2000. In this 
way, the variable that captures the impact of new job openings vary over time.   
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The Turkish Statistical Agency (TÜİK) makes publicly available the 5% random sample 
of the population censuses from years 1985, 1990 and 2000. We use 5% censuses from 1990 
and 2000 to determine the internal migrants. Then, we match internal migrants who had 
changed their province of residence between 1985 and 1990 with possible destinations and their 
characteristics measured in 1985 census. Similarly, internal migrants who had moved between 
1995 and 2000 are matched to locations and their characteristics measured in 1990 census. The 
location characteristics are observed before the migration had occurred. Hence, simultaneity 
issues are not much of concern. The census questionnaire asks besides the current place of 
residence and place of residence five years ago, detailed questions about demographics such as 
                                                          
92 Actually we include this dummy variable only to specifications in Table 2-3 where we run robustness checks and omit 
province-group dummies from the model specification. It will be explained in more detail later, but shortly including province 
fixed effects causes convergence issues which lead us to create groups of similar provinces with respect to socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics and instead include province-group dummies to the location choice models.  
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the last finished schooling, gender, age, marital status, occupation, and unemployment. The 
2000 census adds to the set of questions in 1990 census the motives for migration.   
The 5% census from 1990 contains 2,864,207 observations from all 73 provinces in 
Turkey. A total of 598,067 individuals live in a province which is different than their province 
of birth. 204,949 individuals changed their province of residence in the last five years93. Around 
7.2% of the observations migrated internally within the last five years. There are many motives 
for migration including finding a better job, getting education and marriage. The determinants 
of location choices for migrants with different migration motives may differ as well. Work 
migrants are suspected to be more sensitive to differences in labor market conditions in possible 
destinations; hence, our study focuses on work migration. 1990 census contains 25,325 male 
internal migrants who are between ages 28 and 54, are not either students or retirees, and are 
not civil servants or members of Turkish armed forces. Non-migrant male group is similarly 
defined and has a total count of 319,503. The migrants are on average younger, better educated 
and more likely to be literate, less likely to be household heads and married, less likely to be 
self-employed or unpaid family workers, more likely to be wage earners and unemployed 
compared to non-migrants. The age difference between the migrant and non-migrant groups 
reflects the fact that migrants generally move when they are younger so that there is more time 
left to collect the returns to migration. Since migrants and non-migrants differ on observable 
characteristics, there is a chance to have heterogeneity in unobservable characteristics as well. 
If the traits that are unobserved to the econometrician help determine whether a person moves 
or stays and also are correlated with the determinants of location choice, then focusing on only 
migrants to estimate location propensities may cause sample selection bias. Therefore, as a 
robustness check we estimate the impact of choice attributes based on a sample consisting of 
both migrants and non-migrants.  
5% random sample of 2000 population census contains 3,444,456 observations from all 
81 provinces in Turkey. 239,727 of them settled in a different province than their province of 
origin. A total of 854,502 individuals left their birth province. When it comes to the motives 
for migration, among adult male migrants who are at least 15 years-old the largest group is 
work migrants with a share of 52%, it is followed by education related migration with 13% and 
migration dependent on a household member with 8%. Migration due to marriage only 
                                                          
93 The information regarding migration within last five years is available for individuals who are at least 5 years-old. Migration 
status with respect to birth province is known for any individual regardless of their ages. The descriptive analysis and 
multivariate analysis disregard individuals born in foreign countries, individuals who migrated to foreign countries or in-
migrated from foreign countries within the last five years.  
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constitutes 1% of adult male migrants. When we look at the motives for migration of adult 
female migrants, the largest group moves since one of the household members migrates. It is 
followed by work related migration with a share of 22%. Share of education related migration 
is on par with adult male migrants. However, unlike adult males, marriage is an important 
motive for migration for females: 19% of adult females change province of residence within 
last five years to accompany their spouses.  
The estimation sample consists of adult male work migrants who are 28-to-54-years-
old, are not either students or retirees; hence, have a possible connection to labor markets. We 
exclude civil servants and soldiers since their location choices may be exogenous to socio-
demographic and labor market characteristics of locations. Knowing the motives for migration 
helps us pinpoint migrants who desire to find a better job by migrating. We can further restrict 
the estimation sample in 2000 census to individuals who migrate in order to search for a job or 
find a job. There are 16,655 records of internal migrants who satisfy the abovementioned 
restrictions in 2000 census data. 28-54 years old non-migrants who are not students or retirees, 
and are not civil servants or soldiers have a total count of 432,688. Some demographic 
characteristics of 28-54 years old migrants and non-migrants are very similar: on average both 
groups are secondary school graduates and are equally likely to be literate. Some characteristics 
vary hugely between the groups: there is more than 25 percentage points difference in wage 
earner rates between migrant and non-migrant groups; vast majority of migrants (around 64%) 
are wage earners. Other characteristics follow the pattern in 1990 census: migrants are younger, 
less likely to be married and household heads, less likely to be employers or self-employed or 
working as unpaid family worker, and more likely to be unemployed.  The unemployment rates 
increase dramatically between 1990 and 2000 for both migrants and non-migrants. The 
unemployment rate for 28-54-years-old male migrants is 6.8% and the corresponding figure for 
non-migrants is 4.9% in 1990. A decade later the unemployment rates increase to 13.8% and 
12.4% for migrants and non-migrants, respectively. The significant decline in the economic 
performance of the country during late 1990s may bring about its own migration dynamics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the determinants of location choice separately for years 
1990 and 2000.  
Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used to estimate migrants’ 
likelihood to move to a destination. We report average (over immigrants) of the differences in 
a variable between destination and origin provinces; that is, the variables in Table 2-1 are of the 
form ∆𝑖𝑗
𝑥 = 𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 where 𝑥 is the choice attribute, 𝑖 is the province of origin and 𝑗 corresponds 
to one of the remaining 66 provinces. For example, let 𝑥 measure unemployment rate in a 
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province; for actual destination of a migrant, ∆𝑖𝑗
𝑥  is the difference in unemployment rates (in %) 
between the chosen province and origin province of the migrant. We take average of ∆𝑖𝑗
𝑥  over 
all immigrants for the actual destination in columns (1) and (4). Similarly, columns (2) and (5) 
present the average of ∆𝑖𝑗
𝑥  over all immigrants for the remaining 65 alternative destinations. 
Columns (3) and (6) present t statistic for the test of equality of means.   
The immigrants both in 1990 and 2000 move to provinces in which the immigrant’s 
birth province group constitutes a smaller percent of population in comparison to the percent of 
origin province population that is from immigrant’s province of birth. More than half of 
migrants in both years made the move out of their birth provinces where the immigrants’ birth 
province groups are highly concentrated; thus, observing such a difference between birth 
province shares in populations of destination and origin provinces is expected. On the other 
hand, the alternative destinations, on average, have much smaller population shares due to 
immigrant’s birth province relative to that of origin province. The difference in population 
shares from immigrant’s birth province between actual and alternative destinations is 
statistically significant at 1% level. Hence, migrants prefer to migrate to provinces that 
unconditionally have higher percent of population that is from immigrant’s birth province. The 
same pattern applies for the migrant network variable that measures the percent of immigrant’s 
birth province population that is living in a destination in both cross-sections: migrants’ actual 
destinations, on average, have fewer number of individuals that are from immigrants’ birth 
provinces than origin provinces have. The difference in number of individuals from 
immigrant’s birth province between actual and alternative destinations is statistically significant 
at 1% level which implies that migrants move to destinations that unconditionally contain more 
people who share the same birth province with them. In both cross-sections, foreign-born 
individuals, on average, make up a larger share of actual destination populations relative to 
province of origin. Alternative destinations, on average, are less dense in terms of foreign-born 
settlers relative to origin province. The difference in all three network variables between actual 
and hypothetical destinations is large in magnitude and statistically significant at 1% level in 
both years. Indeed, the differences in all variables between actual and alternative provinces are 
statistically significant at 1% level in each year. When the network variables are defined based 
on sharing the same origin province with former migrants, the differences between actual and 
alternative destinations is small; though strongly statistically significant. This reveals that 
former individuals from the same origin province with the current migrants, on average, are 
equally likely to move to any possible province in Turkey.  
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The observational evidence suggests that unemployment rates are, on average, higher in 
actual destinations than in the origin province for 1990 cross-section of migrants. Settling in 
alternative destinations, on average, would have reduced the unemployment rate. The 
comparison of means in actual and alternative provinces shows that migrants move to provinces 
that have unconditionally higher unemployment rates in 1985. The pattern changes for the 2000 
cross-section of migrants. Unemployment rates are lower in actual destinations relative to origin 
and alternative provinces. Alternative measures of labor market performance reveal that 
migrants prefer provinces with a higher nonagricultural employment rate and a lower 
nonagricultural unemployment rate relative to origin and alternative provinces in both years. 
The association between labor market performance and migrants’ location preferences from 
alternative measures is more in line with the expected responses of migrants to labor market 
characteristics of destinations. Actual destination choices of migrants, on average, are more 
populous and denser than origin and alternative provinces in both cross-sections. There is, on 
average, 45-to-55% increase in population size between the province of origin and actual 
destination in 1985 and 1990, respectively94. Moving to alternative destinations, on average, 
would have reduced the population size by 43-to-44% relative to province of origin in 1985 and 
1990, respectively. The actual destinations are on average 155-to-176% larger with respect to 
population size than alternative destinations in 1985 and 1990, respectively. Actual 
destinations, on average, are closer to migrants’ origin provinces than alternative destinations 
and the difference is large in magnitude (around one third of a standard deviation) and strongly 
statistically significant.   
To sum up, migrants prefer to move to provinces with: a higher concentration of same 
birth province individuals relative to alternative provinces; a higher unemployment rate and 
nonagricultural employment rate, and a lower nonagricultural unemployment rate relative to 
origin and alternative destinations; a larger population and population density relative to origin 
and alternative destinations; and a smaller distance to the origin province relative to alternative 
provinces.   
2.4 Results 
Table 2-2 presents the coefficient estimates from our main specification for 28-54-years-
old male work migrants, Tables 2-3 and 2-13 present results from alternative specifications. We 
                                                          
94 The average percentage difference in population sizes between actual destination and origin province is calculated by the 
formula: (𝑒𝑏 − 1) ∗ 100; where 𝑏 corresponds to the mean difference in log population sizes between actual destination and 
source province of migrants.  
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use fixed effects conditional logit to estimate the determinants of migrants’ location choices. 
The regressors include a linear and a quadratic term for: immigrant’s birth city percent of 
province population; percent of immigrant’s birth city population in province; percent of 
province population that is from individuals who are born outside the province; and the straight-
line distance between destination and origin provinces. To control for labor market 
characteristics, we include the unemployment rate and population size of province. To allow 
source province characteristics to play a role in migrant’s location choice, differences between 
destination and origin province attributes are included as regressors. We account for differences 
in individual traits that are constant across choices through including individual fixed effects. 
We cannot estimate the impact of these alternative-constant individual characteristics; though, 
by controlling for them we alleviate the concerns for having omitted variable bias. Migrants 
from same origin province may have correlated errors; thus, to achieve correct inference 
standard error calculation takes into account clustering of observations at origin province level. 
Standard errors that are clustered at origin province level encompass clustering at individual 
level; hence, via clustering standard errors by origin province we also achieve to control for the 
negative and positive correlation pattern in errors across alternatives relative to a migrant.  
The most natural way to control for unobserved economic and noneconomic differences 
between provinces that may affect migrants’ location choices is to add province fixed effects to 
the model specification. Our identification strategy requires dropping the observation that 
corresponds to the migrant’s origin province. Hence, for any migrant the choice set consists of 
66 alternatives. Including province fixed effects imply adding 65 alternative specific constants 
to the model. We believe that the huge increase in the number of parameters and the likely 
correlation between destination characteristics and destination fixed effects cause maximum 
likelihood estimations with province fixed effects to declare convergence95. To solve the 
dimensionality problem, we group provinces which are similar in characteristics such as 
population, socioeconomic development, geography, per capita GDP, per capita output in 
industry, agricultural output, and urbanization rate96. This results in 26 province groups, and 
regressions include 25 province-group dummies with the group consisting of Balıkesir and 
Çanakkale as the omitted base category. This approach reduces the number of parameters to be 
estimated dramatically, and helps to overcome the convergence issues encountered with 
                                                          
95 It is possible that provinces with favorable observable attributes also have favorable unobserved attributes such as cities with 
greater perceived economic conditions may provide better access to amenities. Since alternative specific constants control for 
unobserved characteristics of provinces, it is possible to have collinearity between observable province attributes and province 
fixed effects.  
96 The groupings of provinces used in the study is provided by TÜİK and is at NUTS-2 level. 
164 
 
province fixed effects models. The resemblance of provinces with respect to observable 
characteristics within province groupings implies a possible similarity in terms of unobserved 
province characteristics as well; hence, justifying the use of province-group dummies in place 
of province dummies. Estimation results omitting province-group dummies are reported in 
Table 2-3 and there are two main differences relative to the results in Table 2-2: the squared 
term for the foreign-born percent of province population is estimated to have insignificant effect 
on location choice and population size is estimated to have a significantly smaller coefficient 
in all regressions. The main conclusion deduced from this comparison is that unobserved 
differences between province groupings matter and controlling for them may help identify the 
parameters. The identification comes from within province-group variation in covariates over 
time in models estimated with pooled cross-sectional data. The coefficients on location 
characteristics are identified by within province-group differences in single cross-section 
models of location choice.  
We mentioned previously that almost half of the migrants moved from an origin 
province that is different than their birth province which implies that for those migrants the 
choice sets contain their birth provinces. The availability of birth province as an alternative 
destination may bring about the possibility of return migration (around 29% of migrants in total 
are return migrants), and those return migrants may do so because there are unobserved birth 
province characteristics which draw migrants back to their home such as the need to take care 
of family enterprises; the need to look after parents who suffer from a disease; the negative 
experiences with former migration moves, etc. The widely available information about labor 
markets at birth provinces may confound with those unobserved individual-specific-birth-
province characteristics. Province-group fixed effects cannot control for those unobserved 
birth-province pull effects. Thus, to achieve consistent parameter estimation we include a birth 
province dummy which takes value one if the alternative is the birth province of the migrant, 
and takes value zero otherwise.  
The increase in the number of provinces from 67 to 81 between 1989 and 2000 is a 
serious issue which requires careful consideration. The problem is that the creation of new 
provinces may act as positive labor market shocks to the existing provinces which by splitting 
up led new provinces to emerge. We combine the last 14 provinces with the existing provinces 
which contained them initially; hence, the newly emerging labor markets in the latter founded 
provinces may have created unobserved taste for some provinces—the old provinces which the 
new ones are separated from—after we have measured the location characteristics in 1985 or 
1990. The unobserved pull impact of new job opportunities in newly created cities varies across 
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alternatives; therefore, province-group fixed effects cannot control for it. A possible correlation 
between the unobserved labor market shocks and location characteristics may bias the 
estimates; hence, we need to control for it. In 1990 cross-section, we include a dummy which 
takes value one for the alternatives which included counties that became cities between 1985 
and 1990, and takes value zero otherwise. In 2000 cross-section, we similarly include a dummy 
which takes value one for the alternatives which included counties that became cities between 
1990 and 2000, and takes value zero otherwise. There is an implicit assumption which implies 
that there is no impact of new job opportunities that were available during the city formation 
process for cities founded before 1990 on location choices of migrants who had moved between 
1995 and 2000. For the analysis using pooled data from 1990 and 2000, we allow the impact of 
job creation due to new city formation to vary over time by including three dummy variables: 
a dummy that takes value one for provinces that had a border change before 1990 for 
observations from 1990 census data, and takes value zero otherwise; a dummy that takes value 
one for provinces that had a border change before 1990 for observations from 2000 census data, 
and takes value zero otherwise; a dummy that takes value one for provinces that had a border 
change between 1990 and 2000 for observations from 2000 census data, and takes value zero 
otherwise.  
Another concern is the possibility of fear of terrorism being a confounder in migrants’ 
location propensities. We do not need to explicitly control for the impact of terrorism on 
migrants’ location choices since provinces which are mostly affected by terrorism during late 
1980s and 1990s are grouped in same sets of provinces; hence, province-group dummies 
account for the impact of terrorism.   
The univariate analysis showed significant differences between location choices and 
available alternatives. The multivariate analysis in Table 2-2 confirms that the differences 
between actual destinations and alternatives are significant once we control for population size, 
labor market attributes and migrant networks. We begin with the estimation results from the 
pooled data. We exclude civil servants, soldiers, retirees and students, in addition we drop 
migrants who moved between 1995 and 2000 for reasons other than search or find a job. The 
pooled estimation sample consists of 41,980 male work migrants who are 28-to-54-years-old. 
For each migrant there are 66 alternatives among which he can choose resulting in 2,770,680 
observations for the fixed effects conditional logit analysis. The results show that immigrants 
are more likely to choose locations in which their compatriots are more highly concentrated 
compared to alternative locations. For two of the three migrant network variables there are 
diminishing returns to the size of the networks: immigrant’s birth city share of province 
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population and province share in immigrant’s birth city population have inverted U shaped 
effects on the probability of choosing a particular province. The chances to migrate to a 
particular province increases as the difference in an immigrant’s birth city shares in that 
province and origin province increases up to 88 percentage points and declines afterwards. The 
average marginal effect of a 1% increase in the destination-origin difference in population 
shares from immigrant’s birth city with respect to the results from pooled data, evaluated at the 
sample mean of differences -1.548574 and average probability of location 0.0149, is a 0.43 
percentage points increase in the probability of locating in that particular destination97. The 
impact of percent of immigrant’s birth city population in province peaks at a destination-origin 
difference around 67% and declines afterwards. Evaluated at the sample mean of a destination-
origin difference in percent of immigrant’s birth city population of -1.595674, the average 
marginal effect of an increase in the destination-origin difference in percent of immigrant’s 
birth city population by 1% is 0.0003. That is, a 1% increase in the destination-origin difference 
in the percentage of immigrant’s birth city population, on average, increases the probability of 
a migrant choosing to live in that destination by 0.03 percentage points. Among these two 
migrant network measures, the first one is more important. This suggests that migrants prefer 
to choose less populous provinces in which their compatriots make up a larger share of the 
population rather than moving to provinces where they have more number of individuals who 
were born in the same city as they were. An increase in the destination-origin difference in 
foreign-born shares increases the chances of a migrant to settle in that destination with an 
increasing rate. All migrant network variables and their squared terms have strongly significant 
coefficient estimates. The immigrant’s birth city share and the percent of immigrant’s birth city 
population living in the actual destination is higher than in alternative destinations. In addition, 
the actual destinations of migrants have higher percentage of province population that is from 
foreign-born individuals compared to alternative destinations.  
Unemployment rate has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at 1% 
level in column (1). On average, the actual destination has lower unemployment rate than 
alternative destinations. Lack of job opportunities is a deterrent in migration decision. A 1% 
increase in the destination-origin difference in unemployment rates that is caused by an increase 
in the destination unemployment rate, on average, reduces the probability of migrating to that 
                                                          
97 The average marginal effect of migrant network variables and distance, evaluated at the sample mean of variables, is 
calculated by the formula: 
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destination by 0.2 percentage points98. Migrants prefer to move to relatively more populous 
provinces. Provinces with large populations may provide more job opportunities and easier 
access to information about labor markets as the information may be widely available. This 
reduces the search costs of potential migrants and increases the returns on job search activities 
in large cities which results in higher chances for a potential migrant to choose relatively larger 
cities. In addition, it may be easier for migrants to benefit from their migrant enclaves in large 
cities: large cities offer more job opportunities; hence, the help from immigrant’s compatriots 
is more likely to yield a desired job position for the potential migrant. The results on 
unemployment rate and population size together suggest that migrants while deciding on the 
migration destination take into consideration the economic conditions of locations. One 
standard deviation increase in the destination-origin difference in log population sizes with 
respect to the results from pooled sample, on average, increases the likelihood of migrating to 
this destination by 1.4 percentage points. Distance as expected has negative sign and the impact 
is precisely estimated. The coefficient on the squared distance has positive sign and is strongly 
significant which implies that distance has a deterrent effect on probability of migrating to a 
destination but the deterrent effect is not linear; it is in U shape. That is, as distance between 
destination and origin increases, the probability of choosing that destination decreases with a 
decreasing rate. The turning point is reached at a distance between destination and origin 
province of around 870 kilometers, and the impact of distance on location probabilities becomes 
positive around 1750 kilometers. However, the sample does not include destination-origin pairs 
which are as distant as 1750 kilometers; hence, over the range the combined effect of distance 
on migrants’ location propensities is negative. The average marginal effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in the distance between destination and origin, evaluated at the sample mean 
of distance between alternative and origin provinces, is a 0.6 percentage points decrease in a 
migrant’s likelihood to locate in that destination.   
Once we allow for the parameters to vary across time, most coefficient estimates are 
stable over a decade except for percent of immigrant’s birth city population in province and 
unemployment rate. Migrants, who had moved between 1995 and 2000, appear to take into 
consideration the difference in relative size of the network but disregard the difference in 
absolute size of the network between destination and origin while deciding on the migration 
destination. The result suggests that 2000 cross-section of migrants care about the amount of 
available ethnic goods in a province but the extent of information about housing and labor 
                                                          
98 The average marginal effect of unemployment rate is calculated according to equation (4). 
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markets in a province relative to alternatives is not influential on their location choice. However, 
for 1990 cross-section of migrants the percent of immigrant’s birth city population in a province 
has an inverted U-shaped relation with the probability of migration to a province. Foreign-born 
share of province is more important for 1990 cross-section migrants than 2000 cross-section 
migrants. Unemployment rate differences between destination and origin appear to be more 
influential on 1990 cross-section migrants’ rather than 2000 cross-section migrants’ location 
choices. In addition, the significance of the coefficient estimate for the unemployment rate 
differential reduces to 5% level in column (3). Davies et al. (2001) provide as an explanation 
for the variation in the size of the unemployment rate ratio coefficient (on location probabilities) 
over the years 1986-1996, the changes in the distribution of unemployment rates over U.S. 
states that occurred during the eleven years under consideration. In years where the 
unemployment rate is more evenly distributed across states, there is less information that 
migrants can make use of in deciding where to locate; hence, the impact of unemployment rate 
ratio is considerably smaller in these years compared to remaining years. The difference in the 
magnitude of the coefficients for the unemployment rate differential in columns (2) and (3) is 
not due to unemployment rates being more evenly distributed over provinces when 2000 cross-
section of migrants took migration decisions so that unemployment rate differentials do not 
provide 2000 cross-section of migrants as much information as they provide to 1990 cross-
section of migrants about differences in job opportunities across alternative locations. On the 
contrary, the variance of province unemployment rate for 28-54-years-old males in 1990 is 3.56 
while the corresponding figure in 1985 is 2.48; the means are 4.20 and 3.90 in 1990 and 1985, 
respectively. The reason of why the effect of unemployment rate differential on location 
propensities decrease over a decade is unclear. 
2.5 Robustness Checks 
Results from conditional logit regressions of alternative specifications are presented in 
Tables between 2-3 and 2-13. Firstly, we test the sensitivity of the results in Table 2-2 to the 
omission of province-group fixed effects. Since we exclude province-group dummies from 
model specifications, we explicitly need to control for the impact of terrorism on migrants’ 
location probabilities. We consider the provinces that have an average annual fatality rate for 
the time period 1987-2001 of more than 9.73 as most affected locations from terrorism and 
create a dummy which takes value 1 for these provinces and zero for the rest of the provinces 
(Öcal and Yıldırım, 2010). The main differences from results in Table 2-2 can be summarized 
as follows: the squared term for the foreign-born share of province population is insignificant 
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at nominal 5% level and the difference in log population sizes has a smaller effect on location 
propensities in all specifications; the unemployment rate differential appears to be less 
important for the pooled sample and 1990 cross-section of migrants, and appears to be more 
important for 2000 cross-section of migrants when province-group dummies are omitted. The 
significance level of the unemployment rate differential increases to 1% for 2000 cross-section 
of migrants as well. The inverted U-shaped relationship between location probabilities and 
relative and absolute sizes of the migrant networks remains constant. The foreign-born share of 
a province is now estimated to have a linear effect on migrants’ location propensities. The 
estimates for the remaining variables are comparable to the corresponding estimates in Table 
2-2 with respect to sign, size and significance. The R-squared in models with province-group 
dummies are higher than in models that omit province-group dummies. The comparison of 
results in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 suggests that unobserved differences between province groupings 
are important and including province-group dummies to the specification helps to identify the 
parameters.   
 Next, we re-estimate the determinants of migrants’ location choices by replacing 
unemployment rate differential with nonagricultural employment rate differential in Table 2-4 
and with nonagricultural unemployment rate differential in Table 2-5. The coefficient estimates 
are very similar to those in Table 2-2 in terms of size, sign and significance in these alternative 
specifications. Although the coefficient estimate is close to zero, nonagricultural employment 
rate differential has an unexpected negative sign in Table 2-4. The result implies that migrants 
prefer locations where employed individuals are more likely to be working in agricultural 
sector; in other words, migrants prefer more rural areas. However, the estimates in Table 2-2 
reveal that migrants prefer to move to relatively larger population destinations which is more 
in line with migration from rural to urban areas. Cross-tabulation of migrants’ residential 
statuses (city center, county center or village) five years prior to their moves by their current 
residential statuses suggests that rural-out migration is less frequent to city centers by 41%; 
only 53% of migrants from county centers prefer city centers as destinations and a similar rate 
(by 57%) applies to migrants from city centers. Migrants from county centers and villages 
constitute the largest share of migrants by a total of 56%. The observational evidence shows 
that city centers are not dominant migration destinations. Hence, the negative sign on 
nonagricultural employment rate may not be unexpected at all considering that migration flows 
in 1980s and 1990s might have been directed towards less dense (more rural) locations. 
Regressions in Tables 2-6 and 2-7 present evidence in favor of this possibility.  
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 When it comes to results with nonagricultural unemployment rate differential as the 
preferred labor market control, all estimates are consistent with those in Table 2-2. The only 
difference is that nonagricultural unemployment rate differential is estimated to have a smaller 
impact on migrants’ location choices compared to unemployment rate differential. 
Nevertheless, the size of the coefficient on nonagricultural unemployment rate differential is 
more stable across time compared to the unemployment rate differential. In both specifications 
with alternative labor market measures, the significance of the coefficient on the labor market 
attribute drops to 10% level for 2000 cross-section of migrants. The R-squared of regressions 
with alternative labor market measures are smaller compared to their counterparts in Table 2-
2.   
Next, we run regressions where we drop differential in log population size and include 
differential in population density between destination and origin provinces; plus, in another set 
of regressions we add to the main specification the differential in log land area between 
destination and origin provinces. The results are presented in Table 2-6 and Table 2-7, 
respectively. Once we replace log population size differential with population density 
differential in Table 2-6, we find that pooled sample of migrants and 2000 cross-section of 
migrants are more likely to locate where population density is lower compared to alternative 
destinations, while 1990 cross-section of migrants are more likely to choose relatively denser 
locations. It is expected to have a positive impact of population density if migrants view dense 
locations as better performing labor markets; though, greater population density may bring 
about congestion which may push migrants away. The change in the sign of the population 
density differential may reflect the impact of increasing congestion in provinces over a decade. 
In Table 2-7, we see that both 1990 and 2000 cross-sections of migrants prefer less dense areas 
over alternatives, ceteris paribus. In Tables 2-6 and 2-7, the impact of unemployment rate 
differential is smaller on migrants’ location decisions and for 2000 cross-section of migrants 
the effect completely vanishes. The influence of foreign-born share of province on the 
probability of choosing a location is more pronounced in these alternative specifications. 
Furthermore, the province share of immigrant’s birth city population in Turkey is estimated to 
have a positive, linear and strongly significant impact on a migrant’s location choice who had 
moved between 1995 and 2000. The remaining explanatory variables are on par with those in 
Table 2-2 in terms of sign, magnitude and significance level.  
There is a concern that a possible collinearity between foreign-born share of a province 
and the province share of immigrant’s birth city population may affect the estimation results. 
Hence, in Table 2-8 we check the sensitivity of the results to the omission of foreign-born share 
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of province population. If there would have been a severe collinearity between these two 
variables, then omitting the foreign-born share of a province would help to identify mainly the 
coefficient on province share of immigrant’s birth city population. However, all three aspects 
of the coefficient on province share of immigrant’s birth city population—sign, size and 
significance—are on par with those in Table 2-2. Omitting foreign-born share of province 
variable, on the contrary, harms identification of parameters as unemployment rate differential 
has insignificant coefficient estimate for 1990 and 2000 cross-sections of migrants.   
In Tables 2-9 and 2-10, we define migrant networks as links that connect former and 
latter migrants through sharing the same origin province. In Table 2-9, the migrant networks 
are measured by using the migration history of the immigrant’s origin province from the 
previous census so that the immigrant himself would not be included in the calculation of the 
migrant networks. In Table 2-10, we allow the migrant himself to be a part of the migrant 
network calculation; however, in this specification, there is a chance that the migrant himself 
migrated before his countrymen did. Furthermore, not using anterior data to construct migrant 
network variables may lead to simultaneity bias. We have seen in the univariate analysis that 
migrant networks based on the alternative definition are, on average, more concentrated in 
actual destinations rather than in alternative destinations. Although the difference in mean 
network sizes in actual and alternative destinations is significant, it is sizably smaller relative 
to the mean difference in migrant networks that are defined by the birth place of the immigrant. 
Once we control for population size, unemployment rate and distance, the impact of the first 
two stock network measures becomes negative, and as the difference in network sizes between 
destination and origin increases the deterrent impact of networks increase with an increasing 
rate. The results in Table 2-9 and Table 2-10 show that holding everything else constant, the 
share of province from immigrant’s origin city and the percent of immigrant’s origin city 
population in province is larger in alternative destinations than in actual destinations of 
immigrants. It implies that immigrants are less likely to move to destinations in which their 
former or current countrymen are relatively more concentrated. One may interpret these results 
as the negative network externalities present in provinces which have larger absolute number 
and population share from immigrants’ countrymen, push away potential migrants from 
choosing these locations. However, attention should be paid before arriving to that conclusion 
since both specifications in Tables 2-9 and 2-10 have some inherent problems with the 
definition of migrant networks. Firstly, in Table 2-9 a potential migrant is assumed to live in 
the same origin province when his countrymen decided to migrate to another location which 
implies that 1990 cross-section of migrants were living in their same origin provinces in 1980; 
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and 2000 cross-section of migrants were living in their same origin provinces in 1985. This 
restriction might have generated a spurious correlation between migrant networks and migrants’ 
location choices. Secondly, in Table 2-10 the definition of migrant networks includes the 
migration patterns of immigrants whose location preferences were investigated. Hence, 
simultaneity problems may bias the estimates. On the contrary to the huge differences in the 
size and sign of the impact of migrant networks in Table 2-2 and Tables 2-9 – 2-10, the 
remaining explanatory variables have comparable effects on location choices of immigrants. 
Even the R-squared of the models are not vastly different.  
In Table 2-11, we re-estimate the discrete choice model by using only destination 
attributes as regressors. The implicit assumption in this specification is that migrants regardless 
of their source locations view choice characteristics in the same way. That is, unemployment 
rate of a destination affects location propensities of migrants from high and low unemployment 
sources in the same way. This is the model specification used in Jaeger (2007) and Bauer et al. 
(2007). The specification in Table 2-11 is more restrictive than our main specification in Table 
2-2 (Davies et al., 2001). The results in Table 2-11 are similar to those in Table 2-2 with respect 
to the direction of the impacts; however, the estimates from the restricted model have larger 
absolute sizes and the foreign-born share of province now has an inverted U-shaped effect on 
location probabilities. The average marginal effect of a 1% increase in immigrant’s birth city 
percentage in province population for the pooled sample of migrants, evaluated at the sample 
mean of immigrant’s birth city percent of province population of 1.474146 and average location 
probability of 0.0149, on average is a 0.57 percentage point increase in the probability of 
locating in that province. The corresponding average marginal effect is estimated to be lower 
by 0.14 percentage points in Table 2-2. The most important difference between the results from 
our main specification and from Jaeger’s (2007) method is that all migrant networks have 
inverted U-shaped relation with migrants’ likelihood of locating in a province. This result is 
consistent with Jaeger’s (2007) finding of an inverted U-shaped relation between migrant 
networks and international migrant’s choices among states in U.S.      
Lastly, we check the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of non-migrants to the 
estimation sample. Omitting non-migrants may result in sample selection bias (Davies et al., 
2001); hence, the specifications in Tables 2-12 and 2-13 include 28-54-years-old non-migrant 
males who are supposed to have a possible connection to the labor market, and are not students, 
retirees, civil servants or members of Turkish armed forces. Furthermore, choice sets of 
individuals include their source provinces. Every individual has the same choice set which 
consists of 67 provinces of Turkey. To control for the unobserved differences between staying 
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and moving, we include to the specification: individual-specific province-of-origin fixed effects 
in regressions in Table 2-12; and a non-migration dummy in regressions in Table 2-13. 
Province-of-origin fixed effects capture the effect of push factors for migrants and accounts for 
the unobserved costs of moving for non-migrants. The push factors help to determine why a 
migrant decides to move out of his origin province but do not affect his location choice. The 
unobserved costs of moving includes the psychic and economic costs associated with moving. 
Non-migration dummy takes value one if the chosen province is someone’s province of 
origin—thus, for migrants the non-migration dummy always takes value zero—and takes value 
zero otherwise. Non-migration dummy captures the unobserved costs associated with moving. 
The results on migrant networks in these specifications differ from those in Table 2-2 with 
respect to the shape of the effect on location probabilities. The variables that measure the 
relative and absolute sizes of the migrant networks have an inverted U-shaped effect on location 
propensities for 28-54-years-old male work migrants in our main specification. Once we 
include non-migrants to the estimation sample in regressions in Tables 2-12 and 2-13, the 
positive impact of individual’s birth city share in province population has an increasing rate 
while for migrants the relative size of migrant network is estimated to have a diminishing return 
in Table 2-2. The results from specification with province-of-origin fixed effect show a positive 
(with an increasing rate) impact of province percent of individual’s birth city population on 
location probabilities for the pooled sample and 2000 cross-section of individuals. The impact 
of the absolute size of network is estimated to be linear on location propensities of individuals 
from 1990 census data. However, the specification with non-migration dummy gives consistent 
results (with those in Table 2-2) with respect to the shape of the effect of province percent of 
individual’s birth city population on location propensities. In both specifications (in Tables 2-
12 and 2-13), the coefficient on individual’s birth city share of province population is smaller 
in magnitude relative to the coefficient on the same variable in Table 2-2. The impact of 
province percent of individual’s birth city population is estimated to be larger in specification 
with non-migration dummy than in our main specification, but comparable in specification with 
province-of-origin fixed effects. Foreign-born share of province population is estimated to be 
more important in individual’s location choice in specification with non-migration dummy 
compared to our main specification; however, the size of coefficients on this variable is 
comparable in specification with province-of-origin fixed effect and in our main specification. 
The specifications in Tables 2-12 and 2-13 differ significantly with respect to the results they 
spit out for impacts of labor market and population characteristics. The estimates from 
specification with province-of-origin fixed effect show that unemployment rate difference 
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between destination and origin is not effective on individuals’ location choices for the pooled 
sample of migrants and non-migrants; is a marginally significant deterrent for 1990 cross-
section of individuals and has a negative and statistically significant at 5% level impact on 
individuals’ location probabilities who are from 2000 census data. The corresponding results 
from the specification with non-migration dummy reveal that unemployment rate difference is 
always a statistically significant deterrent for location propensities regardless of the estimation 
sample used to run the regressions. The direction, size and the significance of the coefficient 
on unemployment rate differential that is estimated in Table 2-13 is consistent with what we 
have found in our regressions with our main specification. The impact of population size 
differential is estimated to be lower in the specification with province-of-origin fixed effect 
while the magnitude of the coefficient on population size differential in the specification with 
non-migration dummy is on par with the coefficient’s size in our main preferred specification. 
Distance is estimated to have similar deterrent effects in both specifications with province of-
origin and non-migration dummies and the size of the coefficient in both specifications is 
comparable to the corresponding size in our main specification. Both coefficients on province-
of-origin and non-migration dummies have very large and strongly significant effects 
(compared to other explanatory variables) on location probabilities. It implies that unobserved 
differences between staying and moving are important determinants of location choice and 
being unable to account for them may bias coefficient estimates. Both the inconsistencies in 
coefficient estimates of migrant networks, labor market and population characteristics; and the 
huge difference in R-squared (the models in Table 2-13 have between 5 to 6 percentage points 
more power in explaining the variation in individuals’ location choices) between specification 
with province-of-origin fixed effect and specification with non-migration dummy suggests that 
the right specification to use when one wants to include non-migrants and source locations to 
the regressions is the one with non-migration dummy which is used in their study on migration 
location choices of American internal migrants among possible states by Davies et al. (2001).  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this study we try to estimate the determinants of internal migrants’ location choices 
among 67 provinces of Turkey. We focus on 28-54-years-old male work migrants’ location 
preferences. We observe that province-to-province migration is frequent in Turkey both in the 
past and in the present; hence, quantifying the impact of migration destination’s pull factors 
may help local legislators to predict the extent of migrants that they will host in the future and 
get prepared in advance. Government officials by predicting the forthcoming waves of migrants 
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to different provinces may try to achieve an efficient distribution of these prospective migrants 
over provinces with the help of regulatory laws.  
The results from our main specification show that internal migrants from both 1990 and 
2000 census data respond to differences in migrant networks, labor market and population 
attributes between locations while deciding on the migration destination. Distance between 
destination and source province is shown to be a significant deterrent of immigrant’s location 
choice. The variables that capture the relative and absolute sizes of migrant networks in a 
province have inverted U-shaped relation with the probability of a migrant choosing a province; 
though, over the relevant range of migrant network variables the net effect is positive. Foreign-
born share of a province population has a positive and significant impact on location 
propensities. The impact, on the contrary to other migrant stock variables, has an increasing 
return to the size of the foreign-born share of province population. This result reflects the effect 
of migrant hiring cities like İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir; plus, the migrants’ preferences to move 
to cities that they know welcome all kinds of migrants. The results on migrant network variables 
together imply that migrants are drawn to cities in which their former compatriots and former 
migrants from all sources are highly concentrated. Differences in population size and 
unemployment rate have the expected impact on migrants’ location probabilities. Population 
size differences between migration destinations capture the extent of differences in available 
job opportunities and the results show that migrants are more likely to move to cities in which 
economic conditions are relatively better. Unemployment rate differences control for the lack 
of job opportunities and the results reveal that migrants stay away from cities with relatively 
higher unemployment rates. Most of the coefficient estimates are stable across time except for 
the province share of immigrant’s birth province population in Turkey and unemployment rate. 
Having similar results across time, while relative economic and noneconomic conditions were 
changing across provinces, suggests that the results are not derived by an outlier province at 
one point in time.  
The robustness checks are presented in Tables between 2-3 and 2-13. The results from 
these alternative specifications show that province-group dummies are important in identifying 
model parameters. The impact of migrant networks on location probabilities is robust to a 
change in the measure used to control for labor market and population characteristics; omission 
of foreign-born share of province population variable from the model; using only destination 
characteristics as regressors; and inclusion of non-migrants to the estimation sample. The shape 
of the relation between migrant networks and location probabilities changes for the foreign-
born share of province population variable when we use only destination characteristics as 
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regressors. The size of the coefficient estimates changes across alternative specifications but 
the difference between these estimates and our main specification is not dramatic. Labor market 
and population characteristics are least robust to changes in model specification while distance, 
which proxies transportation and psychic costs of moving, is most robust to changes in model 
specification.  
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that tries to understand the 
determinants of migration destination choice of internal migrants in Turkey.  The results of this 
study support the earlier findings of the immense literature on migrants’ destination choices. It 
also presents evidence on similar responses to determinants of location choice by migrants from 
developing and developed country contexts. 
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Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics 
 1990 cross-section of immigrants 2000 cross-section of immigrants 
Cell contents are relative to the 
province of origin 
Mean in chosen 
destinations 
 
(1) 
Mean in 
alternative 
destinations 
(2) 
t-test of 
difference in 
means 
(3) 
Mean in chosen 
destinations 
 
(4) 
Mean in 
alternative 
destinations 
(5) 
t-test of 
difference in 
means 
(6) 
Migrant networks       
Birth place share of province 
population (in %)   
-23.412 
(71.913) 
-44.601 
(45.373) 
46.745 -44.332 
(61.461) 
-55.512 
(43.301) 
23.384 
Percent of birth place population 
in province  
-17.573 
(62.208) 
-40.084 
(38.401) 
57.415 -36.620 
(53.782) 
-50.010 
(36.788) 
32.014 
Foreign-born share of province 
population (in %) 
9.613 
(30.820) 
-7.753 
(21.149) 
89.349 12.703 
(29.549) 
-6.533 
(21.122) 
83.685 
Origin city share of province 
population (in %) 
-81.148 
(2.442) 
-81.317 
(2.406) 
10.957 -81.579 
(3.579) 
-81.791 
(3.540) 
7.599 
Percent of origin city population 
in province 
-92.034 
(2.754) 
-92.786 
(2.083) 
43.298 -90.425 
(4.412) 
-91.463 
(3.307) 
30.228 
       
Labor market attributes       
Unemployment rate (in %) 0.077 
(1.830) 
-0.295 
(2.167) 
32.122 -0.524 
(2.013) 
-0.308 
(2.668) 
-13.612 
Nonagricultural employment 
rate (in %) 
8.201 
(29.528) 
-8.238 
(23.124) 
88.182 9.212 
(24.105) 
-5.546 
(19.115) 
78.633 
Nonagricultural unemployment 
rate (in %) 
-0.724 
(3.234) 
0.326 
(4.465) 
-50.999 -1.550 
(3.646) 
-0.079 
(4.751) 
-51.382 
       
Population and distance       
Population size (log) 0.375 
(1.517) 
-0.563 
(1.142) 
98.040 0.436 
(1.524) 
-0.582 
(1.142) 
85.911 
Population density 115.001 
(503.161) 
-105.659 
(301.060) 
69.598 177.783 
(616.577) 
-111.203 
(351.680) 
60.336 
Distance from origin province 
(in 100 km) 
4.963 
(3.468) 
5.714 
(3.161) 
-34.245 4.881 
(3.400) 
5.700 
(3.122) 
-30.877 
Notes: t-test of difference in means column reports the t statistic for the test of equality of means. t-test assumes unknown and unequal population variances. 
All differences in means are statistically significant at 1% level. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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Table 2-2 Determinants of location choice - using 28-54 years old male work migrants 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.2847*** 
(0.0203) 
0.2856*** 
(0.0233) 
0.2862*** 
(0.0207) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1621*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.1607*** 
(0.0187) 
-0.1694*** 
(0.0163) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0205*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0265*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0108 
(0.0069) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-.0152*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0231*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0060 
(0.0040) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0396*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0524*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0300*** 
(0.0046) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0073*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0065** 
(0.0025) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0035) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1439*** 
(0.0232) 
-0.1907*** 
(0.0257) 
-0.0983** 
(0.0475) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9651*** 
(0.0596) 
0.9796*** 
(0.0671) 
0.9391*** 
(0.0586) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3770*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.3799*** 
(0.0311) 
-0.3814*** 
(0.0335) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1577*** 
(0.2250) 
2.2618*** 
(0.2413) 
2.0239*** 
(0.2409) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3980 0.4309 0.3551 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. We control for 
within-origin-province error correlation by implementing cluster robust variance estimator. Cluster 
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of 
birth fixed effects, and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on 
migrants’ location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-3 Determinants of location choice – omitting province-group dummies 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.3036*** 
(0.0193) 
0.3191*** 
(0.0234) 
0.2854*** 
(0.0194) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1767*** 
(0.0158) 
-0.1856*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.1712*** 
(0.0153) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0209*** 
(0.0067) 
0.0228*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0139** 
(0.0068) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0051 
(0.0037) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0349*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0348*** 
(0.0016) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
-0.0023 
(0.0027) 
-0.0058* 
(0.0031) 
0.0028 
(0.0034) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1041*** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0591*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.1437*** 
(0.0207) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.7614*** 
(0.0595) 
0.7561*** 
(0.0696) 
0.6694*** 
(0.0422) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3405*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.3462*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.3465*** 
(0.0381) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.0289*** 
(0.2390) 
2.1636*** 
(0.2565) 
1.9862*** 
(0.2555) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3849 0.4182 0.3367 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province of birth fixed effects, a dummy that controls for the impact 
of terrorism and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ 
location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-4 Determinants of location choice – alternative measure for labor market condition - 1 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.2851*** 
(0.0202) 
0.2890*** 
(0.0235) 
0.2871*** 
(0.0206) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1624*** 
(0.0164) 
-0.1636*** 
(0.0187) 
-0.1702*** 
(0.0162) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0203*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0253*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0107 
(0.0068) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0057 
(0.0040) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0423*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0558*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0339*** 
(0.0063) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0075*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0112*** 
(0.0035) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Nonagricultural employment rate (in %) -0.0090*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0092* 
(0.0049) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9203*** 
(0.0557) 
0.9400*** 
(0.0648) 
0.8989*** 
(0.0571) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3765*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.3791*** 
(0.0313) 
-0.3809*** 
(0.0338) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1541*** 
(0.2274) 
2.2611*** 
(0.2461) 
2.0169*** 
(0.2446) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3976 0.4306 0.3550 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-5 Determinants of location choice – alternative measure for labor market condition - 2 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.2811*** 
(0.0200) 
0.2833*** 
(0.0232) 
0.2850*** 
(0.0206) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1590*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.1590*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.1684*** 
(0.0161) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0212*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0109 
(0.0069) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0234*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0062 
(0.0040) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0365*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0460*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0262*** 
(0.0052) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0075*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0110*** 
(0.0035) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Nonagricultural unemployment rate (in %) -0.0490*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0343*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0476* 
(0.0253) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9304*** 
(0.0565) 
0.9253*** 
(0.0652) 
0.9465*** 
(0.0609) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3784*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.3816*** 
(0.0314) 
-0.3824*** 
(0.0337) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1655*** 
(0.2246) 
2.2793*** 
(0.2437) 
2.0305*** 
(0.2405) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3977 0.4303 0.3550 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-6 Determinants of location choice – population density as alternative population control 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.2657*** 
(0.0198) 
0.2716*** 
(0.0225) 
0.2656*** 
(0.0204) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1455*** 
(0.0163) 
-0.1488*** 
(0.0182) 
-0.1509*** 
(0.0164) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0296*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0341*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0194*** 
(0.0073) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0238*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0076* 
(0.0041) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0732*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0628*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0825*** 
(0.0064) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0067*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0056** 
(0.0024) 
0.0108*** 
(0.0035) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.0723*** 
(0.0175) 
-0.1134*** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0285 
(0.0511) 
    
Population and distance    
Population density -0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
0.0031*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0009) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3684*** 
(0.0309) 
-0.3725*** 
(0.0323) 
-0.3762*** 
(0.0340) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1165*** 
(0.2262) 
2.2336*** 
(0.2447) 
1.9995*** 
(0.2417) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3917 0.4249 0.3495 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-7 Determinants of location choice – land area added to the main specification 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.2813*** 
(0.0212) 
0.2830*** 
(0.0241) 
0.2832*** 
(0.0213) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1594*** 
(0.0172) 
-0.1587*** 
(0.0193) 
-0.1670*** 
(0.0168) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0222*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0278*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0122* 
(0.0072) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0230*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0057 
(0.0041) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0682*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0054) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0077*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0115*** 
(0.0035) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1145*** 
(0.0251) 
-0.1569*** 
(0.0280) 
-0.0385 
(0.0556) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.6248*** 
(0.0755) 
0.7077*** 
(0.0793) 
0.5935*** 
(0.0883) 
Land area (log) 0.6592*** 
(0.0896) 
0.5379*** 
(0.1011) 
0.6261*** 
(0.1055) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3796*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.3808*** 
(0.0313) 
-0.3860*** 
(0.0330) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1744*** 
(0.2268) 
2.2657*** 
(0.2430) 
2.0595*** 
(0.2412) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3990 0.4315 0.3562 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
Table 2-8 Determinants of location choice – foreign-born share of province omitted 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.3099*** 
(0.0199) 
0.3164*** 
(0.0239) 
0.3045*** 
(0.0203) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.1815*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.1851*** 
(0.0182) 
-0.1840*** 
(0.0156) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0161*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0199*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0078 
(0.0069) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0144*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0073* 
(0.0040) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.0911*** 
(0.0292) 
-0.0593 
(0.0388) 
-0.0186 
(0.0461) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 1.2221*** 
(0.0502) 
1.1929*** 
(0.0583) 
1.1842*** 
(0.0559) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3661*** 
(0.0306) 
-0.3722*** 
(0.0328) 
-0.3633*** 
(0.0343) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.1512*** 
(0.2316) 
2.2869*** 
(0.2576) 
1.9865*** 
(0.2443) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3953 0.4274 0.3533 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-9 Determinants of location choice – networks based on living in the same origin province - 1 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Origin city share of province population (in %)   -12.9817*** 
(2.1540) 
-26.7224*** 
(2.5514) 
-13.5790*** 
(1.5978) 
Origin city share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-8.8662*** 
(1.4065) 
-17.6864*** 
(1.6615) 
-9.3261*** 
(1.0816) 
Percent of origin city population in province -2.5264*** 
(0.4480) 
-3.8500*** 
(0.9559) 
-1.2757*** 
(0.30647) 
Percent of origin city population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-1.6527*** 
(0.2695) 
-2.3997*** 
(0.5467) 
-0.8630*** 
(0.1959) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0321*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0422*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0286*** 
(0.0044) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0133*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0072* 
(0.0041) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1275*** 
(0.0210) 
-0.1544*** 
(0.0246) 
-0.0869** 
(0.0397) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9775*** 
(0.0463) 
1.0301*** 
(0.0630) 
0.9137*** 
(0.0495) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.2891*** 
(0.0294) 
-0.2540*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.2889*** 
(0.0347) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
1.6304*** 
(0.1919) 
1.5242*** 
(0.2363) 
1.4677*** 
(0.2034) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3906 0.4230 0.3526 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. The migrant network measures are 
calculated using migration information from the previous census for each cross-section of migrants. 
Standard error calculation takes into account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster 
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of 
birth fixed effects, and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on 
migrants’ location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-10 Determinants of location choice – networks based on living in the same origin province - 2 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Origin city share of province population (in %)   -9.8798*** 
(3.7223) 
-12.9610*** 
(1.4366) 
-31.2947*** 
(3.4263) 
Origin city share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-6.7975*** 
(2.4297) 
-9.0300*** 
(0.9727) 
-19.9757*** 
(2.1539) 
Percent of origin city population in province -1.9388*** 
(0.4149) 
-1.2687*** 
(0.2758) 
-2.3732*** 
(0.8775) 
Percent of origin city population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-1.3584*** 
(0.2688) 
-0.8945*** 
(0.1771) 
-1.5948*** 
(0.5300) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0346*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0379*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0297*** 
(0.0038) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0072 
(0.0063) 
0.0064 
(0.0051) 
0.0050 
(0.0049) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1041*** 
(0.0227) 
-0.1131*** 
(0.0235) 
-0.0822** 
(0.0342) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9396*** 
(0.0445) 
0.9757*** 
(0.0466) 
0.9245*** 
(0.0530) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.2698*** 
(0.0245) 
-0.2433*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.2080*** 
(0.0300) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
1.4786*** 
(0.1822) 
1.3459*** 
(0.2266) 
0.9860*** 
(0.1878) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3956 0.4268 0.3586 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. The migrant network measures are 
calculated using migration information from the same census for each cross-section of migrants. 
Standard error calculation takes into account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster 
robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of 
birth fixed effects, and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on 
migrants’ location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-11 Determinants of location choice – using only destination characteristics as regressors 
 Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.3880*** 
(0.0335) 
0.3743*** 
(0.0317) 
0.4197*** 
(0.0407) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
-0.2358*** 
(0.0260) 
-0.2269*** 
(0.0241) 
-0.2639*** 
(0.0303) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0762*** 
(0.0090) 
0.0961*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0523*** 
(0.0115) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0819*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.1032*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0622*** 
(0.0091) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0812*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0813*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0648*** 
(0.0111) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
-0.0794*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0619*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0648*** 
(0.0169) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1733*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.2053*** 
(0.0260) 
-0.1073** 
(0.0481) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.9893*** 
(0.0499) 
1.0324*** 
(0.0554) 
0.9451*** 
(0.0553) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.4019*** 
(0.0312) 
-0.4068*** 
(0.0305) 
-0.3998*** 
(0.0369) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
2.3795*** 
(0.2117) 
2.5049*** 
(0.2190) 
2.2215*** 
(0.2456) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.3969 0.4292 0.3542 
Number of individuals 41,980 25,325 16,655 
Number of observations 2,770,680 1,671,450 1,099,230 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old adult male work migrants. Standard error calculation takes into 
account possible error correlations within-origin-provinces. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed effects, and 
dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border change on migrants’ location 
propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-12 Determinants of location choice – including non-migrants to the estimation sample - 1 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.0439*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0497*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0398*** 
(0.0025) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
0.0141*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0148*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0133*** 
(0.0023) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0238*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0329*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0203*** 
(0.0047) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
0.0051** 
(0.0025) 
0.0021 
(0.0029) 
0.0056** 
(0.0024) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0344*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0516*** 
(0.0083) 
0.0333*** 
(0.0061) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0517*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0539*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0508*** 
(0.0048) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.0036 
(-0.0036) 
-0.0787* 
(0.0408) 
-0.0802** 
(0.0356) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.4782*** 
(0.0644) 
0.4930*** 
(0.0689) 
0.4604*** 
(0.0825) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3481*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.3372*** 
(0.0449) 
-0.4230*** 
(0.0508) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
1.8265*** 
(0.3112) 
1.9036*** 
(0.3279) 
2.1657*** 
(0.3408) 
    
Province of origin dummy 5.5994*** 
(0.1084) 
5.1486*** 
(0.1059) 
5.8994*** 
(0.1164) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.9193 0.8982 0.9378 
Number of individuals 794,171 344,828 449,343 
Number of observations 53,209,457 23,103,476 30,105,981 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old male work migrants and non-migrants. We control for within-origin-
province error correlation by implementing cluster robust variance estimator. Cluster robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed 
effects, province-of-origin fixed effect, and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province 
border change on migrants’ location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. 
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Table 2-13 Determinants of location choice – including non-migrants to the estimation sample - 2 
Province difference in Pooled data 
(1990 & 2000) 
(1) 
1990 cross-
section 
(2) 
2000 cross-
section 
(3) 
Migrant networks    
Birth place share of province population (in %)   0.0285*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0223** 
(0.0089) 
0.0355*** 
(0.0063) 
Birth place share of province population (in %) 
sq. ÷ 100  
0.0510*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0570*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0440*** 
(0.0030) 
Percent of birth place population in province 0.0611*** 
(0.0099) 
0.0656*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0554*** 
(0.0095) 
Percent of birth place population in province sq. 
÷ 100 
-0.0086*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0132*** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0026 
(0.0028) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) 
0.0508*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0692*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0425*** 
(0.0078) 
Foreign-born share of province population (in 
%) sq. ÷ 100 
0.0471*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0500*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0082) 
    
Labor market attribute    
Unemployment rate (in %) -0.1211*** 
(0.0282) 
-0.1999*** 
(0.0396) 
-0.1108** 
(0.0444) 
    
Population and distance    
Population size (log) 0.8366*** 
(0.0565) 
0.8415*** 
(0.0582) 
0.8201*** 
(0.0670) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) -0.3759*** 
(0.0641) 
-0.3752*** 
(0.0672) 
-0.3878*** 
(0.0630) 
Distance from origin province (in 100 km) sq. ÷ 
100 
1.8780*** 
(0.4585) 
1.9580*** 
(0.4919) 
1.7793*** 
(0.4350) 
    
Non-migration dummy 33.6947*** 
(0.5446) 
32.0574*** 
(0.6600) 
31.6183*** 
(0.4212) 
    
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.9666 0.9559 0.9750 
Number of individuals 794,171 344,828 449,343 
Number of observations 53,209,457 23,103,476 30,105,981 
Notes: The table presents coefficient estimates from fixed effects conditional logit. The estimation 
sample consists of 28-54-years-old male work migrants and non-migrants. We control for within-origin-
province error correlation by implementing cluster robust variance estimator. Cluster robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. All models also include province-group dummies, province of birth fixed 
effects, non-migration dummy, and dummy/dummies that accounts for the impact of province border 
change on migrants’ location propensities. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 
1%. 
  
190 
 
REFERENCES 
Abadan-Unat, N. (2006). Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten Ulus-Ötesi Yurttaşlığa [Unending 
Migration:from Guest-worker to Transnational Citizen]. İstanbul: Bilgi University 
Press. 
Abadan-Unat, N., & Keleş, R. (1976). Migration and Development. Ankara: Ajans Turk Press. 
Abadie, A. (2003). Semiparametric Instrumental Variable Estimation of Treatment Response 
Models. Journal of Econometrics, 113, 231-263. 
ABD'nin vize engelini ilk uyguladığı Yağlıdere, ABD'ye böyle göç etti. (2017, October 23). 
Yenişafak. Retrieved June 30, 2018, from https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/abdnin-
vize-engelini-ilk-uyguladigi-yaglidere-abdye-boyle-goc-etti-2804559 
Acosta, P. (2006). Labor Supply, School Attendance, and Remittances from International 
Migration: The Case of El Salvador. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3903. 
Acosta, P. (2011). School Attendance, Child Labour, and Remittances from International 
Migration in El Salvador. Journal of Development Studies, 47(6), 913-936. 
Adams, R. H. (1998). Remittances, Investment and Rural Asset Accumulation in Pakistan. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 47(155-173). 
Adams, R. H., & Page, J. (2003). International Migration, Remittances and Poverty in 
Developing Countries. Policy research working paper 3179, Washington: World Bank. 
Alcaraz, C., Chiquiar, D., & Salcedo, A. (2012). Remittances, schooling, and child labor in 
Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 97, 156-165. 
Allison, P. (2009). Fixed Effects Regression Models (1 ed.). SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Altonji, J., Elder, T., & Taber, C. (2005). Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: 
Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools. Journal of Political Economy, 113(1), 
151-184. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Pozo, S. (2006). Migration, Remitances, and Male and Female 
Employment Patterns. American Economic Review, 96(2), 222-226. 
Anderson, T. W., & Rubin, H. (1949). Estimation of the Parameters of a Single Equation in a 
Complete System of Stochastic Equations. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 20(1), 46-
63. 
Angrist, J. (1991). Intrumental Variables Estimation of Average Treatment Effects in 
Econometrics and Epidemiology. National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 115. 
Angrist, J. (2001). Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Dummy 
Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Practice. Journal of Business 
& Economic Statistics, 19(1), 2-16. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1392531 
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s 
Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Aslund, O. (2005). Now and Forever? Initial and Subsequent Location Choices of Immigrants. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35, 141–165. 
191 
 
Atalık, G., & Beeley, B. (1993). What Mass Migration Has Meant for Turkey. In R. King (Ed.), 
Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future (pp. 156-173). London: 
Belhaven Press. 
Aydaş, O. T., Kıvılcım, M. Ö., & Neyaptı, B. (2005). Determinants of Workers' Remittances : 
The Case of Turkey. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 41(3), 53-69. 
Aydemir, A. B., & Kırdar, M. (2017). Low Wage Returns to Schooling in a Developing 
Country: Evidence from a Major Policy Reform in Turkey. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 79(6), 1046-1086. 
Ayhan, H. Ö. (2000). Push and Pull Factors of International Migration: Country Report- 
Turkey. Luxembourg: Eurostat. 
Bansak, C., & Chezum, B. (2009). How Do Remittances Affect Human Capital Formation of 
School-Age Boys and Girls? American Economic Review, 99(2), 145-148. 
Barışık, A., Eraydın, A., & Gedik, A. (1990). Turkey. In W. Serow, C. Nam, D. Sly, & R. 
Weller (Eds.), Handbook on International Migration (pp. 301-323). New York: 
Greenwood Press. 
Bartel, A. (1989). Where Do the New US Immigrants Live? Journal of Labor Economics, 7(4), 
371–391. 
Başel, H. (2003). Sosyal Politika Açısından İç Göçler: Sivas’tan İstanbul’a Göç Örneği. 
(Doctoral dissertation) İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. 
Bauer, T., Epstein , G., & Gang, I. (2005). Enclaves, Language, and the Location Choice of 
Migrants. Journal of Population Economics, 18(4), 649–662. 
Bauer, T., Epstein, G., & Gang, I. (2007). The Influence of Stocks and Flows on Migrants’ 
Location Choices. Research in Labor Economics, 26, 199-229. 
Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced Routines for Instrumental 
Variables/Generalized Method of Moments Estimation and Testing. The Stata Journal, 
7(4), 465-506. 
Baum, C. F., Schaffer, M. E., & Stillman, S. (2010). ivreg2: Stata module for extended 
instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression. 
Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html 
Behrman, J. R., & Rosenzweig, M. R. (2002). Does Increasing Women's Schooling Raise the 
Schooling of the Next Generation? American Economic Review, 92(1), 323-334. 
Bengin, T. (2016, January 27). Şırnak il oldu ne oldu? Milliyet. Retrieved June 30, 2018, from 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tunca-bengin/sirnak-il-oldu-ne-oldu--2185500/ 
Bester, C. A., Conley, T. G., & Hansen, C. B. (2011). Inference with Dependent Data Using 
Cluster Covariance Estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 165(2), 137-151. 
Bhattacharya, J., Goldman, J., & McCaffrey, D. (2006). Estimating Probit Models with Self-
selected Treatments. Statistics in Medicine, 25(3), 389-413. 
Binzel, C., & Assaad, R. (2011). Egyptian Men Working Abroad: Labour Supply Responses 
by the Women Left Behind. Labor Economics, 18, S98-S114. 
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995). Problems with Instrumental Variables 
Estimation when the Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous 
Explanatory Variable is Weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(430), 
443-450. 
192 
 
Brown, R. P., & Ahlburg, D. A. (1999). Remittances in the South Pacific. International Journal 
of Social Economics, 26(1/2/3), 325–344. 
Brown, R. P., & Poirine, B. (1997). Intergenerational Transfers With Impure Altruism: An 
Analysis of Migrants' Remittances. Discussion Paper, University of Queensland. 
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (Agugust 2008). Bootstrap-based 
Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 90(3), 414-427. 
Cameron, C., & Miller, D. (2015). A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference. Journal 
of Human Resources, 50(2), 317-372. 
Carter, A. V., Schnepel, K. T., & Steirgerwald, D. G. (October 2017). Asymptotic Behavior of 
a t-Test Robust to Cluster Heterogeneity. Review of Economics and Statistics, 99(4), 
698-709. 
Cattaneo, C. (2012). Migrants’ International Tranfers and Educational Expenditure: Empirical 
Evidence from Albania. Economics of Transition, 20(1), 163-193. 
Chami, R., Fullenkamp, C., & Jajah, S. (2003). Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of 
Capital for Development? IMF Working Paper 03/189. 
Chiburis, R. C. (2010). Score Tests of Normality in Bivariate Probit Models: Comment. 
Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin. 
Chiburis, R. C., Das, J., & Lokshin, M. (2011). A Practical Comparison of the Bivariate Probit 
and Linear IV Estimators. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, #5601. 
Chiswick, B., & Miller, P. (1996). Ethnic Networks and Language Proficiency Among 
Immigrants. Journal of Population Economics, 9(1), 19–35. 
Cox Edwards, A., & Ureta, M. (2003). International Migration, Remittances, and Schooling: 
Evidence from El Salvador. Journal of Development Economics, 72, 429-461. 
Cox, D., Eser, Z., & Jimenez, E. (1998). Motives for Private Transfers over the Life Cycle: An 
Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru. Journal of Development Economics, 
55(1), 57-80. 
Cox-Edwards, A., & Rodriguez-Oreggia, E. (2009). Remittances and Labor Force Participation 
in Mexico: An Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching. World Development, 37(5), 
1004-1014. 
Cragg, M., & Kahn, M. (1997). New Estimates of Climate Demand: Evidence from Migration. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 42, 261–284. 
Damm, A. (2009). Determinants of Recent Immigrants’ Location Choices: Quasi-experimental 
Evidence. Journal of Population Economics, 22, 145–174. 
Davidson, R., & Flachaire, E. (2008). The Wild Bootstrap, Tamed at last. Journal of 
Econometrics, 146, 162-169. 
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (2010). Wild Bootstrap Tests for IV Regression. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, 28, 128-144. 
Davies, P., Greenwood, M., & Haizheng, L. (2001). A Conditional Logit Approach to U.S. 
State-to-State Migration. Journal of Regional Science, 41(2), 337-360. 
193 
 
Davis, B., Stecklov, G., & Winters, P. (2002). Domestic and International Migration from Rural 
Mexico: Disaggregating the Effects of Network Structure and Composition. Population 
Studies, 56(3), 291-309. 
Day, L. H., & İçduygu, A. (1999). Does International Migration Encourage Consumerism in 
the Country of Origin? 20(6), 503-525. 
Day, L. H., & İçduygu, A. (Sep. 1997). The Consequences of International Migration for the 
Status of Women. 35(3), 337-371. 
De Luca, G. (2008). SNP and SML Estimation of Univariate and Bivariate Binary-choice 
Models. The Stata Journal, 8(2), 190-20. 
De Luca, G., & Peracchi, F. (2007). A Sample Selection Model for Unit and Item Non-response 
in Cross-sectional Surveys. CEIS Tor Vergata—Research Paper Series, 33, 1-44. 
Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2006). The economics' of Migrants Remittances. In S.-C. Kolm, 
& J. Ythier (Eds.), Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism 
(Vol. 2, pp. 1135-1198). Amsterdam, North Holland. Chapter 17. 
Donald, S. G., & Lang, K. (2007). Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel 
Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 221-233. 
Dunlevy, J. (1991). On the Settlement Patterns of Recent Caribbean and Latin Immigrants to 
the U.S. Growth and Change, 22, 54–67. 
Esarey, J., & Menger, A. (2018). Practical and Effective Approaches to Dealing With Clustered 
Data. Political Science Research and Methods, 1-19. doi:10.1017/psrm.2017.42. 
Fafchamps, M., & Shilpi, F. (2009). Determinants of the Choice of Migration Destination. 
BREAD Working Paper Series No. 237. 
Fafchamps, M., & Shilpi, F. (2013). Determinants of the Choice of Migration Destination. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 75(3), 388-409. 
Faini, R. (2007/2). Migration and Remittances: The Impact on the Countries of Origin. Revue 
D'economie Du Developpement, 15, 153-182. 
Gallant, A. R., & Nychka, R. W. (1987). Semi-nonparametric Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation. Econometrica, 55, 363-390. 
Giuliano, P., & Ruiz-Arranz, M. (2005). Remittances, Financial Development, and Growth. 
IMF Working Paper 05/234. 
Gottlieb, P. (1987). Making Their Own Way: Shorthorn Blacks’ Migration to Pittsburgh, 1916–
30. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Görlich, D., Toman, M., & Trebesch, C. (2007). Explaining Labour Market Inactivity in 
Migrant-Sending Families: Housework, Hammock, or Higher Education? Working 
Paper 1391, Kiel, Germany: Kiel Institute for the Working Economy. 
Greene, W. H. (1998). Econometric analysis, 3rd edn. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Grossman, J. (1989). Land and Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gubert, F. (2002). Do Migrants Insure Those Who Stay Behind? Evidence from the Kayes 
Area. Oxford Development Studies, 30(3), 267-287. 
194 
 
Hahn, J., & Hausman, J. (2002). A New Specification Test for the Validity of Instrumental 
Variables. Econometrica, 70, 163-189. 
Hansen, L. P., Heaton, J., & Yaron, A. (July 1996). Finite-sample Properties of some 
Alternative GMM Estimators. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 14(3), 262-
280. 
Hanson, G., & Woodruff, C. (2003). Emigration and Educational Attainment in Mexico. 
Mimeo, University of California at San Diego. 
Heckman, J. J. (1978). Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System. 
Econometrica, 46(6), 931-959. 
Hildebrandt, N., & McKenzie, D. J. (2005). The Effects of Migration on Child Health in 
Mexico. Economia, 6(1), 257-289. 
Hoddinott, J. (1994). A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western Kenya. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 46(3), 459-476. 
Holmlund, H., Lindahl, M., & Plug, E. (2011 Sep.). The Causal Effect of Parents' Schooling on 
Children's Schooling: A Comparison of Estimation Methods. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 49(3), 615-651. 
Ichimura, H. (1993). Semiparametric Least Squares (SLS) and Weighted SLS Estimation of 
Single-index Models. Journal of Econometrics, 58, 71-120. 
İçduygu, A. (1991). Migrant as a Transitional Category: Turkish Migrants in Melbourne, 
Australia. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Canberra: Australian National University. 
İçduygu, A. (2005). Migration, Remittances and Their Impact on Economic Development in 
Turkey. In OECD (Ed.), Migration, Remittances and Development. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
İçduygu, A. (2009). International Migration and Human Development in Turkey. Munich 
Personal RePec Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 19235. 
Imbens, G., & Angrist, J. (1994). Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment 
Effects. Econometrica, 62(2), 467-475. 
Jaeger, D. (2000). Local Labor Markets, Admission Categories, and Immigrant Location 
Choice. Hunter College and Graduate Center, City University of New York. 
Unpublished Mimeo. 
Jaeger, D. (2007). Green Cards and the Location Choices of Immigrants in the United States, 
1971-2000. Research in Labor Economics, 27, 131-183. 
Kaushal, N. (2005). New Immigrants’ Location Choices: Welfare Without Magnets. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 23, 59–80. 
Keleş, R. (1985). The Effects of External Migration on Regional Development in Turkey. (R. 
Hudson, & J. Lewis, Eds.) Uneven Development in Southern Europe, 54-75. 
Killingsworth, M. R. (1983). Labor Supply. Cambridge University Press. 
Kızılot, Ş. (2012, December 24). Kim, ne zaman ve nasıl emekli olabilecek. Hürriyet. Retrieved 
June 30, 2018, from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kim-ne-zaman-ve-nasil-emekli-
olabilecek-22221306 
Klein, R. W., & Spady, R. H. (March 1993). An Efficient Semiparametric Estimator for Binary 
Response Models. Econometrica, 61(2), 387-421. 
195 
 
Kline, P., & Santos, A. (2012). A Score Based Approach to Wild Bootstrap Inference. Journal 
of Econometric Methods, 1(1), 23-41. 
Knapp, L. G., & Seeks, T. G. (1998). A Hausman test for a dummy variable in probit. Applied 
Economics Letters, 5(5), 321-323. 
Koc, I., & Onan, I. (2004). International Migrants’ Remittances and Welfare Status of the Left-
Behind Families in Turkey. International Migration Review, 38(1), 78-112. 
Kocaman, T. (2008). Türkiye’de İçgöçler ve Göç Edenlerin Nitelikleri (1965-2000). DPT, 
Ankara. 
Köksal, N. (2006, January 6). Determinants and Impact on the Turkish Economy of 
Remittances. paper presented at the 2006 MEEA/ASSA meetings, Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
Lee, C. H., & Steigerwald, D. G. (2017). Inference for Clustered Data. Working Paper, 
University of California, Santa Barbara. 
Liu, R. Y. (1988). Bootstrap Procedures under some Non-I.I.D. Models. The Annals of 
Statistics, 16(4), 1696-1708. 
Lokshin, M., & Glinskaya, E. (2009). The Effect of Male Migration on Employment of Women 
in Nepal. The World Bank Economic Review, 23(3), 481-507. 
Lopez Cordova, E. (2005). Globalization, Migration and Development: The Role of Mexican 
Migrant Remittances. Economia, 6(1), 217-256. 
Lucas, R. E., & Stark, O. (1985). Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana. Journal of 
Political Economy, October 93, 901-918. 
MacKinnon, J. G., & Webb, M. D. (2017). Wild Bootstrap Inference for Wildly Different 
Cluster Sizes. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 32, 233-254. 
Maddala, G. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometric 
(Econometric Society Monographs). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Maddala, G. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mammen, E. (March 1993). Bootstrap and Wild Bootstrap for High Dimensional Linear 
Models. The Annals of Statistics, 21(1), 255-285. 
Manski, C. (1975). Maximum Score Estimation of the Stochastic Utility Model of Choice. 
Journal of Econometrics, 3, 225-228. 
Marks, C. (1989). Farewell – We’re Good and Gone: The Great Black Migration. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Martin, P. (1991). International Migration: Challenges and Opportunities. Prepared for the 
International Money Found. 
Massey, D. S. (Sep. 1988). Economic Development and International Migration in Comparative 
Perspective. Population and Development Review, 14(3), 383-413. 
McFadden, D. (1984). Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Choice Models. (Z. Griliches, & 
M. Intriligator, Eds.) Handbook of Econometrics, Volume II, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
196 
 
McKenzie, D. (2005). Beyond Remittances: The Effects of Migration on Mexican Households. 
(C. Ozden, & M. Schiff, Eds.) International Migration, Remittances and the Brain 
Drain, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007). Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and 
Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 
84(1), 1-24. 
McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2011). Can Migration Reduce Educational Attainment? 
Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Population Economics, 24, 1331-1358. 
Mendola, M., & Carletto, G. (2009). International Migration and Gender Differentials in the 
Home Labor Market: Evidence from Albania. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 4900. 
Montiel-Olea, J. L., & Pflueger, C. (2013). A Robust Test for Weak Instruments. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, 31(3), 358-369, DOI: 10.1080/00401706.2013.806694. 
Moulton, B. (1986). Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates. Journal 
of Econometrics, 32(3), 385-397. 
Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor 
Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549-597. 
Murat, S., & Ersöz, H. (1997). Nüfus ve Demografi-I 1927-1990. İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir 
Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı Yayını No:56. 
Murhpy, A. (2007). Score Tests of Normality in Bivariate Probit Models. Economics Letters, 
95(3), 374-379. 
Nagar, A. (1959). The Bias and Moment Matrix of the General k-Class Estimators of the 
Parameters in Simultaneous Equations. Econometrica(27), 575-595. 
Öcal, N., & Yıldırım, J. (2010). Regional Effects of Terrorism on Economic Growth in Turkey. 
Journal of Peace Research, 47, 477-489. 
PKK'nın kanlı tarihi. (2016, April 25). A Haber. Retrieved June 30, 2018, from 
https://www.ahaber.com.tr/analiz/2016/04/25/pkknin-kanli-tarihi 
Powell, J. L., Stock, J., & Stoker, T. M. (1989). Semiparametric Estimation of Index 
Coefficients. Econometrica, 57(6), 1403-1430. 
Rodriguez, E. R., & Tiongson, E. R. (Autumn 2001). Temporary Migration Overseas and 
Household Labor Supply: Evidence from Urban Philippines. The International 
Migration Review, 35(3), 709-725. 
Sorensen, T., Fishback, P., Allen, S., & Kantor, S. (2007). Migration Creation, Diversion, and 
Retention: New Deal Grants and Migration: 1935-1940. NBER Working Paper Series 
No. 13491. 
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica, 65, 557-586. 
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regressions. In 
D. W. Andrews, & J. H. Stock (Eds.), Identification and Inference for Econometric 
Models (pp. 80-108). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tandoğan, A. (1990). Karadeniz Bölgesi ve Kıyı Kesimde Yer Alan İllerin Türkiye Nüfus 
Hareketleri İçersindeki Yeri. II. Tarih Boyunca Karadeniz Kongresi Bildirileri (pp. 438-
467). Samsun: OMÜ Eğitim Fak. Yay. 
197 
 
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation (2 ed.). Cambridge University 
Press. 
Van Dalen, H. P., Groenewold, G., & T. F. (2005 Nov.). Remittances and their effect on 
Emigration Intentions in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. Population Studies(Camb), 
59(3), 375-392. 
White, H. (1984). Asymptotic Theory for Econometricians. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Winters, P., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2001). Family and Community Networks in Mexico-
U.S. Migration. Journal of Human Resources, 36(1), 159-184. 
Woodruff, C., & Zenteno, R. (2001). Remittances and Microenterprises in Mexico. Working 
Paper, University of California, San Diego (UCSD) and ITESM-Guadalajara, 
December. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (1995). Score diagnostics for linear models estimated by two stage least 
squares. In G. S. Maddala, P. C. Phillips, & T. N. Srinivasan (Eds.), Advances in 
Econometrics and Quantitative Economics: Essays in Honor of Professor C. R. Rao 
(pp. 66-87). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Yamauchi, F., & Tanabe, S. (2008). Nonmarket Networks Among Migrants: Evidence from 
Metropolitan Bangkok, Thailand. Journal of Population Economics, 21(3), 649-664. 
Yang, D. (2008). International Migration, Remittances, and Household Investment: Evidence 
from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks. The Economic Journal, 118(5), 591-
630. 
Yang, D. (Summer 2011). Migrant Remittances. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 129-
152. 
Yang, D., & Choi, H. (2005). Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in 
the Philippines. Ford School of Public Policy Working Paper Series 2005-005, 
University of Michigan. 
Yıldırım, J., & Öcal, N. (2013). Analysing the Determinants of Terrorism in Turkey Using 
Geographically Weighted Regression. Defence and Peace Economics, 24(3), 195-209. 
Zahniser, S. (1999). Mexican Migration to the United States: The Role of Migration Networks 
and Human Capital Accumulation. New York, N.Y.: Garland Publishing Inc. 
Zavodny, M. (1999). Determinants of Recent Immigrants’ Locational Choices. International 
Migration Review, 33, 1014–1030. 
 
 
 
 
